Russia prepared much more for what to do after the occupation of Ukraine than for how to achieve it. In particular, after the invasion, the Russians planned to divide all Ukrainians into five groups — from active collaborators to "leaders of Ukrainian nationalism," on whom they wanted to hold show trials.
This is stated in the report of the British Royal Institute of Defense Studies.
The Russians had a similar approach to creating an occupation administration. First, they pulled all possible databases to get complete information about the region and its population. This was information from hospitals, educational institutions, residential and operating offices (ROO), tax authorities, police, election commissions and local authorities, insurance companies and public organizations. Based on this, the Russians created a map of who lives where and with whom, and whether they can somehow support the Ukrainian government.
After that, the occupiers divided the population of the occupied territories into five groups:
- "leaders of Ukrainian nationalism" who were supposed to be destroyed or, after capturing, hold show trials. But Russia was not able to capture large cities like Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and others, where mostly such people live;
- those who could support the Ukrainian resistance. First of all, this concerned the employees of Ukrainian law enforcement structures, local authorities and the military, who did not immediately agree to become collaborators. They were planned to either be recruited or oppressed;
- apathetic citizens;
- active collaborators;
- people on whom the normal operation of critical infrastructure depended. They had to be controlled.
In each village and city, the occupiers chose a building in which to organize the power headquarters. Usually it was a police station or emergency department. There, the Russian military equipped, in particular, rooms for interrogations and torture. In all occupied territories, these rooms were equipped in the same way — even the devices for electric current torture were the same. This proves that the Russians prepared for torture systematically and in advance.
Having occupied separate Ukrainian territories, FSB representatives held talks with all heads of local state organizations and authorities. They were offered a choice: cooperation with the occupation administration and denunciations of pro-Ukrainian colleagues or dismissal. Often, if the previous manager refused to cooperate, a new one was sought primarily from among the employees of the same institution. If collaborators could not be found, the institution was headed by a Russian citizen. As for utilities, it was an employee of the FSB department responsible for the operation of critical infrastructure.
The FSB believed that for effective control of the occupied territories, it is not necessary for the occupation regime to be supported by the majority or even a significant share of the population. The experience of the Second Chechen War showed that supporters of the new government can be only 8% of the population of the region, and if they are used as a tool to control the rest, this will be enough. As the assessment of the Ukrainian special services shows, the calculation of the Russians generally came true. With such low support, control can only be established through violence, which is what the Russians did.