“They wiretapped my car.” Arsen Zhumadilov — about drones, meeting with Fedorov, problems with fiber optics and “our boys” from NABU. A long interview with the head of the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA)

We met exactly a year ago, at the height of the conflict around DPA. You said then that you could not refuse the offer to take this position. Over the past year, have you regretted not refusing?

It is easy to be wise after the event. Letʼs say, if I had known what would happen and in what form, I would have hesitated longer. But at that stage, with the introductions known at that time, it was the only right decision.

Are you ready to continue working now?

I have a contract until the beginning of March 2027. Thatʼs what Iʼm working on until then. Iʼm not ready to say now whether Iʼm ready to continue working if thereʼs an offer to stay, if thereʼs a competition.

Letʼs talk about the past year. There were several questions to the previous management regarding the results of the work. In particular, regarding overdue receivables and state budget funds that were not used. Five percent of the DPA budget in 2024 went to contracts for which there were no deliveries. What is your result?

Overdue receivables are now 3.1%. 92.4% of them consist of debts under contracts concluded until 2025. That is, out of 3.1% of overdue receivables from the financing volume of last year, 2.9% are contracts concluded under the previous management. Only 0.2% are contracts for 2025.

What about unused funds?

The funds are at the same level as last year in percentage terms — 0.6% of the general fund. The fact that such funds still exist is due to shortcomings in the current legislation, which we were unable to change last year, but perhaps we can now.

VOLUME OF PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO THE STATE BUDGET:

2024: UAH 426.8 billion (12% of the budget based on the results of the year)

2025: UAH 633.3 billion (13.5% of the budget according to the results of the year)

2026: UAH 585.2 billion (12.1% of the budget according to the results of the year)

*Data as of January 2026. The budget is expected to increase

The previous leadership was criticized for a large percentage of contracts with special importers. And you were the one who said that there is nothing wrong with special importers if they offer good prices and meet deadlines. I looked at your statistics for the year. Compared to 2024, the percentage of contracts with special importers has significantly decreased — by 9%, but the share of Ukrainian manufacturers has increased just as significantly, from 3% to 13%. Why?

The share of Ukrainian suppliers has increased significantly, as purchases of foreign-made multi-rotor reconnaissance drones have increased — we are talking about the Chinese DJI “Mavic”, “Matrice”, and “Autel”.

Let me clarify, this is about Ukrainian private companies that buy all this abroad and bring it to Ukraine.

Yes, because we cannot directly conclude contracts with a Chinese manufacturer. Accordingly, we conclude all these contracts based on the results of procedures on “Prozorro”.

Агенція оборонних закупівель

Агенція оборонних закупівель

1. RESULTS OF THE UAV AND EW PROGRAM: 84% — FPV; 72% — bombers; 86% — deep-strikes; 91% — interceptors; 99% — multirotor; 96% — EW.
2. DELIVERIES IN DYNAMICS OF YEARS: FPV (2 197 857; 341 644); multirotor/reconnaissance drones (98 716; 42 784); EW (33 151; 11 187); ground robotic complexes (13 428; 274).

If you compare the situation around DPA a year ago and now, there is a bit of deja vu. A year ago there was a war here. And now…

Why deja vu? Is a war also now?

Itʼs a quiet war now. You know that the new Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov has been criticizing the work of DPA from the very first day of his tenure. One of the key points is that the processes are too bureaucratic, contracts are concluded for a long time, and the front suffers because of this. What can you say about this? How much does it cost on average to conclude one contract?

Currently, our average is 20 days — from the opening of a commercial offer to the conclusion of a contract. During this time, a lot of work needs to be done, all coordination procedures must be completed, including with the Ministry of Defense.

Do we plan to reduce this figure this year? Yes, we do.

What can we compare the current figure with? I don’t know, because when I joined DPA, in fact, little was measured here in terms of internal organizational efficiency.

I also don’t know how other customers in the sector conclude contracts and fulfill them. I don’t know who to compare myself with. The only comparison I have is when last summer there was a meeting chaired by then Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, at which I was asked whether we were ready to administer electronic points so that orders for them would be delivered much faster.

Because at that stage, both the Prime Minister and the then Minister of Digital Transformation [Mykhailo Fedorov] were dissatisfied with how the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection (SCIP) purchases and supplies within the framework of the “ePoints” program.

That is, they accepted orders in the spring, which were delivered at the end of autumn.

At that time, we had already developed both in the regulatory sense and in the technical sense DOT-Chain Defence, which we were preparing not for electronic points, but for the centralized supply of drones at the expense of the Ministry of Defense. We said that we were ready to take it on ourselves.

As of today, if the product is in stock, it is delivered on average in 11 days, and if it is pre-ordered, it takes 30 calendar days.

Is this in DOT-Chain?

Yes, it is in the dot-chain, both for electronic points and for the funds of the Ministry of Defense. These two systems operate in the same electronic environment. And if we compare how we, as a defense customer, purchase in comparison with SCIP, then (probably) this comparison is in our favour.

Can we move forward with reducing some bureaucratic regulatory restrictions so that we can conclude contracts faster? Probably, yes.

But in general, the logic here needs to be changed, that when we need something on the front, we should already have a contract concluded and, based on the new need, we should place orders.

How to ensure that when the army needs something, it is already in stock, rather than having to order it for production? This is an eternal question that still remains unanswered.

This is a very valid question, there are two approaches. One approach, more democratic, is that we are not forcing anyone. The market itself must at some stage mature to the understanding that if you have a drone in stock, the probability that you will be ordered is higher than that of competitors who have to produce it.

This is our approach — to go not through coercion, but through market mechanisms, to encourage the market to produce on the shelf.

If we see that this market mechanism is not working, we can impose such an obligation on our counterparties, that they are obliged to keep a certain stock each time and be ready to ship it no later than one day after the order.

We can come to this, but there must be convincing arguments and a common position in the Ministry of Defense and in us as a state customer. Probably, at some stage we will really come to this. This is normal practice, to have appropriate obligations on the part of counterparties to keep a certain stock.

By the way, I spoke with one manufacturer who had claims regarding payment for the goods, but he said that of the 20 days available to conclude a contract, the lionʼs share of the time is spent on coordination with the Ministry of Defense.

Let me not comment on that, itʼs separate.

Letʼs ask one more question, which you probably donʼt want to comment on. Youʼve already mentioned that DOT-Chain essentially serves "ePoints". And the interface of this system is “Brave1 Market”. Why complicate it so much? The state had enough political will to merge DOT and DPA, but not two administrator panels. This looks like competition between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Digital. Now that Mykhailo Fedorov has become the Minister of Defense. Will they merge them?

Indeed, it so happened historically that in fact we have two marketplaces, one of which has a public module — itʼs “Brave1 Market” — and the other does not. And when the military orders drones for "ePoints" through the “Brave1 Market” interface, the orders fall into DOT-Chain.

When they order for guaranteed supply, they do it immediately in DOT-Chain, that is, one way or another it all collapses into DOT-Chain.

Will the Ministry of Defense decide that there should be a single interface? I donʼt know. [You] need to ask them.

We talked about it in the summer that the key to a marketplaceʼs efficient operation is large stocks in warehouses. Are there any statistics on how many orders are picked up immediately from warehouses?

Twenty percent of what is ordered on DOT-Chain is supplied from warehouses. Eighty percent is on pre-order. We want the first number to grow, and competition can contribute to this, but in some categories the competition is not so high.

Somewhere there is a strong player who, in fact, has a significant market share and an advantage over others and does not have much motivation to work on the shelf, because everything is already being raked in advance.

Actually, this is a question that is often asked by smaller manufacturers — that in certain categories, for various reasons and in various ways, virtual monopolists appear on the market. If we talk about large bombers, itʼs “Skyfall” — everyone wants to have “Vampire”. In fiber optics, “Vyriy Drone” has a large share.

I wouldnʼt say that we have monopolization in the sense that youʼre talking about. Monopolization is when one product or one manufacturer has more than 50% of the market. Not to mention other indicators.

In most categories, there is no such situation now.

I canʼt speak about exact data, but doesnʼt the “Vampire”, which became number one in terms of defeats, have more than half in the large bomber segment? The “Vyriy Drone” in fiber optics is also said to have over 50%.

Well, “Vyriy” had a large order at the end of last year according to the specification that the General Staff provides us and according to which we buy.

This is not DOT-Chain, there is no such advantage that you are talking about.

Some manufacturers work according to the Danish model or directly with money from Western partners. They are loaded there and are not very interested in going to DOT-Chain or tenders. Is this a problem for you?

The Danish model and other foreign financing options, which in some cases directly target certain manufacturers, do indeed distort market competition to some extent.

This year, we are working to ensure that the main financing mechanisms from foreign donors enter the DOT-Chain and do not distort competition. We have developed and presented all of these financial mechanisms.

Currently, we at the Ministry of Defense are working with our international partners to finance the purchase of drones through the DOT-Chain using these models.

So you want to redirect the parallel flow of money that goes directly from abroad to our manufacturers to DOT-Chain?

Thatʼs right. Because it really distorts this motivation somewhat. There are companies that are on the lists of those financed by foreign partners, there are those that are not.

For market participants, these are not always super obvious things. But all this applies specifically to drones, in other categories the situation is completely different.

Previously, many said that there were problems with timely contracting of interceptors. Now, that there are problems with fiber-optic drones, which are in great demand at the front.

If we talk about how we started with fiber optics and how we finished, in the first quarter of 2025 we were supplying a thousand drones on fiber optics per month. At the end of last year, only through centralized purchases to LFC warehouses, we were supplying an average of 51-52 000 drones per month.

That is, in principle, this market has accelerated. And it took some time for it to accelerate. Some manufacturers had problems with their own production process. They didn’t guess everything right away (for example, with the spool, with some other parameters).

Those who guessed correctly were unable to fully provide themselves with the appropriate components. Now I can’t say that those who produce fiber optics have no orders at all.

On the contrary, the military says there is high unmet demand.

Itʼs because in fact we bought out everything that is available via fiber optic on DOT-Chain and through centralized supplies.

I know that one large manufacturer of fiber-optic drones ordered fiber from a Chinese supplier at $4 per kilometer, and when it was time to pick up the goods, they were told that the new price was $17. Other manufacturers have the same problems. The price is from $12 to $18. This is due to the fact that the Russians are also betting on fiber, and in China we are not a priority. Obviously, all this will affect the price of drones. Are you preparing for this?

We have mechanisms built into current contracts to avoid increasing prices in such cases, but we understand the conditions in which producers have to work. We have proposed amendments to the legislation.

For contracts lasting more than six months, there should be a mechanism for revising the price within a certain percentage, taking into account the market situation. Of course, everything must be properly confirmed.

Last August, you held a tender for the supply of drones in “Prozorro”, but in a closed system, only manufacturers saw it. In this tender, “Vyriy” gave the lowest price for 16 lots, and then refused all but the cheapest. The official reason was that the delivery times were unrealistically short (although they were known about them). But the owner of the company Oleksiy Babenko said that they wanted to bring down the prices in the tender and show that drones can be cheap. Other manufacturers were very dissatisfied. How many lots from that tender were never completed?

According to the law, firstly, there is no option to limit the number of lots in one hand in a closed framework. Secondly, out of the 110 000 that were reported, we contracted 83 000 drones — all of them were delivered, including one contract with “Vyriy”, which they delivered on time. This was experience. It showed certain lessons that we took into account. For example, that in the end no one was satisfied.

The manufacturers, as always, had the impression that the tender was written for someone specific. And the teams do not have a request to receive something cheap, instead they have a request to receive exactly what they need — with a specific antenna, on a specific frequency. They want a specific manufacturer and a specific drone.

Manufacturers complained — and quite reasonably — that the tactical and technical characteristics (TTC) of the drones in this tender were poorly written. Who wrote them?

We worked on the performance characteristics with the structural units of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense. That is, it was a collective work in several iterations. We prescribed what exactly users would like to see in such drones: what frequencies, what battery power, what camera, what resolution, and so on.

In the end, the performance characteristics were prescribed, I would say, at the lower limit of what is in principle permissible for use on the front. They were not aimed at the top segment. The entry barrier was quite democratic in the sense that any or almost any manufacturer could meet these requirements.

Because of this, there was good competition in price, but it did not give the desired result.

Are you not planning to hold such tenders anymore?

Not yet.

We wrote yesterday (February 4) that Taras Chmut is to become a member of the supervisory board of DPA from the state. I understand that as we speak, his appointment will be officially reported. Chmut left the supervisory board in the midst of the conflict surrounding the previous leadership of DPA and was one of those who did not want to terminate the contract with Maryna Bezrukova. What are your relations with the supervisory board?

I have a working relationship with the supervisory board. This is an important component in terms of corporate governance. Sometimes there may be situations when, in theory, we are faced with a procurement that has more questions than answers — why this particular product, why this particular price, why this particular manufacturer.

And when there are a lot of such questions, but formally you seem to have all the documents to conclude a contract, the supervisory board asks questions and can block this or that procurement.

And then I can turn to the Ministry of Defense, to the General Staff with the fact that look, the position of the supervisory board is that we cannot move under this contract. Or we can move only on the condition that this product or this manufacturer conducts additional tests or inspections.

Now, as far as I know, the position of the supervisory board is the following — if the new minister suddenly wants to fire you, they will be against it, because there are no sufficient grounds for this. That is, you have good relations.

We have equal relations. I build neutral, non-personal relations with all ministers, both at my previous place of work, in the healthcare sector, and here.

Have you met the new minister in person?

Yes.

And what did you agree on?

We talked for quite a long time, I presented our results and plans, he listened carefully to everything, said that at the moment his focus is on building an organizational structure within the Ministry of Defense.

As you know, they are actively changing deputies there. And then he will look specifically at the areas: what we are doing, how we are doing it, and so on. We will talk about everything in detail when they appoint a deputy for military equipment procurement.

At the last meeting with journalists, you talked about launching the Register of Firearm Dealers. It seems to me that this registry is very similar to the list of licensed weapons suppliers that DPA has already created. What is its difference?

Nothing, it will simply be administered by the Ministry of Defense, which is more correct than when it is administered by us.

It should be available to all components of the Defense Forces, not just us. And suppliers will receive requests for commercial offers from that register, not from us.

I will not now discuss again the case of the purchase of bulletproof vests, which became known in the context of the “Mindich case”. There is a statement from the Public Anti-Corruption Council under the Ministry of Defense about possible abuses by the DOT officials. There is your position. It has not changed, are you sure that the NABU case will not have any consequences?

Iʼm sure. Iʼll tell you more, Iʼm sure that there is no case at all and there can be no case in NABU where detectives would have real questions either for me or for people with whom I have been working for a long time.

There is not a single manufacturer or individual who would say that I or my colleagues demanded something from him, received something, played along with someone, and so on.

Only last year I have several cases of wiretaps taken from my car. I think that they are probably still wiretaping there. Even if something happened — you understand — I am responsible for about half a trillion budget UAH today.

And how do you know about wiretapping?

Because it was physically removed. When I was driving my car to the service station, they found it there and asked what it was. I say that I don’t know, but now we will ask the law enforcement agencies what it is.

My colleagues called the relevant law enforcement agencies, and they even registered a criminal case. I understand perfectly well that they are wiretapping me, the only thing I was interested in was that it wasn’t some completely external points [elements].

And if itʼs NABU, then itʼs okay?

Yes, thatʼs our boys.