He sold shells to Ukraine, and survived two poisonings. The story of Emilian Gebrev, whose warehouses in Bulgaria are burning again

A Man of “Soviet Caliber”

Emilian Gebrev was born in Sofia on June 8, 1954. He entered the arms business during the socialist era. In 1979, after graduating from the Karl Marx Institute of Economics, he joined “Kintex” (a Bulgarian arms trading company).

In 1992, he founded EMCO. The company started with the trade and repair of ammunition, and later Gebrev launched his own production. The main enterprises are located near the cities of Tryavna and Montana, and warehouses are scattered throughout Bulgaria. In 2022, Gebrev became an honorary citizen of Tryavna for preserving production and jobs.

Gebrev’s main asset is Bulgarian defense technology from the Warsaw Pact era. EMCO produces, repairs, and modernizes Soviet-caliber artillery and tank ammunition from 100 to 152 millimeters.

In 2023, The Financial Times reported that Gebrev’s factories produce a significant portion of Bulgarian bullets and tank shells that go to Ukraine. EMCO does not disclose current volumes and supply routes.

Cooperation with Ukraine began in 2014, when there were only two companies in the EU specializing in modern ammunition for Soviet large-caliber systems — from 120 to 152 millimeters.

According to Bellingcat, one of these manufacturers was actually controlled by the Russians. Moreover, Russian military intelligence then offered all traders inflated prices so that ammunition compatible with Ukrainian artillery would not reach Kyiv.

No one wanted escalation, so it was very difficult for the Ukrainians to find partners. On November 10, 2014, EMCO signed a contract with Ukraine for over €25 million. It shipped 60 000 30-millimeter shells, grenades for rocket launchers and under-barrel grenade launchers, and 5000 152-millimeter shells in three sea shipments. EMCO manufactured the latter itself, and purchased the rest from Bulgarian state-owned manufacturers. The last shipment left on February 26, 2015.

According to the companyʼs official version, it stopped shipments after “Minsk-2”, allegedly due to the beginning of the settlement of the situation in eastern Ukraine.

However, there is one notable detail. In February 2015, Russian intelligence agents began to monitor Emilian Gebrev.

Warehouses in Vrbetice and a Room with a View of the Garage

In 2014, EMCO bought a shipment of ammunition from a Czech trader, but did not have time to export it from the Czech Republic. The ammunition was stored by the Czech company “Imex” in warehouses in the village of Vrbetice (near the Slovak border).

By October 2014, Gebrevʼs company was in debt for storage. “Imex” asked to pick up the shipment or sell it. “Imex” did not disclose who exactly wanted to buy the ammunition.

On October 7, Gebrev refused to sell this batch of weapons. According to Bellingcat, the very next day, six Russian military intelligence officers confirmed booking tickets to the Czech Republic. Two of them were Alexander Mishkin and Anatoliy Chepiga (remember the fans of British spires) under false names. They had passports of citizens of Moldova and Tajikistan, and applied to “Imex” for permission to visit the warehouses in Vrbetice from October 13 to 17 and received it.

On October 16, the first warehouse exploded, killing two workers. On December 3, the second exploded. Gebrev’s warehouses contained approximately 10 000 120-millimeter mines and more than 16 000 152-millimeter shells.

Czech investigators believed that the operation involved GRU unit 29155. Mishkin and Chepiga, according to their version, were the perpetrators. Investigators from Bellingcat, The Insider, and Respekt identified at least six participants in the operation. Mishkin and Chepigaʼs commander Andrei Averyanov was also in the Czech Republic in October 2014.

Four months later, officers from this unit surfaced in Sofia. On February 15, 2015, the GRU General Denis Sergeyev, his subordinates Sergei Lyutenko, and Egor Gordienko arrived on three separate flights.

Lyutenko checked into the “Hill Hotel” near the EMCO office and requested a room on the third floor overlooking the parking lot. Gordienko chose the fifteenth floor of the nearby “Marinella Hotel”. The window overlooked the entrance to the underground garage where Gebrev and his managers parked.

Bulgarian investigators believe the Russians studied Gebrev’s routine and routes. The group left Sofia a week later, and returned in April. Lyutenko again booked room 305 at the “Hill”. This time, they did more than just observe.

Man in a Felt Hat

April 28, 2015 began as a regular workday. Around 11 AM, Gebrev parked his “Nissan” in the underground garage behind the “Hill Hotel” and went to the office. Later, the “Toyota” of production director Valentin Takhchiev and the “Mercedes” (which Gebrevʼs personal driver had brought) were parked nearby.

At 1:58 PM, a man wearing a felt hat and black gloves appeared in the garage. He was holding something in his hand. The man stopped next to the “Toyota”, then — next to the “Nissan”, and walked around both cars three times.

The cameras did not show what he was doing with his hands. On the way out, he paused for a few seconds near the passenger door of the “Mercedes”. All of this lasted 4 minutes.

At 2:15 PM, the driver got into the “Mercedes”, and Gebrev got into the car a few minutes later. A month earlier, his wife had died of cancer. Gebrev later told The Guardian that he had been drowning his sorrow in work, had barely eaten, and had not paid any attention to his well-being.

That evening he met with Polish partners in the restaurant of the “Marinella Hotel”. Suddenly, laser-like streaks flashed before his eyes, and he felt uncontrollably nauseous. Gebrev later fainted and fell into a coma in the hospital.

On the morning of April 30, Valentin Takhchiev took his “Toyota” from the garage. Within a few hours, his vision began to blur, he lost some of his speech, his blood pressure shot up, and he began vomiting continuously. In the evening, he was brought to the hospital, barely alive. As he later said, the next few days were erased from his memory.

That same morning, April 30, Gebrevʼs son Hristo came to the garage with a portable hazardous substance detector. His father was in critical condition, and the doctors did not know what had poisoned him or what to do with him.

So Hristo sought answers himself. He opened the trunk of the “Nissan”, went around it with the detector, and then checked the “Toyota”. On May 4, he also felt sick, he had all the same symptoms as his father, but they were weaker. According to Bellingcat sources, he could have touched the remains of the toxic substance on the cars.

Gebrev was taken to the Military Medical Academy. Takhchiev — first to the “Tokuda” hospital, and then — to the “Pirogov” hospital. Both were saved by intensive symptomatic treatment. The doctors had experience working in combat zones and acted according to military protocols, although they did not know the name of the poison.

Bulgarian investigators believe that an unknown organophosphorus substance was applied to the handles of the cars. They have not established who exactly was hiding under the hat. Bellingcat believes that — most likely — it was GRU General Denis Sergeyev, but this has not been proven.

Paradoxically, the Bulgarian investigation initially considered the version of domestic poisoning. Traces of the pesticide were found in the kitchen of Gebrevʼs apartment — in arugula and some in the remains of coffee from the coffee machine.

Gebrev insisted that he did not drink coffee or eat arugula that day, while his director and son ate separately. Later, Bulgariaʼs chief prosecutor Sotir Tsatsarov stated that the investigation did not insist on food poisoning, and the case was classified as attempted murder.

Gebrev sent his blood to the “Verifin” laboratory in Finland at his own expense. They found two unknown organophosphorus substances there — compounds from the same group as “Novichok”, but they couldn’t name them with certainty. The laboratory promised to keep the samples for five years. When Bulgarian investigators asked for them for re-analysis in 2019, the samples were gone. They had been destroyed.

In mid-May, Gebrev was released from the hospital and went with his son to a house by the sea. On May 23, the GRU officers Sergeyev, Gordienko, and Danil Kapralov (an officer of unit 29155 who had medical and special forces training) returned to Bulgaria.

Five days later, Gebrevʼs familiar symptoms returned. He was lucky that his son was nearby, who immediately took his father to a military hospital in Sofia.

The next day, Sergeyev and Gordienko drove to Serbia. Kapralov flew from Sofia to Moscow. It was never established exactly how Gebrev came into contact with the poison again, and the family did not voice their assumptions.

The Bulgarian prosecutorʼs office in absentia charged Sergeyev, Gordienko, and Lyutenko with the assassination attempts on Gebrev, his son, and Takhchiev, and put them on the international wanted list.

In 2020, the case was stopped, but not closed.

"A Thoroughfare Without a Fence"

From 2011 to 2020, there were four explosions that the Bulgarian prosecutorʼs office combined into one case: in 2011, at the EMCO warehouse in Lovnidol; twice in 2015, at the state-owned VMZ plant in Iganov, where EMCO ammunition was destroyed during one of the explosions; in 2020, at the “Arsenal” plant near Miglizh.

The pattern was repeated. Firstly, there was a fire, and then an explosion. The charge could be activated remotely, on the days of the explosions, Russians came to Bulgaria, who were later identified as the same GRU employees from unit 29155.

In 2024, the court allowed the issuance of European arrest warrants for six Russians accused of terrorism. Hovewer, the appeals court admitted that there was little evidence of each personʼs role, mainly trips, hotels and contacts with companies shortly before the explosions.

The prosecutorʼs office did not publicly name the suspects or report any arrests.

Fire at the EMCO warehouse near Tsareva Livada on September 11, 2026.

webcafe.bg / Скриншот

Explosion at the companyʼs factory near the village of Belitsa on August 10, 2026.

nova.bg / Скриншот

“Since these cases did not reach court and proper investigations were not conducted when the traces were fresh, most of the evidence is circumstantial. But together they look convincing,” Ruslan Stefanov, program director of the Bulgarian Center for the Study of Democracy and co-author of “The Kremlin Playbook”, tells Babel.

According to him, the movements of officers from Unit 29155 during the Gebrev poisonings, the participation of the same unit in other operations in Europe, and the official accusations of the Bulgarian prosecutor’s office all add up to one picture.

Stefanov considers the version of an attempt to disrupt the supply of ammunition to Ukraine very plausible, especially when looking not only at the poisoning of Gebrev, but at the entire series of operations in different countries.

The warehouses in Vrbetitsa and Bulgaria were connected to ammunition that could have reached Ukraine, and Russia was interested in disrupting these supply chains.

In July 2022 and June 2023, EMCO warehouses near the Bulgarian Karnobat pier were on fire again. Before the first explosion, the alarm went off. The guards went to check, but did not have time to reach the warehouse, and this saved their lives.

Gebrev stated about the Russian trace, and according to him, there was nothing inside that could have caught fire. Although, he had no direct evidence, and the perpetrator was not found.

Last June, the investigation was stopped.

Stefanov attributes the lack of convictions to two reasons. The Russian suspects are outside Bulgaria, and Moscow will not extradite current or former military intelligence officers to stand trial in a NATO country.

At the same time, Bulgarian law enforcement initially investigated each explosion and poisoning separately and failed to promptly verify the version of a coordinated sabotage campaign. Due to delays, evidence disappeared, witnesses forgot details, and Russian operatives managed to leave the country.

“You can’t say that every delay proves direct Russian interference,” Stefanov says.

He states that the problem is deeper. It’s the so-called “state capture”, when informal political, economic, and personal connections prevent institutions from independently enforcing the law against influential people.

Russia is using the country’s existing networks of dependencies — business interests, contacts of former intelligence officers, media, and hidden patronalisms. In Gebrevʼs case, the prosecutor’s office and part of the security system were the weakest. Added to this is the willingness of populist politicians to play on the sympathies of some voters toward Russia and their reluctance to conflict with Russian business interests.

When EU and NATO countries expelled Russian diplomats en masse after the Skripal poisoning in 2018, Sofia did not join them. Gebrev’s poisoning case was reopened only at his insistence, amid the publicity of several public investigations.

In 2021, Bulgarian law enforcement officers exposed a group of current and former military intelligence and Defense Ministry employees who were passing classified materials to Russia.

That same year, prosecutors first linked 6 GRU agents to Gebrevʼs warehouse explosions. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Bulgaria expelled 70 Russian diplomatic staff on suspicion of espionage.

Footage released by the Bulgarian prosecutorʼs office after exposing a spy ring in 2021.

X / Christo Grozev

One of the group members copies information from a work computer, December 1, 2020.

X / Christo Grozev

On September 13, the day after the second fire at EMCO warehouses in a month, the usually non-public Gebrev appeared on the Sunday broadcast of the program “In Focus” on Nova TV. He started not with Russia, but with a broom.

According to him, since the beginning of 2026, the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs has inspected the company’s factories, workshops, and warehouses more than 18 times — approximately once every 10-12 days.

The inspectors’ only remark was that the area needed to be swept. The security scheme and the guards themselves were approved by the Ministry, and 70% of the cameras continued to work even after the explosions.

Therefore, Gebrev explained the minister’s statement about the two pensioners and inadequate protection as follows: “Someone is misleading the minister.”

Then he moved the conversation from the new fire to all the previous ones. He recalled the explosions at EMCO facilities, the poisoning of himself, his son and the companyʼs director, and cases that have not reached court for years.

According to Gebrev, investigators do not have the will to identify the customers, documents disappear, and the prosecutorʼs office delays or stops the proceedings. Behind all this, he sees intertwined Bulgarian and Russian connections, state structures and big money.

As an example, he cited the unsuccessful attack on a Ukrainian plane in Leipzig. German media wrote that the explosives could have been delivered through Bulgaria and Serbia.

"We are like a public thoroughfare without a fence," Gebrev concluded.

Will Ukraine be left without Bulgarian shells?

There is no reason to say so yet. It is impossible to estimate the actual losses. EMCO has not disclosed details of current contracts and production volumes since 2015.

An August fire damaged a warehouse and scattered ammunition around the production site, but the plant resumed operations in early September. Two warehouses at another base were damaged in September. The company did not report any destroyed production lines, critical loss of inventory, or delays in specific export shipments.

However, repeated fires and explosions can destroy inventories, delay contract fulfillment, and increase production and security costs.

The Gebrev family is now pushing ahead with another major project — a gunpowder factory near the town of Smyadovo (in northeastern Bulgaria). The project is being handled by “Karash Invest” (a company owned by Gebrev’s son Hristo). The production is planned to be located on the territory of a former chemical plant built in the 1980s.

Before privatization, it was the largest explosives production facility in the Balkans.

Gunpowder is one of the main problems of European ammunition production. After the start of the great war against Ukraine, the demand for artillery ammunition increased sharply, and European factories faced a shortage of gunpowder and components for it.

According to the project documentation, the enterprise near Smedov will be able to produce up to six tons of gunpowder per day, or approximately 1 200 tons per year. To do this, 12 new production buildings are to be built and warehouses are to be rebuilt.

The plant plans to produce bibasic gunpowder for mortar and artillery shots and solid rocket fuel. Production is planned to start in 2027.

However, political risk remains. In June 2026, the government of Prime Minister Rumen Radev reported that Bulgaria would no longer provide weapons to Ukraine. At first, this sounded like a complete cessation of supplies.

Although, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitar Stoyanov clarified that the state would stop transferring ammunition and equipment from the Bulgarian army’s warehouses to Ukraine free of charge, but would not prohibit private companies from selling their products to Ukraine.

The commercial channel through which EMCO and other Bulgarian manufacturers operate remains open, although specific supplies depend on export licenses granted by the Bulgarian authorities.