The Ukrainian armyʼs counteroffensive began in early June 2023.
The Ukrainian command tried to keep the start date a secret. The fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were going on the offensive became clear to everyone on the night of June 6, when Russia blew up the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant (HPP) — most likely to prevent the Ukrainian army from crossing the Dnipro River.
The entire counteroffensive was to last only eight to ten days. In the first few days, the “shock” brigades were to break through the defenses south of Orikhiv and advance to Tokmak, and beyond that to Melitopol.
The second-echelon brigades were to enter this breakthrough and reach Berdyansk, cutting off the Russian army’s land corridor to Crimea. The brigades were to deliver a diversionary blow south of Velyki Novosilky. A few more brigades were to go on the offensive near Bakhmut.
«Babel'»
However, the initial breakthrough failed. In two months, the Ukrainian army was only able to advance as far as the village of Robotyne. In three months (by the end of August), it only slightly deepened its advance and ran into fortified defensive positions, behind which there were several more lines of defense.
Map based on data from the Finnish OSINT group Black Bird (compiled by Pasi Paroinen).
«Babel'»
After the offensive in this direction was exhausted, Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny decided to force the Dnipro River. In October 2023, the marines landed on the left bank of the river, in particular in the area of the village of Krynky.
In the first few weeks, the operation was successful, but later the initiative passed to the Russian side. However, the command did not stop it for nine months. The details of this operation are known from the analysis of "Ukrainian Truth".
The Ukrainian General Staff has never published an official analysis of the counteroffensive.
However, over the past three years, think tanks and Western media have published their analyses based on open and closed data. In addition, the counteroffensive was described in interviews by its participants.
How the partners, together with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, conceived and planned the counteroffensive and how it was carried out is known in general terms. (Although, of course, this picture is not detailed.)
Quality media analyzed the counterattack
The detailed analysis was published by the British think tank RUSI. Its authors interviewed fighters and commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. They also had at their disposal data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and spoke with Ukraineʼs international partners.
The New York Times published a large review article describing the counteroffensive from the perspective of the American high command. Its sources were the US Secretary of Defense, the commander of NATOʼs Joint Forces Europe, the commander of the 18th US Airborne Corps, and, on the Ukrainian side, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodsky.
The course of the counteroffensive by day, its problems, and the reasons for its failure were analyzed by experts Michael Coffman and Rob Lee (founders of the War on the Rocks media outlet). They were based on interviews with Ukrainian military personnel, open sources, and the work of the Finnish OSINT group Black Bird.
Separate episodes of the counteroffensive were described in interviews with Ukrainian media by the Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade of the Azov National Guard, Bohdan Krotevych, Senior Sergeant of the 47th Brigade of the Magura National Guard, Valery Markus, and the Commander of the Khortytsia Special Forces Unit, Oleksandr Syrsky.
Almost all analysts agree that there was no single key reason for the failure of the counteroffensive.
Rather, it was a chain of failures and mistakes that piled up one on top of the other. The first was the failure of the secrecy regime.
Three months before the counteroffensive, in early April 2023, the Pentagon leaked documents related to the Russian-Ukrainian war. One of the documents listed nine brigades that were to launch the counteroffensive. It also detailed the Western equipment that was being supplied to these brigades and included a start date of May 1.
From the source: plan for equipping and training 9 (out of 12) counteroffensive brigades. A clear version of this document can be easily found with a simple Google search.
The leaks did not end there. On May 8, a textual plan for the counteroffensive was published by British pro-Russian blogger Yakov Dreyzin. The next day, the same textual plan was published by Russian propagandist Boris Rozhin.
(Judging by some indications, this was a leak from the Russian General Staff.)
Finally, during the counteroffensive, on June 15, Russian media published its map — clearly developed by the American command.
A leaked map from June 15, 2023, at the end of the second week of the counteroffensive. It shows the breakthrough (1), main (2), and diversionary (A) strikes.
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Judging by these leaks, the Russian command knew in advance where and when the counteroffensive would begin. By the summer of 2023, it had managed to analyze the mistakes of the first year, changed the structure of the army (from battalion-tactical groups to brigades and divisions), mobilized, and doubled the number of soldiers, tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems.
In the area of the future Ukrainian offensive, the Russians built five fortified defense lines. In addition, Russian electronic warfare equipment learned to knock off the course of GMLRS missiles of the M270 and M142 systems (HIMARS).
The Ukrainian counteroffensive plan was based on a sound idea. However, the plan was not properly “calibrated” to all the limitations.
For example, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine knew that the Russian army would have air superiority. But it never came up with anything to counter it, and simply ignored this threat. The “shock” brigades lacked experience, they did not have enough time for training and coordination, and there was poor coordination between the brigades.
For example, on the maps of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, the Ukrainian defense line was indicated as Russian — so at the beginning of the counteroffensive, the brigade opened fire on its own (on the positions of the 12th Brigade of the “Azov” Naval Group).
On the maps of the 47th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the Russian defense line that it was breaking through was not marked at all.
Fighters of the 68th Jaeger Brigade in the newly liberated Blahodatne near MaxxPro armored vehicles. Units of the brigade participated in a diversionary strike south of Velyki Novosilky. June 10, 2023.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
In total, 12 new brigades were to participate in the counteroffensive, supported by older, more experienced brigades, including the Marine Corps, the Airborne Assault Forces, and the Territorial Army. The initial plan was for all 12 brigades (in several echelons) to fight in one — southern — direction.
However, some of the new brigades went to Bakhmut — the commander of the “Khortytsia” Special Operations Command Oleksandr Syrsky expected to retake the city by cutting its three main supply lines (Oleksandr Syrsky denies this). This also failed.
In the end, the counteroffensive plan turned out to be too optimistic. It did not take into account disruptions in weapons supplies, Russiaʼs air superiority, and the lack of time for training and coordination.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces command hoped to "kill" the morale of the Russians, cause a "local collapse" of the defense, and break deep (as was achieved during the Kharkiv offensive in 2022). These hopes turned out to be in vain.
In the counteroffensive, Ukraine made the same mistake that the Russians made at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The command hoped that the enemy, caught by surprise and demoralized, would become easy prey.
However, the surprise attack did not work out, and the enemy turned out to be not demoralized, but fully prepared, because he had analyzed and corrected the mistakes of the initial period of the war.