Oleksandr Shyrshyn went against the system: he criticizes Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky and the commanders of the assault regiments. A long interview with the former battalion commander of the “Magura” brigade

On March 16, I posted a photo from the hospital ward.

I wasnʼt injured, I was just having a planned operation. I had problems with my joint. I was operated on in a civilian hospital by referral from a military hospital. I planned the operation in advance and informed everyone.

The General Staff called the hospital, the chief physician. The doctor was dialed by the chief medic, who was dialed by a representative of the General Staff. The hospital was very surprised: whose pass did I cross, like "why did the General Staff call you"?

Iʼm currently on leave, as decided by the military hospital commission. But Iʼm returning to duty a little earlier, I have some errands to do. Iʼll recover while on duty.

We arrived in the Kursk direction in the summer of 2024 after the battles for Pokrovsk.

Between Pokrovsk and the Kursk operation, we had about a month to recover. We were replenished with personnel. They didn’t give us very many people, but it was important, because all the time, starting from the battles for Avdiivka, the battalion worked in difficult conditions and was poorly staffed.

We managed to restore almost all of our “Bradley” infantry fighting vehicles — in Donbas, they were probably the main force of the battalion, until the moment when fiber-optic FPVs appeared. Our evacuation and fire support were built on them, they helped the infantry survive on the battlefield.

As for drones, there weren’t many of them, but we had enough. The brigade worked well in finding supplies, the people who helped our battalion since 2023, when we fought in Zaporizhzhia, worked well.

When the Kursk operation began in August 2024, we were still in Donbas. Units of the Air Assault Forces, the 225th separate assault battalion and other units broke through the border and took part of the territory of the Kursk region. We went there to develop this success.

I had a premonition that we would be transferred there. And a month and a half before we were supposed to go there, I was already collecting information, finding out who was in which directions, and what we would need to pay attention to.

Before the operation began, the commanders of all the brigades were gathered for a large interaction, where the Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky was present.

I also got to it. Each brigade commander reported on his part of the work, how he planned it. The commander of our brigade Yan Yatsishen and the brigade commander of one of the Air Assault Forces brigades reported on the problems we would face and what support we needed to complete the task.

Our task was to advance towards the city of Hlushkovo. We were assigned a sector that we were to storm together with the 225th separate assault battalion. Roughly speaking, we were to approach the city from two different directions.

The problems were primarily related to logistics. There was only one road along which we could approach the city. On the sides were swamps, impassable areas.

The road itself was probably under fire control from the platoon posts. Most likely, there were ATGMs there. We had to either pave, trawl new roads, or "dismantle" these anti-tank guided missiles one by one. Everyone was determined to work, to complete the task.

After the Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky heard about these problems, he changed the plan. I was pleasantly surprised at the time. They changed the direction we were supposed to go to Korenievo.

The general idea of the operation seemed logical. Of course, our battalion received only a small part of the information. But I heard about the components of the operation from the commanders of other brigades. We were to reach the natural boundaries — rivers, swampy terrain.

The Russians would not be able to attack us with equipment. We would take part of their territory, establish ourselves on the boundaries, make it impossible for them to attack. This would help us in negotiations. For them, territory is a sore subject.

The day before the start of our operation, the Russians launched a counteroffensive.

They drove their vehicles in different directions and scattered across our rear. The units that were stationed in those areas and were supposed to stop them, for some reason did not react. I do not want to go into the details of what happened there, but they did not act.

Some of the Russian units then remained surrounded for a long time and fought. I think these were elite units, well-trained. They held out even in such conditions. Therefore, our plans were changed. We concentrated our forces on restoring positions, storming and clearing settlements.

Even then I began to interact with the commander of the 225th separate assault battalion Oleh Shyriaev.

I must say right away that I am biased towards him, given his connections with Illya Kyva. I perceived him and still perceive him as a criminal element. In the Armed Forces, he uses the concepts and methods of the criminal world.

I respect many fighters of the 225th separate assault regiment. They do awesome work, really difficult work. There are good officers. But if we talk about the general philosophy of the unit, headed by Oleh Shyriaev, then the main thing in it is loyalty to the higher command.

If we are ordered, we do it. Regardless of how the situation is assessed. The price is not important. I criticize it.

Personally, I didnʼt see them beating their own people. But I saw how they treated their own people on the battlefield, through streams. And there are testimonies from people I spoke with personally. They worked under the command of the 225th Separate Assault Regiment, and they were deceived into enemy platoon posts.

They were told, for example, that this was our second line of defense, and they were led straight to the enemyʼs general headquarters. They also sent their own people in one direction.

The first time I saw how the 225th worked was when we were supposed to clear a section together.

They would just jump into the Russian rear, into some building, a landing, just into a pit — and say: “The task is completed, change us.” We explained that this is not how it is done. That it is necessary to conduct a clearing, equip a position where we can sit down.

As soon as I said this, I got a call from above. They were screaming, they were crazy. Because Shyriaev called the Commander-in-Chief and complained that the 47th brigade was not changing them. Okay, they changed them then. They went in, sat down in the pit. In an ordinary crater from an explosion, nothing had even been dug up in it.

When the Russians remain in your rear, it doesnʼt do you any good. When their logistical routes are not cut, when they can change personnel and provide them — itʼs not the completion of the mission.

There was another joint operation with the 225th separate assault battalion.

It was identified several directions where we were to enter. Make passages in the barriers, cover the distance to the settlement, and clear it. We were to replace the assault units and develop the offensive.

It so happened that we managed to make only one passage in the barriers. Behind it was a long distance in open terrain. They jumped into the depths using the effect of surprise. But it was impossible to covertly replace them, because the only road ran through the field.

We tried to do it in compliance with all the rules. We influenced the enemyʼs firing points, influenced the pilots. We did several different activities, did demonstrations, tried to drive in with equipment, tried to go in on foot. Day and night. It was almost impossible to get in there — only in bad weather, when drones are not flying. We tried to get in, and suffered losses.

The 225th also had some pretty big losses. They can say that itʼs because the 47th Brigade didnʼt replace them. Thatʼs a lie — the 47th stood with them anyway. We brought some people in anyway. They died for other reasons, and thatʼs about how they used their unit.

I explained to the command that I couldnʼt complete the task. I prescribed what exactly I needed to do to complete it, like "give me this, that, etc". After we failed to make this replacement, an inspection from the General Staff arrived.

In the statute of the Ground Forces there is such an element as “assessment”. You have to assess the forces and means, your own and the enemy’s. You have to compare. And understand whether you have enough time and resources.

If you are ordered to storm a settlement with four detachments where a battalion is stationed — is this a feasible task or not?

Storming a settlement with four detachments, where at least a battalion was stationed, is a real combat mission that was set for an assault unit during the Kursk operation.

I came to the battalion commander and asked him: “Are you serious?” Not only that you climbed into the forest knows where, and some of your people are already wounded, do you still plan to storm the settlement?

He tells me: “This is an order. I do not discuss orders.”

Despite four years of war, my brain is still working. If their doesnʼt, I am very sorry.

They entered the enemy rear through the fields, passing through their battle formations. I was given the task of changing them. I submitted an “urgent” request: to complete the task, I ask them to provide me with this and that, to provide me with passage. To storm a certain area so that I could build a logistical route, primarily for evacuation.

I wrote what risks await us if we continue to carry out the task. I submitted a report to the brigade commander. At the same time, I went to some people from the senior military leadership and reported everything to them. I made a video, showed them what problems we had, explained what we would do.

One of the answers was like: “I will talk to the Commander-in-Chief, but you know... If he decided so, we will not change anything.”

All the risks I prescribed came true. In the end, our people began to be stormed. We could not provide them with proper support. We tried to evacuate them, but we could not. We could not even get to the border because there was only one road. We tried to use the GRCs. It also failed, we were just learning them. Some people died from injuries.

I planned for them to leave, despite the fact that I didn’t get approval from above. I wrote that it was necessary to get people out while there was still a chance, but I only heard screams that it was impossible.

I still planned how I would get them out. I concentrated the means. My subordinates were given tasks, who would act in what way, so that we could get those who remained alive out.

But the people couldn’t stand it psychologically and simply ran. They ran, not yet knowing my plan, not knowing that I was going to get them out. They ran through the enemy battle formations, and they saw them, and started shooting. Some of them ran into anti-personnel mines. If I’m not mistaken, only one of our fighters and one fighter from the assault unit survived.

This was the last straw, after which I wrote the post — the last straw of all these stupid tasks that I received in the Kursk direction.

My battalion never backed down, even from difficult tasks. Never. We never said: “We won’t go.”

I’ll give you a few examples. Once, near Stepove, my officer (the acting commander) spent forty minutes pulling a boy whose legs had given out. The “Bradley” waited for him under fire for forty minutes. The enemy tried to shell them from everything they had.

Guys held out, and evacuated the person. The same in the Kursk region — if it was necessary to evacuate a wounded person, the boys would exhale, get into the car and drive away, receiving three or four FPVs along the way.

But there are tasks that do not fit into common sense. For example, to storm a settlement with four detachments. And when my people are being wiped out in their senseless tasks, and I constantly receive remarks, reprimands and checks — how should I react?

The most painful thing in this story for me has always been the loss of people.

Next, we talk to Oleksandr Shyrshyn about how the public conflict unfolded: the General Staff inspection, the reaction of the assault regiments, Oleksandr Syrskyʼs response, and the transfer to the corps headquarters. Watch the full interview on our YouTube channel.