The key problem with mobilization is the large gap between how many people are called up and how many of them reach combat positions.
Ukraine mobilizes almost 30 000 people every month, but at most a third — about 8-9 000 — end up on the front lines. The remaining two-thirds “fall as ballast on the Armed Forces”. Then the state spends (approximately) UAH 100 billion a year on them.
Many people who should not have been mobilized at all end up in training centers. Some are entitled to a deferral. Some are constantly treated instead of undergoing basic general military training. Then they arrive in brigades with the status of “fully fit”.
Brigades are forced to send such people to repeated MMC. The repeated MMC recognizes 15-50% of new arrivals as “limitedly fit”. After that, they either continue to be treated or serve in rear positions — in support units, electronic warfare and other auxiliary units.
As a result, the number of people in combat positions decreases, while in the rear it increases. On the front line, a brigade of 2 500-3 000 people may have only 50-150 fighters.
Ukraine has a post-Soviet mobilization model.
This means that it is local governments, local authorities, and large enterprises that should “supplie” their people to the army — keep records and ensure their attendance at TRC. In practice, this scheme does not work. The head of the community does not want to mobilize neighbours and lose his political future, and business does not want to lose workers.
Previously, this model still gave results. In 2014 and 2022, it worked because there was a prepared reserve: people with experience of conscription before the war or those who gained combat experience in the ATO/JFO in Donbas.
That is why in 2022 it was possible to fill the army with people quite quickly — both mobilization and a wave of volunteers worked. Before the counteroffensive of 2023, public recruiting campaigns of brigades and battalions appeared. Up to this point, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had practically not called for mobilization. The civilian leadership has not called for it yet.
The recorded reserve has run out. Therefore, the old system is no longer valid.
There is no single body responsible for mobilization.
By law, the Cabinet of Ministers should do this, but it has other priorities — for example, ensuring the operation of critical infrastructure. So the responsibility fell on the “executive component of mobilization”: the National Police, the Central Military Commission, military medical commissions, training centers, and the brigades themselves.
But all these bodies work separately from each other and have different goals. The National Police and the Central Military Commission are focused on numbers, they need to fulfill the draft plan. MMC have become a formality: doctors give everyone the “fully fit” rating, because any decision about “unfitness” immediately triggers checks and suspicions of corruption.
Order No. 402 of the Ministry of Defense in April 2024 lowered the fitness threshold: some of the diseases that previously gave restrictions on service are now considered the norm. As a result, there are more people in the army, but its real combat capability has hardly increased.
Training centers do not have the right to refuse to accept people sent by TRC.
Previously, the admissions committees of these centers could screen out those who were "definitely not suitable". Now, when a person arrives with the status of "fully suitable", the committee cannot challenge this, even if it sees obvious health problems, such as a hernia or missing fingers.
As a result, such people end up in the brigades anyway. There they are sent to a second medical examination, where they are often given a “limited fitness” rating. Formally, this means that the person’s health condition has deteriorated during service. Accordingly, the disease is considered acquired during service — and separate payments are provided for this.
The saddest thing is that the planned 30 000 mobilizers per month is a self-deception. The training centers cannot qualitatively train such a number of mobilizers because they lack instructors or equipment — say, to train tankers for the newly created heavy mechanized brigades, and such brigades should be in every corps. We are deceiving ourselves.