The Defense Procurement Agency, the Ministry of Defense and anti-corruption activists have been accusing each other of disrupting arms supplies. We tell this story first, with details public did not know about

Author:
Oksana Kovalenko
Editor:
Kateryna Kobernyk
Date:
The Defense Procurement Agency, the Ministry of Defense and anti-corruption activists have been accusing each other of disrupting arms supplies. We tell this story first, with details public did not know about

Suspended head of the DPA, Maryna Bezrukova, and the head of the Ministry of Defense, Rustem Umerov.

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Since January 25, 2025, the head of the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA), which is responsible for supplying weapons to the front, has changed five times. Three times, with different formulations, it was the head of the State Rear Operator (SRO), Arsen Zhumadilov, twice — Marina Bezrukova, who headed the DPA since February 2024. The changes in leaders are part of a major conflict between the DPA and the Ministry of Defense, to which the Agency is subordinate. Two more active participants in the conflict are the editor of the website "Our Money" Yuriy Nikolov and the NGO “Center for Countering Corruption”. Once its head, Vitaly Shabunin, welcomed the appointment of Rustem Umerov as Minister of Defense, later he and Nikolov advised Bezrukova to the Ministry of Defense, and now they are convincing Ukrainians and especially Western partners that Umerov did not cope and should leave. The high-profile scandal has damaged the reputation of the DPA, the Ministry of Defense, and Ukraine. The conflict involved the State Border Service, the head of the “Return Alive” foundation Taras Chmut, and the Office of the President. On February 2, the president commented on the scandal — he sided with the minister. Babel correspondent Oksana Kovalenko spoke with almost all the key participants in the conflict, received exclusive figures and testimonies, and tells a big story from all sides. Everything, as always, is not as simple as people in social networks say. And a significant part of important information is classified.

To produce this text, we spoke with

  1. The suspended head of the DPA Maryna Bezrukova.

  2. Currently, the acting head of the DPA, head of the State Rear Operator Arsen Zhumadilov.

  3. The Chairman of the Board of the Center for Countering Corruptopn Vitaly Shabunin.

  4. Head of the Internal Audit Department of the Ministry of Defense Oleksandr Tytkovsky.

  5. Former Deputy Defense Minister Andriy Shevchenko.

  6. Three members of the supervisory board of DPA — Kateryna Kuznetsova, Lukash Stolyarski, and Yuriy Dzhygir.

  7. Partner of Odgers Berndtson ("Talent Advisors") Oleksiy Komlichenko, who selected members of the supervisory board of DPA.

  8. Three high-ranking employees of the Ministry of Defense.

  9. Two members of the Public Council at the Ministry of Defense.

  10. A person well-versed in the arms market.

  11. Member of Parliament from Holos party Oleksandra Ustynova.

  12. Several people under conditions of complete anonymity.

How the agency came to be

The idea of creating a separate agency that would procure everything necessary for the Defense Forces of Ukraine was discussed by then-future Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy even before the full-scale invasion, in the fall of 2021. The idea was not new — it was borrowed from the experience of some Western countries, and most importantly, from NATO, which has the NATO Support and Procurement Agency.

The main goal was to separate commerce from policies, standards, and control — the traditional functions of the Ministry of Defense. Over time, the concept was transformed — it was decided to create two agencies: one was to deal with weapons, the other with food, clothing, body armor, fuel, etc. The logic was simple: weapons procurement is a specific, often classified area, everything else is not. So there are different approaches and control mechanisms.

The structures were launched in order of importance: the Defense Procurement Agency — June 17, 2022, the agency for rear procurement — November 4 of the same year. In August 2023, it was headed by Arsen Zhumadilov, and in December it changed its name to the State Rear Operator. Volodymyr Pikuzo headed the DPA in August 2022.

How does DPA work?

  1. The General Staff forms needs of the frontline, based on the budget allocated for the DPA, and transfers them to the Agency.

  2. The agency searches for ready-made weapons in warehouses, negotiates with manufacturers, or works with intermediaries — for example, special importers.

  3. Under some contracts, DPA pays advances from 10% to 80%. The amount of the advance depends on whether the goods are in stock or need to be produced (in such cases, the advances are larger). After delivery, the Agency pays the rest of the money. DPA doesnʼt work with 100% prepayment.

  4. If the supplier violates the delivery terms, it is charged fines. For the DPA, these delays are counted as receivables under contracts. This is considered a miscalculation by the Agency.

There was one sensitive topic at the start — the supervisory boards of the agencies. There were no questions about the SRA — the supervisory board was planned there from the start, but not in the DPA. The supervisory board was supposed to coordinate all the Agencyʼs large contracts, the Ministry said that in war conditions it was dangerous — there could be delays, internal debates, and weapons had to be purchased quickly.

In September 2023, after a series of corruption scandals, Reznikov resigned. Pikuzo lasted only a few months longer — until January 2024. There were many questions for him. On September 6, 2023, the Ministry of Defense was headed by the former head of the State Property Fund, Rustem Umerov. Anti-corruption activists called his appointment a step forward.

How Maryna Bezrukova appeared in the DPA

In 2024, Ukraine, at the request of NATO, was to carry out a defense procurement reform. The new minister, together with the relevant deputy for procurement Dmytro Klimenkov, were looking for a new head of the DPA. After a series of high-profile scandals related to the Ministry of Defense, they also turned to public anti-corruption fighters — Vitaly Shabunin from the NGO “Center for Countering Corruption” and Yuriy Nikolov, editor of “Nashi Groshi” (”Our Money”) investigative media. At first, they advised Nadiya Bihun — but she refused.

“I turned to experts, and many recommended Maryna Bezrukova, who was effective in Ukrenergo’s procurement,” Shabunin tells Babel. “I didn’t know her personally, but I submitted her candidacy and warned her: if the Ministry has any hidden plans, it’s better not to appoint her.” Umerov apparently decided that there were none, and for several more months, together with Klimenkov, they asked Bezrukova to agree to their proposal. In February 2024, she became the head of the DPA.

On other personnel issues, the Center for Countering Corruption and Umerov disagreed. At the minister’s request, Shabunin’s team proposed a list of candidates for positions related to international cooperation. Umerov did not approve anyone from that list. The CCC submitted another list, which included the name of the CCC’s executive director, Darya Kaleniuk. The minister also rejected her. At some point, he promised to appoint former NABU head Artem Sytnyk as his deputy, but this did not happen either.

The Center proposed its co-founder, Darya Kaleniuk, to the position of Umerovʼs deputy, but he did not accept her.

The CCC claims that some interviews with candidates were conducted by Diana Davityan, an advisor to the Ministerʼs Patronage Service, who was not supposed to do this. Davityan denied this in a comment to Babel. For her part, the Ministry of Defense emphasizes that the CCC has a conflict of interest: Kaleniuk applied for the position of deputy minister and did not receive it, therefore she cannot be impartial on this topic. The CCC calls these accusations manipulations.

Bezrukova and the Ministry of Defense are quarreling over mines

At the end of 2023, US Republican congressmen blocked $60 billion in aid for Ukraine. A month later, the president’s headquarters decided to prioritize purchasing weapons from domestic manufacturers: this would minimize dependence on foreign markets, provide jobs, and keep money in the economy. But there was one problem — few companies in Ukraine could produce the 120 mm and 122 mm artillery ammunition needed on the front in large quantities.

The newly appointed Ministry offered Bezrukova a contract for the supply of these ammunition with a Ukrainian factory, which we will not name for security reasons. They expected an advance payment from the DPA, but Bezrukova hesitated and wanted to diversify the risks by ordering some of the ammunition abroad. “My task is to provide the military with the necessary shells, and not to develop Ukrainian industry — that is the task of the Ministry of Strategic Industries,” Bezrukova explains her logic.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense was pushing her with arguments in favor of the deal. For example, the military representative office at the plant, subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, initially concluded that the manufacturer would not be able to fulfill the contract, but quickly changed its mind. “It happened in three days. The same military representative office, the same person gave a positive conclusion,” recalls Bezrukova. On the other hand, Umerov’s deputy Dmytro Klimenkov persuaded her — he guaranteed that the plant would cope with the task, and he would keep the order under personal control. The Ministry of Defense was pressured by the demand of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Bezrukova agreed, signed a contract, paid a large advance, and in the summer of 2024 the plant admitted that it would not have time to deliver 122-mm ammunition. Klimenkov asked Bezrukova to extend the delivery time — she refused. “At that moment, my relationship with him deteriorated,” recalls Bezrukova. The plant did not fulfill the order and returned the money to DPA.

In the fall of 2024, another plant-related scandal erupted. Under a contract with DPA, it supplied 120-mm mines. Later, journalists found out that the mines did not work — they immediately fell to the ground or could not fly out of the mortar. Several problems were found in the ammunition, in particular with the fuse and raw gunpowder — 24 thousand mines had to be replaced.

The military published a video of the operation of defective 120-mm mines in the fall of 2024.

According to Babel, as of January 2024, out of 20 billion hryvnias of overdue deliveries under DPA contracts, a quarter are the debts of this one Ukrainian plant.

Umerov is trying to remove Bezrukova

In the summer, NATO experts completed an audit of Ukrainian defense procurement, which Reznikov’s deputy Andriy Shevchenko agreed with them in 2023. Among other things, the auditors advised to promptly appoint independent supervisory boards for both agencies. The Center for Countering Corruption also put pressure on the Ministry on this issue. On the other hand, by the fall of 2024, Umerov regretted having called Bezrukova to the DPA. The Ministry of Defense conducted an audit of the Agency’s work for the first half of the year, and the minister did not like its results. Personal relations with Bezrukova also did not work out. Umerov decided to replace her.

According to several interlocutors of Babel, in early autumn a meeting was held at the Ministry of Defense with the participation of Rustem Umerov, Bezrukovaʼs deputy Artem Sytnyk, member of parliament from Holos Oleksandra Ustinova, and representatives of the Center for Countering Corruption — Darya Kalenyuk and Vitaliy Shabunin. At this meeting, Umerov proposed appointing Ustinova as the new head of the Agency, Sytnyk as her deputy, and at the same time creating a supervisory board of the Agency.

The candidacy of Ustinova, Umerovʼs former colleague in the Holos parliamentary faction, was not accidental. It was she who recommended him for the position of minister to the head of the Presidentʼs Office, Andriy Yermak. In addition, in 2022, Ustinova gave birth to a daughter in the United States and has been spending a lot of time there since then. In the States, she has many political connections, access to the heads of Congressional committees, and contacts in the Pentagon.

Republican Senator Lindsey Graham welcomes a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to the Capitol on June 15, 2022. The delegation included a prominent member of the “Servant of the People” faction David Arakhamia and Holos deputies Rustem Umerov and Oleksandra Ustinova.

Getty Images / «Babel'»

Artem Sytnyk also did not end up at the ministerʼs closed meeting by chance. Rumors reached the Ministry that the deputy head of the DPA was not satisfied with his boss. Sytnykʼs former investigator duties included checking the Agencyʼs contracts. And as two of Babelʼs interlocutors say, at some point he had suspicions that Bezrukova was incompetent or was "messing up" contracts. Because of this, in private conversations he said that she should be fired or even imprisoned. Another Babel interlocutor, close to the DPA and familiar with the situation, says that there was indeed mistrust, but at some point Sytnyk and Bezrukova talked and cleared up the main issues. "If Sytnyk had sided with Umerov then, everything would have been resolved long ago," the interlocutor says.

The meeting ended in nothing. Sytnyk proposed to first appoint a supervisory board, and only then talk about a new leader. Shabunin and Kalenyuk demanded to appoint a supervisory board and stood up for DPA. Umerov backed down. He had a backup plan — to merge SRO and DPA under the leadership of Arsen Zhumadilov.

The Ministry decided to substantiate this idea by referring to NATO recommendations. Such recommendations do exist, but they state that the agencies should be merged after martial law is over.

Deputy Minister Klimenkov proposed Zhumadilov to head the joint agency. He explained that the SRO has better established work processes than the DPA, and there are no questions about the professionalism and integrity of its people.

Arsen Zhumadilov and Dmytro Klimenkov at the presentation of the restart of the State Rear Operator.

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Zhumadilov agreed to the offer, but on two conditions: they would not impose a command on him, and most importantly, the agencies would be merged gradually, not simply by liquidation of the DPA. "We drew up technical, managerial, and communication tracks and were ready to start implementing this decision, but it was never adopted," Zhumadilov tells Babel.

Bezrukova first learned about the Ministryʼs plans from Western diplomats. And on September 23, 2024, Umerov and Klimenkov spoke with her personally and offered to join the supervisory board of DPA. She did not like the idea.

Almost instantly, as always, information about the conversation reached the Center for Countering Corruption — its leadership asked the minister for a meeting. He agreed, a narrow circle gathered — Umerov, Shabunin, Klimenkov, Zhumadilov and Bezrukova. The dialogue did not work out. Klimenkov said that the unification of agencies was a NATO requirement. Shabunin — that in fact NATO requires the creation of supervisory boards of the DPA and SRO as soon as possible.

According to Babel, after the meeting, the CCC sent letters to Western embassies and spoke about an attempt to merge the agencies contrary to NATO recommendations. On October 1, Umerov announced that there would be no merger and that he would create supervisory boards for both agencies. On the same day, the NATO mission in Ukraine officially explained that the agencies should be merged after the end of the war.

What problems did the audit of the Ministry of Defense reveal about the DPA?

In October, the Internal Audit Department of the Ministry of Defense completed an audit of the work of the DPA for the first half of 2024. Its final results were shown to Umerov. The documents are classified, but the head of the department, Oleksandr Tytkovsky, in an exclusive comment to Babel, named the key problems of the agency that the audit revealed.

Under the contracts DPA concluded in the first half of the year for first-priority goods, 70% were to be delivered in 2024. The remaining 30% were planned to be delivered in 2025-2026. The Ministry of Defense says that as of the end of 2024, there were delays in the planned 70%.

Poor organization of basic processes. There is no common database of potential suppliers and manufacturers of weapons around the world for each nomenclature. Their capabilities are not systematically assessed. The DPA says that they have such a database and showed it to auditors. However, due to the fact that the information is classified, there is no special software — everything is kept in an Excel spreadsheet.

Serhiy Rakhmanin, a member of the parliamentary defense committee, believes that the DPA failed to deliver weapons to the front. He refers to data received from the Agency.

Unsatisfactory work with commercial proposals. They come in different ways, there is no unified accounting and processing system. Almost all interlocutors who are related to this topic told Babel that commercial proposals are constantly lost in the jungle of DPA.

There is no systematic assessment of risky suppliers and risk identifiers that reduce the percentage of unfulfilled and overdue contracts. The auditors also did not see the risk assessment of the Ukrainian factory that disrupted the supply of ammunition.

Lack of algorithms and uniform instructions for selecting suppliers and preparing contracts.

Low percentage of direct contracts. In the first six months of 2024, 45% of the total value of contracts fell on importing enterprises. And 24% of the value of all contracts DPA concluded with one importer, who “had certain problematic issues in relations with the Ministry of Defense.” According to Babel, in the second half of the year, the number of direct contracts in DPA increased significantly, including with well-known foreign manufacturers. And the Agency concluded a large share of contracts with special importers in 2023, before Bezrukova arrived.

Purchase of goods that are too expensive for the Agencyʼs work using budget funds.

Based on the audit results, the Ministry provided the Agency with its recommendations, and now, says Oleksandr Tytkovsky, they plan to check whether the Agency has taken them into account. According to the contract, the head of the Agency is required to do this.

Outside of the audit, the key complaint of the Ministry of Defense to the DPA is that getting contracts signed takes a long time, and deliveries are delayed. According to the Ministry of Defense, slightly less than a third of the money (29%) allocated to the DPA in 2024 went to new contracts under which weapons were delivered in the same year; 21% of all money went to close contracts for 2023; 44% — contracts under which deliveries will be made in 2025; 5% — are overdue contracts under which there are no deliveries; 1% of the funds were not used and returned to the budget.

What the story of the 23 billion given to border guards really looked like

November 2024. At the General Staff, the president traditionally discusses the needs for weapons. The State Border Service (SBS), which, on a par with the DPA, can directly purchase weapons, received a favorable offer and can cover part of its annual needs for ammunition. But there is a problem — funds need to be found. The Prime Minister promises to help and helps: the DPA finds money. According to the Ministry of Defense, by the end of the year, 102 billion hryvnias will accumulate in its accounts, which will not have time to be used. And 23 billion of this amount is given to the border guards for ammunition. This is not the first time this has happened. In May 2024, the DPA transferred 5.8 billion hryvnias to the SBS for the purchase of mines — the Agency did not have time to deliver them on time.

The Agency did not like the governmentʼs calculations. According to Bezrukova, at that time the Agency had already signed contracts for over 50 billion hryvnias, another 23-25 billion were planned for advances, the rest of the money was blocked for payment for the delivered goods. It had no extra money for border guards or anyone else.

The story got into the media in a completely different form. The editor of the website “Nashi Groshi” Yuriy Nikolov made dozens of posts and videos about how the Ministry “drained” money to the border guards, who “squeezed money,” and the swindlers Umerov and the head of the State Traffic Safety Inspectorate Serhiy Deineko were preparing to take them. Nikolov argued that the border guards bought ammunition more expensively than the DPA could have done. And the supplier was chosen as a dubious Polish company PHU Lechmar, not a manufacturer, but simply a “cover” with a dubious reputation and a modest office.

“Lechmar is not some kind of gasket, but a fairly well-known intermediary,” a person who works in the international arms market explains to Babel on condition of anonymity. According to him, journalists and activists who are now publicly commenting on the arms trade lack an understanding of the specifics of this topic. For example, as evidence of Lechmar’s unreliability, they cite its contract with DPA for the end of 2023. Then the company did not fulfill the contract. “You need to understand that DPA did not pay Lechmar anything in advance, and they gave the shells to those who gave the money,” says the interlocutor. “This is how this market works. It is right to play it safe, look for better conditions and not give advances, but then there are high risks that you will not receive the goods. In each specific case, you need to weigh what is now the priority — the lowest risks and prices or weapons on the front line on time.”

On January 23, 2025, Lechmar reported that the military cargo under the contract with the State Border Service had already been inspected by a military commission and was being prepared for shipment to Ukraine. In addition, Lechmar, according to its representative, supplied the Defense Forces of Ukraine with self-propelled howitzers, which are in short supply worldwide. They arrived at the State Border Service a month after the prepayment.

No one has ever made any specific accusations of corruption against the State Border Service, but the scandal has damaged the reputation of the border guards and further inflamed the conflict between the State Border Service and the Ministry.

“The problem is that Bezrukova has a purely managerial position, and in order to protect herself, she engages in politics — she brings conflicts into the public sphere, relies on the support of activists and journalists,” says Babel’s interlocutor, who has communicated with both Umerov and Bezrukova in recent months, and is equidistant from both. “The minister, on the contrary, has a political position, and he keeps himself in the shadows, although in reality he really likes to control everything and everyone. The conflict between them was inevitable.”

Why is it so difficult with supervisory boards?

The Supervisory Board of the Defense Procurement Agency began to be formed in March 2024. Oleksiy Komlichenko, a partner at Odgers Berndston (“Talent Advisors”), which was looking for candidates, recalls that in early June they held interviews and the process stopped there — the Ministry dragged out announcing the winners. The Center for Countering Corruption was nervous and threatened to put Talent Advisors “on the blacklist of all donors” if they didn’t do something about it.

On October 11, 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers, at the suggestion of Umerov, approved the composition of both supervisory boards, each with five people. The DPA has three independent members: Patrick Auroy, Kateryna Kuznetsova, and Lukash Stolyarski. And two — Yuriy Dzhigyr and Taras Chmut — are representatives of the state. They were appointed by Umerov. They could vote at their discretion, but “taking into account the position of the Ministry of Defense.” This incomprehensible wording hides a future conflict.

The supervisory board of the DPA did not have time to convene its first meeting, as the day before, on December 16, the Ministry of Defense, without the consent of the DPA and the SRO, changed the charters of the agencies: the Ministry granted itself the right “in the event of a threat to national security” to change the heads of the agencies alone, without the consent of the supervisory boards. The Center for Countering Corruption reacted instantly and announced an attempt to deprive the agency of its independence. The Ministry replied that during the war the supervisory board would not always be able to meet at a critical moment, it was a safety precaution.

Another war of arguments began. Meanwhile, the supervisory board of the Public Health Service had to decide on an important issue — whether to extend the contract with Bezrukova, which expired on January 31, 2025. On December 2, Umerov informed the supervisory board that he was against it. After that, Dzhigir recalls, he and his colleagues tried to agree on a position on this issue with the Ministry: they wrote letters, draft decisions — the Ministry did not respond.

"Then we were invited to a meeting with the minister to discuss options. The minister said: I expect dismissal and a competition. In fact, we were brought together right for this," says Dzhigir.

In December 2024, DPA received an award in two nominations at the Prozorro Awards 2024 — “Best Competition” and “Pioneer of the Year”.
The award was received by Maryna Bezrukova.

In December 2024, DPA received an award in two nominations at the Prozorro Awards 2024 — “Best Competition” and “Pioneer of the Year”. The award was received by Maryna Bezrukova.

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The supervisory board had a different plan — they did not want to dismiss Bezrukova, it could compromise the newly created body. In addition, according to Dzhigir, the board members were afraid that if they followed the ministerʼs order now, tomorrow they would be told which contracts to approve and which not. In 2024, the supervisory board was supposed to approve contracts worth more than a billion hryvnias, that is, practically every one. In 2025, the threshold was raised to 16 billion hryvnias.

After several more meetings of the supervisory board members with Umerov, the situation did not change. The minister demanded Bezrukovaʼs dismissal, the supervisory board wanted to keep her and conduct an independent audit of the DPA. This idea was proposed by Lukasz Stolyarski, who had experience working in NATOʼs NSPA — the DPA role model.

“We had a word against a word. And both parties are responsible here. However, if the audit result is negative, we will immediately terminate the contract with the director. But if not, we will remove all ministerial objections,” Stolyarski tells Babel. The Ministry noted to Babel that independent auditors will not be able to analyze DPA contracts, because this is classified information. And even if a solution were found, the audit would take a lot of time, and DPA would continue to fail procurements.

On January 22, the Ministry of Defense sent a letter to the Supervisory Board, in which it did not approve its draft decision regarding Bezrukova and noted that it had the full right to do so, according to the statute. Nevertheless, on January 23, the Supervisory Board voted: Chmut and Dzhigir — for the extension of the contract with Bezrukova, Stolyarsky and Kuznetsova — against it. Auroy did not vote — he did not attend any meeting of the Supervisory Board. Before the vote, Kuznetsova proposed to recognize that the Ministry of Defense, according to the statute, does not approve the extension of Bezrukova’s contract, and to once again ask the Ministry for time to figure it out, launch an audit, and objectively assess Bezrukova’s activities. Both independent members said in comments to Babel that they did not want to act contrary to the current statute of the Supervisory Board.

Umerovʼs former deputy Yuriy Dzhigir supported Bezrukova. His vote, as chairman of the supervisory board, was decisive.

Since the fifth member, Patrick Auroy, resigned on January 20, the votes were split in half, and Chairman Dzhigirʼs vote was decisive. Supervisory board extended Bezrukovaʼs contract.

The next day, Umerov announced that the weapons purchases had failed, so he fired his deputy Dmytro Klimenkov, refused to extend the contract with Maryna Bezrukova, and recalled two members of the supervisory board — Taras Chmut and Yuriy Dzhygyr, who had ignored the recommendations of the Ministry of Defense. Dzhygyr believes that he and Chmut had every right to do this, since the only thing that distinguished them from independent members was the selection procedure, and they could vote freely.

“I was appointed there and paid a pretty good salary so that I could apply my professional experience, and not have my strings pulled,” says Dzhygyr.

On January 25, the Center for Countering Corruption filed a complaint with the NABU regarding possible abuse of power by Umerov, who fired Bezrukova contrary to the supervisory authorityʼs decision. NABU has launched an investigation.

Whatʼs happening now?

On February 1, the head of the SRO Arsen Zhumadilov became the temporary acting head of the DPA (read the blitz interview with him soon). Maryna Bezrukova was suspended and an internal investigation was launched due to anti-tank mines, which she planned to purchase at, in the opinion of the Ministry of Defense, inflated prices.

Since February 1, the information about the head and signatory of the DOA has changed in the registers five times. Zhumadilov replaced Bezrukova, and so on in a circle. Now Zhumadilov is the temporary acting head, signs documents and is confident that he will cope with the new job, if he gets it — he has already launched procurement in the medical sector, and later — in the SRO.

Timeline of changes in DPA heads

  1. Head Arsen Zhumadilov.

  2. Zhumadilov is acting temporarily during Bezrukovaʼs suspension.

  3. Bezrukovaʼs head again.

  4. Bezrukova is the head with a note about suspension for the duration of the internal investigation. The signatory with the right to conclude contracts is Zhumadilov.

  5. The interim acting head is Arsen Zhumadilov, as well as signatory.

However, the current interim administration is a temporary solution. The Ministry insists that since the supervisory board has only two members left, it is incompetent, and therefore the management of the DPA is in the hands of the Ministry of Defense.

The CCC insists that Umerov acted illegally and that the supervisory board is authorized until February 3, because formally there are still three independent members, including Patrick Auroy. His authority was supposed to end only two weeks after he left the supervisory board — that was on January 20.

"Yesterday I was asked, who is the head of the DPA? I replied that I donʼt know, I need to look on the Internet, because I donʼt understand what is happening. I will think about whether it is possible to translate the solution of the situation into a legal plane, but none of my actions will harm the Armed Forces of Ukraine," Bezrukova comments.

The situation has reached a dead end. The Public Anti-Corruption Council of the Ministry of Defense has proposed a way out. Its advice: it is necessary to immediately bring the statutes of the supervisory boards into line with the legislation, the Ministry of Defense should submit candidacies of state representatives to the supervisory board as soon as possible, and the supervisory board should launch an independent audit, appoint the acting head of the Agency and start a competition to select the next head.

“Personally, I think this whole situation has become very emotional and has gone beyond the bounds of professional prudence. And I feel sorry for the soldiers in the trenches, whose safety and effectiveness may be compromised,” concludes Łukasz Stolarski, who has been following this story from the front row in recent months.

At the time of publication of the text, the acting head of the DPA was Arsen Zhumadilov.

Валентина Поліщук / «Бабель»

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