Letʼs start with the context. What was happening in the early 1990s? Why did the war break out in Abkhazia, which at that time had the status of an autonomous republic of Georgia?
It all started in 1989. At that time, Georgia included 3 autonomous republics: the so-called “South Ossetia”, the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, and the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. In Abkhazia, there was the "Aidgilara" movement, an Abkhazian so-called “national organization” that, when the Soviet Union began to crumble, began to advocate the national idea in Abkhazia. They put forward rather strange ideas, but it later turned out that they were largely fueled by Moscow.
At that time, the leadership of the Soviet Union and KGB clearly realized that the Union was disintegrating and Georgia would definitely leave it. On April 9, 1989, an anti-Soviet demonstration took place in Georgia, and Soviet troops used sapper shovels to disperse it. More than 20 people died.
After that, the leadership of KGB and the Central Committee of the Communist Party activated the separatist movement in Abkhazia and began to support one of the leaders — Vladislav Ardzinba.
The first clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians occurred in the summer of 1989. Several people died on both sides. The clashes were quickly extinguished, but relations between Georgians and Abkhazians were spoiled.
When Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his party "Round Table — Free Georgia" won the elections in Georgia, disobedience to the center began in Abkhazia. Tbilisi sought a compromise, the principle of "chess" distribution of personnel on national grounds appeared — if the Minister of Internal Affairs was Georgian, then the Prosecutor General was necessarily Abkhaz, for example.
For numerous mistakes, Gamsakhurdia was removed from power in the same 1991, and the country was headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, who had to quell the conflict in South Ossetia and the consequences of the civil war.
Finally, in 1992, when — by agreement with Ardzinba — Georgian troops were to enter Abkhazia to control the situation, they were fired upon at the entrance to Abkhazia. This was August 1992. It was from this moment that the war in Abkhazia began.
And you fought in it like an ordinary soldier...
Yes, I served in military unit 1014. I was 19 years old.
Bacho Korchilava (center) with his comrades during the war in Abkhazia, January 1, 1993.
skrypin.ua / Facebook
At this point, who was fighting for the Abkhazians?
In the first days, it was the so-called Abkhazian guard, which was trained by Russian military personnel at military bases in Abkhazia: in Esher, in Sukhumi and in Gudauta.
At the beginning of the conflict, Russia began to massively supply Abkhazian units with weapons. Although, after the collapse of USSR and the withdrawal of a small part of Russian units from the country, Moscow transferred a huge amount of weapons and ammunition to the Georgian troops.
In fact, at that moment, Russia, pretending that it had nothing to do with it, was very actively fueling this conflict. Like the Ossetian conflict a little earlier. And here we are talking about Russia not yet under Putin, but under the “democrat” Yeltsin.
As of 1993, when people started talking about a humanitarian disaster in Tkvarcheli and the need for humanitarian aid, what was the balance of power in Abkhazia?
Since the beginning of the war, Georgian troops have fought their way from the border with Abkhazia to the Gumista River, and in the city of Gagra, which is closer to the Russian border, our troops landed, and Gagra also came under Georgian control.
The Gudauta and Bzyb districts remained under the control of the Abkhazians. The city of Tkvarcheli was controlled by the Abkhazians, but it was completely surrounded by us. Then negotiations began with the Abkhazians to "resolve the situation through a political settlement".
Already during the negotiations, Georgia lost Gagra. Then a positional war began. The negotiations continued, and the Abkhazians in the Tkvarcheli group, which is based in the mountains, were weakening — they could not normally receive ammunition or other reinforcements.
«Babel'»
At this very moment, there are talks about a humanitarian convoy?
Yes. In late winter and early spring of 1993, the Russians began talking about the difficult humanitarian situation in Tkvarcheli and that the city needed help because people there were starving.
What information did Georgia have about the situation of pro-Russian troops in Tkvarcheli?
We had information that Russian helicopter pilots were delivering food there from Russia, they were flying along the ridge. We also understood that you can’t deliver a lot of ammunition by helicopter, especially over the terrain above the mountains, when the helicopter is flying at its maximum altitude.
Once, Abkhaz militants Vladimir Antsupov and Aslan Zantaria were flying in one of these helicopters with a dozen subordinates. It was taking off from the blockaded Tkvarcheli with civilians on board.
It’s hard to say how it happened, but that helicopter was shot down by Georgians. Then a new round of pressure from the Russians began — they started saying that people were dying of hunger in Tkvarcheli, and the Georgians were shooting down helicopters with provisions.
In that war, Russia always positioned itself as a mediator, promoting a peaceful settlement. They said that there was a humanitarian catastrophe in Tkvarcheli and a humanitarian corridor was needed. Both Russian diplomacy and Russian propaganda insisted on this.
They said, “Donʼt you want your people to starve, do you? They are actually your citizens!”
Ukraine had heard such talk about itself more than once. Then there were neither social networks nor the Internet. Therefore, many in the Georgian government began to feel guilty, and in the end they agreed to the cargo. Although we had no information that people were starving, our intelligence did not confirm this, and the Russians said that we did not have the information.
In fact, 3 weeks later, during the trilateral meeting “Georgia — Abkhaz separatists — Russia”, a decision was made that the Russians would deliver humanitarian aid.
One of the separatist leaders Vladimir Antsupov fled from the besieged Tkvarcheli, under cover of civilians. This helicopter was shot down, and the Russians used the incident to pressure Georgia to launch a humanitarian convoy.
Sputnik Abkhazia; abkhazworld
It is probably worth noting here that this situation is somewhat different from the one that developed in Oleshky: in our humanitarian corridor, Ukraine insisted that, for example, the Red Cross could come and take people away, because the civilians were really in terrible conditions. There was hunger there, and the Russians were simply killing civilians. Ukraine did not need a ceasefire to continue pressing the Russians there. So what were the conditions for the Russian convoy to pass through?
We made a mistake then. We didnʼt understand that since people there were starving and living in terrible conditions, as Russia described. The question should not have been about bringing food to Tkvarcheli, but about taking people out of there. Ukraine has now done the right thing by taking people out of Oleshky.
Then, in 1993, the newly appointed Major General Sergei Shoigu — the head of the Russian State Committee for Emergency Situations — was entrusted with managing the shipment of humanitarian cargo. The convoy was to be under the control of Russian troops. We only provided a safe corridor for the Russians, and the safe corridor on the other side was provided by the Abkhaz side.
Photo taken during the Russian “humanitarian” operation. On the far left is Giorgi Karkarashvili, commander of the brigade where Bacho Korchilava served. He later became the Minister of Defense of Georgia. Behind him is Sergei Shoigu, who led the “humanitarian” mission. In the middle is Geno Adamia, commander of the 24th Georgian brigade. He died in Sukhumi.
The humanitarian was transported on the large landing ship "Konstantin Olshansky".
Yes. It moored on the coast between Sukhumi and Ochamchira. We were there and saw from a distance everything that was being unloaded from this ship.
The first to get off the ship were Russian paratroopers and take up positions. There were “Urals” and KamAZs. There were products, but on several vehicles we clearly saw boxes with RPG-7 rounds (hand grenade launchers). There were also boxes with 5.45 and 7.62 caliber cartridges, and all of this was open, without any special camouflage.
We informed the command that this was ammunition and that they were being transported to Tkvarcheli under the guise of a convoy.
The large landing ship"Konstantin Olshansky" delivered a "humanitarian convoy" of Russians. In 1996, it was transferred to the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet.
Couldnʼt the Russians have said that they needed it just in case, for safe passage through the corridor?
The Russian military would not have been able to secure the humanitarian convoy if the Georgian side had not provided appropriate guarantees. This issue was agreed upon in advance at the political and military levels. The Russians did not have to ensure the security of the corridor.
If both sides provide you with a safe corridor, and it is clear that you have equipment, such as armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, then why do you need two dozen trucks with ammunition?
Letʼs go back to what you told the command about the ammunition. Was there a condition that Georgia could inspect the convoy before it left for Tkvarcheli?
No. We didnʼt understand these details, everything was on our word of honor, that there was only a humanitarian aid there. In addition, there was enormous pressure on the Georgian leadership: they say, people are dying there, and you donʼt want them to have food.
Thirdly, the action was not allowed to proceed. The military leaders said that there was an agreement and we were providing a corridor, because otherwise it could have led to a direct combat clash with the Russian military, and this could not have been allowed.
Russian sources say that Georgia demanded an inspection of the humanitarian convoy...
Yes, it tried, but there was no inspection. The Russians did not let [it]. They never let [anyone] inspect their cargo.
When a ship with a humanitarian convoy arrived, the Russians landed paratroopers along with heavy equipment — they controlled access to the cargo. This is what part of the humanitarian convoy on the way to Tkvarcheli looked like.
cyxymu.info
Was there any information about how much and what they brought there? Perhaps you learned about it later, already in your post during diplomatic work.
The estimates were made when I was still in the military. According to our calculations, this would be enough for the Abkhazians to last for several months. We did not have accurate information on how many armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles entered Tkvarcheli and how many left.
Itʼs because while negotiations were ongoing about the inspection by the convoy, some of the equipment remained on the ships. When the inspection was never agreed upon and the convoy set off, these vehicles left the ship at high speed and rushed with the convoy.
There were definitely at least a hundred of them. No one except the Russians knows the exact number, how many left and how many returned. Although, within a few days we felt that the enemyʼs firepower had increased significantly. This primarily concerned large-caliber machine guns and shells for cannons, since they had more ammunition and they began to use artillery and mortars more actively.
Even more significant reinforcements began when the landing took place, right after the arrival of the humanitarian convoy.
We are talking about the landing operation that pro-Abkhazian forces carried out a month after the humanitarian convoy...
About a month after this humanitarian convoy, the Tamishi landing operation began. The landing site was approximately the same as the humanitarian mission we just talked about.
I think the Russians had scouted the coast and the situation well, because it needed to know the depths and the relief.
So the Russians scouted the situation when they arrived with the convoy?
There is that too. The landing party that landed was very well prepared, they communicated mostly in Russian with each other. Now I can say that there were mostly Russians there.
They landed and demonstratively entered into battle with the Georgians, despite the fact that they could have quietly infiltrated, because it was the weakest fortified area.
Although, later we realized that this was their trick. They wanted us to think that we could easily defeat them, and to relax. So it happened, it seemed to us that we had coped without difficulty and defeated them, but in fact, they climbed the mountains in Tkvarcheli in small groups.
In total, more than one and a half thousand soldiers went there. This was their goal — to strengthen the Tkvarcheli group, because — as we now understand — a large operation to capture Sukhumi was already being prepared at that time.
The ammunition for the main strike was already waiting in Tkvarcheli. Although, then we couldnʼt even think about it, because on July 27 in Sochi, Russia became the guarantor of the ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia, under which Georgia withdrew heavy equipment from Sukhumi.
But the operation to capture Sukhumi only began in September. Is it possible to link the humanitarian convoy and the operation?
Yes. Because among those who came with the landing were instructors, and they were preparing the Tkvarcheli group for the battles for Sukhumi.
Well, just think about it. Tkvarcheli is essentially an enclave that was under siege for 13 months and had a problem with ammunition, and suddenly this ammunition appeared in huge quantities, and besides, Tkvarcheli became one of the striking fists of a large operation. At the same time, nothing except the Russian humanitarian convoy entered that enclave...
On September 14, 1993, the operation to capture Sukhumi began. The Tkvarcheli group cut the road between Sukhumi and Gali, cutting off the main Georgian troops from the rest of Georgia. That is, they cut off all logistics.
On September 27, the last fighter of the Georgian Armed Forces left Sukhumi. Troops and refugees fled from Sukhumi to the north, to the mountains, to Upper Svaneti.
In September, winter was already in full swing there, so people found themselves blocked in the mountains. It was then that the famous story of the Ukrainian helicopter pilots who rescued the Georgians happened.
Ukrainian soldiers rescued Georgians from the mountains and delivered humanitarian aid. Rescued Georgian refugees.
ukrmilitary; Getty Images / «Babel'»
Here I want to mention another tactic of the Russians that you are familiar with. I read it in a book published by one of the Russian pilots twenty years after the fall of Sukhumi. Despite the fighting, a transit corridor for passenger planes remained over Sukhumi. It was believed that there were no means that could shoot down a plane at an altitude of 10 000 meters.
Although, there are memories of this Russian pilot about how he flew under a civilian plane in order to remain unnoticed and strike at Sukhumi. Itʼs despite the fact that the then Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev said that there were no Russian planes over Abkhazia, that the Georgians themselves put Russian stars on their planes, then shoot them down and bomb their own cities.
After your service, you worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, then — as a journalist, and then — as a Georgian diplomat. While still a journalist, you worked in working groups with the Russians as an expert on humanitarian issues, and then continued this work as a diplomat. Did you ever discuss that “humanitarian” convoy with the Russians?
When I became a diplomat, I met many interesting and decent people, there were also some on the Russian side, but I won’t name their names, because some of them are still alive and active in that environment.
In informal conversations, they told us: “You understand that we will never reach an agreement. Our task is not to reach an agreement. Our task is to deceive you.”
By that time, we already understood this ourselves, and they saw that we understood this, and they probably wanted to seem somewhat normal to us.
They preferred not to talk about that "humanitarian convoy", but at the same time they did not deny that there were weapons in that convoy. They said: "All is fair in war."
During your work in these working groups, were there any cases where the Russians again tried to use humanitarian issues to strengthen certain positions?
Constantly.
The reason for talking about this humanitarian convoy was that, according to our military, the Russians used the humanitarian ceasefire to bring in ammunition and replenish the units stationed in Oleshky. Some say that this is quite logical — to take advantage of the ceasefire to improve their tactical position. In your opinion and from your military and diplomatic experience — is this really normal?
The humanitarian aspect is the humanitarian aspect.
The military may have a different logic, saying, while itʼs quiet, why not to move to a more convenient position? Maybe from a military point of view this is correct, but from an agreement point of view — no, it creates distrust.
This is what the Russian humanitarian convoy in Oleshky looked like in 2026.
We have a slightly different story with trust — there is simply none of it. For you, the Russians were a "third party", while for us they are an open enemy, not a mediator.
Yes, but there is a catch — after all, if we ever want to start negotiations, the first step in diplomacy is to strengthen confidence-building measures.
If you agree to a humanitarian operation, and your opponent instead begins to act in the point of delivering a crushing blow to you, then what kind of strengthening of confidence between the parties can there be in the future?
Georgia has been recovering from that “humanitarian aspect” for 20 years.
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