Is there a strategic breakthrough at the front? There is indeed good news, but it is too early to celebrate victory — we deal together with Vladyslav Urubkov (“Come Back Alive”)

Medium-range kamikaze drones are gradually appearing on the battlefield.

At first, they were operated by units of the Main Directorate of Intelligence (known as GUR) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) — they aimed mainly at air defense systems in Crimea. In 2025, the UAV brigades began to operate drones of this purpose — mainly at military bases, logistics hubs, and electrical substations.

Now, units of some corps are operating middle-strikes: “Khartiia”, “Azov", and 3rd Army Corps showed their videos of defeats.

It is known from open sources that in addition to these three corps, units of the assault troops, the 30th Marine Corps, and the 17th Ground Forces Corps operate kamikaze drones in the operational depth.

In total, the front line is divided between seventeen corps. These corps differ in their capabilities, some of them are better equipped and better able to recruit specialists who service UAVs.

It is clear that the advanced corps will also use medium-range drones more effectively. The Ministry of Defense has already allocated UAH 5 billion to the most effective units to purchase middle strike drones directly from manufacturers. In the second stage, the Ministry of Defense plans to hold open, centralized tenders for the supply of such drones to the army.

Systematic work with middle strike drones will complicate the enemyʼs logistics. He already has to extend the shoulder for convoys moving in the rear (from warehouses to the edge of the kill zone).

A longer logistical shoulder will complicate assaults. However, it is unlikely that medium-range drones will be able to turn the tide on the battlefield by themselves.

The fact that the offensive of the Russian Armed Forces has slowed down is clear from the statistics of territorial losses.

The Russians have repeatedly failed to storm large mechanized columns. Two months ago, in March 2026, units of three different corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine defeated Russian mechanized columns in three different directions.

However, the Russian army is not standing still: it will seek to counter middle strike drones. First of all, it will close the roads in the rear with nets. It is also possible that it will reorient its “anti-aircraft” units to work on medium-range drones.

Pictures of Russian military trucks with geometric coloring have already appeared. This is how the Russian military is trying to prevent AI-guided “Hornet” medium-range drones.

The Russian command is learning from its mistakes. It is trying to create reserves to rotate and block breakthroughs in the defense line — scaling successful brigades into divisions. The Russian command is also testing new tactics for using drone-assault groups of troops.

For example, in the summer of 2025, in the Kupyansk direction, it tried a coordinated drone assault in a 30-km strip: approximately 170 crews operated different types of drones at three different depths simultaneously (this tactic is called the “drone line” by the Russian Armed Forces).

If we expect to first stop the Russian offensive completely, and then seize the strategic initiative, medium-range drones alone will not be enough.

Ukraine — front and rear — will have to solve several systemic problems. The army must reform the training system (to simplify: increase the quality of programs and the number of instructors and equipment in training centers) and complete the corps reform (bring all linear brigades into corps bands, form “corps sets” and coordinate them). At the same time, the rear must reform the mobilization system.

The shortage of people still remains the main problem of the Defense Forces. This problem does not disappear from the fact that the corps begins to use middle strikes — people are needed for the positions of engineers and UAV pilots. The need for infantry remains, the need for crews for the NRC is growing. Their linear brigades are now being introduced for logistics and evacuation in the kill zone.

Mobilization itself is a complex problem. Now the responsibility for it is placed on the heads of territorial communities and heads of enterprises. Neither the first nor the second is profitable to “give away” people.

That is why mobilization stalls at the very first stage. In addition, there is a huge gap between how many people are called up and how many people reach combat positions.

The problems of the army will have to be sorted out by the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

On January 13, 2026, the parliament dismissed Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal. The next day, he was replaced by Mykhailo Fedorov, who previously headed the Ministry of Digital Affairs. Together with the General Staff, he is already planning to update the contract system.

To a large extent, the problems that the Ministry of Defense will have to solve are rooted in a lack of money. Centralized purchases of middle strike drones, modernization of training centers, salary increases, and reform of the mobilization system — all of them require greater budget expenditures.

The government will have to raise money for these expenditures through an unpopular tax reform.