What does the end of the war mean for Ukrainians?
In the mass consciousness of Ukrainians, the "end of the war" is not limited to the formal cessation of hostilities. Data from sociological research, primarily by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2022-2026, show that this concept has a complex nature.
Ukrainians perceive the end of the war not only as a military-political fact, but also as a state of security and the restoration of normal life, which does not undermine the basic interests of the state.
To be specific, this is a combination of several conditions: a cessation of hostilities, a sense of long-term security, the lack of legitimization of the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories, and the perception of an acceptable outcome of the war.
Letʼs take it step by step. Cessation of hostilities.
For most Ukrainians, the war ends when the shelling, fighting, and casualties stop. At the same time, sociological surveys show that a ceasefire in itself is not always perceived as a true end to the war if it does not guarantee a stable peace.
Accordingly, the second important component of the idea of the end of the war is long-term security. Many Ukrainians associate the end of the war with a situation when Russia will no longer be able or dare to attack again. This may be international security guarantees, membership in alliances, or a significant strengthening of Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
According to the results of a 2025 KIIS survey, 75% of Ukrainians believe that a ceasefire can be acceptable only under the condition of reliable international security guarantees.
And the issue of territorial integrity?
A significant part of Ukrainians believe that the war will not end without restoring Ukraineʼs control over all or most of the occupied territories. In the early years of the war, this position was especially strong — for example, in 2023, over 80% of Ukrainians believed that victory meant the liberation of all territories up to the 1991 borders.
In subsequent years, Ukrainians became more realistic and pragmatic: some citizens allow the war to end without the immediate return of all territories, but on the condition that the occupation is not legally recognized and the prospect of their return remains.
The concept of “the end of the war” is closely related to how people imagine victory. These ideas have been somewhat transformed since 2022. Initially, maximalist expectations of victory dominated: the liberation of all territories, a return to the 1991 borders, and sometimes even the collapse of Russia.
Now, most Ukrainians agree to freeze the front line if there are security guarantees, accession to the EU, and the maintenance of sanctions against the Russian Federation; only 15% support continuing the war until the captured territories are returned. By victory, most respondents understand the preservation of Ukrainian statehood and lasting peace.
Thus, a certain evolution of the image of victory is taking place in the mass consciousness, i.e. from maximalist expectations to more realistic criteria, among which the preservation of the independence and security of the state is the main one.
Do Ukrainians have a need for justice when we talk about Russian aggression?
Yes, the demand for justice in Ukrainian society is very strong.
Most citizens believe that without punishing the aggressor and reparations, peace will not be perceived as fair. This also explains why a significant part of the population is skeptical of peace agreements that could provide for amnesty or waiver of responsibility for war crimes.
At the same time, there is a certain tension in society between the desire for justice and the desire to end the war as soon as possible. This is often called the “dilemma between peace and justice”, which is characteristic of many conflicts. Sociological research shows that the need for justice is one of the key characteristics of public opinion in Ukraine during the war and largely determines which scenarios for the end of the war are considered acceptable by society.
As a result, for a significant part of Ukrainian society, justice is not an alternative to peace, but a condition for a sustainable and acceptable end to the war.
Then letʼs clarify what justice is for Ukrainians, how do they understand it?
In short, it is the restoration of the broken moral and political order after aggression. Sociological research shows that this concept is complex and contains several components: punishment of those guilty of war crimes, compensation for the damage caused, return or restoration of the just status of territories, as well as recognition of the suffering of war victims.
Letʼs focus on each of them, punishing the guilty — how high is the need for this and does it concern more the military-political leadership or the executors?
Public opinion is dominated by the belief that those responsible for aggression and crimes against civilians should be punished. In a study on post-war justice conducted in 2024, 82% of Ukrainians consider it very important to hold trials of those responsible for war crimes, including the political and military leadership of Russia. This indicates a strong public demand for criminal responsibility and international justice mechanisms.
But I would add here that the level of knowledge about specific institutions, such as the International Criminal Court or the Special Tribunal for Aggression, among the population is lower than support for the idea of punishment itself, people do not distinguish between different types of international courts.
Next, you mentioned reparations and compensation for damages.
Thus, compensation for the damage caused by the war is the second important component of justice. And this concerns not only compensation to the affected citizens, but also compensation to the state for the destroyed infrastructure.
According to the results of the aforementioned study, 90% of Ukrainians consider reparations or other forms of material compensation that Russia should pay to be very important.
At the same time, more than half of the respondents call reparations one of the most important elements of restoring justice after the war.
One of the sociological studies on what Ukrainians need for a just peace.
«Babel'»
And what does restoring the just status of territories mean?
For a significant part of Ukrainians, justice is also connected with the territorial issue. It is about restoring Ukraineʼs control over the occupied territories or at least refusing to recognize their annexation.
Thus, territorial integrity is not only a political or military goal, but also a symbol of a just outcome of the war.
You also said that for Ukrainians, justice means recognizing the victims and establishing the truth.
Thus, another important dimension of justice is moral restoration — acknowledging the suffering of victims, establishing the truth about war crimes, and preserving the memory of the dead.
In the aforementioned study, 75% of respondents consider establishing the truth about war crimes to be very important, and 94% consider finding and determining the fate of missing persons to be very important.
This shows that for Ukrainian society, justice means not only punishing the guilty, but also public recognition and documentation of the tragedy of war.
Are Ukrainians ready to personally talk about what they experienced?
Many people are willing to testify about their experiences, as evidenced, for example, by the large archives of civilian testimonies, which have already collected over 140 000 stories. But research also shows that the participation of victims in trials or public testimony can be psychologically difficult and require special support.
Therefore, sociologists and human rights activists speak of the need for psychological assistance, witness protection, and the opportunity to give testimony in a safe format.
Ukrainians generally support a combination of several mechanisms for establishing the truth: trials, documenting testimonies, and memorializing victims.
Surveys on war memory (e.g., the Rating study) show that Ukrainians consider the preservation of the memory of the dead, the creation of memorials, the documentation of war stories, and a state memory policy important. Such practices are seen not only as historical memory, but also as part of post-war justice.
Letʼs talk about collaborators. Do Ukrainians take into account the conditions in which people found themselves during the occupation when assessing the actions of collaborators?
Ukrainians demand real punishment for collaborators and take into account the conditions in which people found themselves during the occupation, but, in my opinion, it is not enough. According to the law, collaborators are only those who voluntarily cooperate with the authorities, and not forced to do so under pressure.
In September 2022, we asked about those who remained in the occupied territory, respondents had to choose which of the two answer options was closer to their point of view: “The majority of residents who still live in the territories occupied after February 24 continue to live there because they really support the Russians or they simply do not care about Ukraine” or “The majority of residents who still live in the territories occupied after February 24 are victims of circumstances, they would like Ukraine to regain control over these territories”.
Only 12% chose the first answer, and the majority (72%) believed that the residents of the occupied territories were victims of circumstances and were waiting for the return of Ukrainian authorities (the rest did not know what to answer).
In December 2022, in a similar survey, 83% expressed sympathy for the occupied Ukrainians, and 6% expressed condemnation.
Do Ukrainians demand real punishment for them and is lustration enough for certain categories?
In another study conducted by KIIS for the NGO “Opora” in August 2022, a significant part of the respondents demanded criminal liability for certain categories of occupied Ukrainian citizens.
Almost 70% considered criminal liability necessary if people agreed to “take a leadership position in the occupation administration to ensure their livelihood”, and this is quite understandable. But the demand for criminal liability for some other categories of the population is not so unambiguous.
For example, half of the respondents demanded criminal liability for those who received a Russian passport, the same number for teachers who “agreed to teach subjects according to the Russian curriculum”, 37% for pensioners who receive Russian social benefits, and 24% for doctors.
But what were pensioners supposed to do if the occupiers made it impossible to receive Ukrainian pensions?
And after the murder of teachers in Bucha or Mariupol, having claims against those who continue to work at the school and considering this as voluntary cooperation with the occupiers is also not enough to take into account the conditions in which they live.
In July-August 2024, KIIS conducted a survey for the Presidential Representation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Partnership for a Strong Ukraine Foundation, the results of which show a fairly normal attitude towards residents of the occupation.
For example, 63% of respondents have a good attitude towards Ukrainians living in the temporarily occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Kharkiv regions, 29% are neutral and only 5% are bad. But also with a demand for punishment for certain categories.
In my opinion, it is very important that Ukraine has a clear information policy and manages to convey to the population of the occupied regions who is considered a collaborator and who is not.
It is also important to form a positive attitude among the population towards the Ukrainians who remained in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Then we have a chance for the successful reintegration of the occupied territories.
How big is the split in Ukrainian society and what can unite it?
The question of possible divisions among the population is a constant concern for sociologists, and KIIS is trying to monitor these processes. There is a risk that contradictions and a new social differentiation of Ukrainian citizens may arise based on their behavior during a full-scale war and efforts to defend Ukraine “Where were you and what did you do during the war?”
At least five groups can be distinguished:
(1) those who fought in the ranks of the Ukrainian Defense Forces;
(2) those who remained in Ukraine during the war and did not leave their homes;
(3) internally displaced persons;
(4) people who left abroad (refugees) — it is worth distinguishing between refugees who legally left the territory of Ukraine and men who illegally left abroad;
(5) people who were in the occupied territory. And here too, various problems may arise regarding the “old” territories that were occupied in 2014 and the “new” ones that were occupied over the past four years.
Some misunderstandings may arise between these groups, which will develop into serious conflicts if society does not try to prevent possible problems. For example, those in the ranks of the Defense Forces may accuse those in security of having fun and living a “normal” life during the war.
Those who remained in Ukraine may accuse refugees living in Europe of lacking patriotism and enjoying life in the EU, while other Ukrainians suffer from constant missile and drone attacks by the enemy. This is actively discussed on social networks and may reduce the motivation of refugees to return home.
And those who remained in the occupied territories are treated by some Ukrainians as collaborators (although the absolute majority maintains a normal-positive attitude).
Of all the problem groups, the attitude towards IDPs is the best, and there is hope that there will be fewer problems of social tension here than with other groups. The biggest problems are in the attitude towards Ukrainians who are ethnic Russians: according to the 1991 census, they were 17%, and in 2026, according to our data, only 3 percent.
However, so far all the disagreements and social tension do not reach the level of splits, and the integration of society is now, perhaps, the highest in the entire existence of Ukraine as an independent state. We do not always feel this, because the majority of the population is guided not by the data of sociological research, but by social networks.
And the contributors on social networks are much more aggressive and intolerant than the population as a whole. In addition, there is an information war, and Russian bots and the revival of the political struggle in Ukraine add to the aggressiveness.
And what can unite Ukrainians?
First of all, Ukrainians are united by a common struggle against the enemy, the struggle for independence and the survival of the state. After 2022, support for Ukraineʼs independence reached historically high levels — over 90% of residents.
In KIIS research, the majority of Ukrainians also declare that they are ready to support resistance to aggression for as long as necessary. This creates a common framework: the independence and security of the state are perceived as a basic value that unites different groups of the population.
Ukrainians are also united by the existential nature of the war; when they talk about the goals of the Russians, the two main ones are the physical destruction of Ukrainians and the destruction of Ukraine as a state.
Therefore, supporting each other is critical for survival. In addition, the war has formed a sense of common destiny, since almost all families are directly or indirectly affected by the war — through military service, losses, forced displacement, or economic difficulties. Such a common experience strengthens solidarity and readiness for mutual support.
«Babel'»
Another factor is the process of forming Ukrainian civic national identity — from strengthening citizens’ self-identification as Ukrainians to rethinking historical heritage in cultural influences. The percentage of citizens who consider themselves primarily citizens of Ukraine increased from 40% in 1992–2004 to almost 80% after the start of the full-scale war in 2022–2024.
The popularity of public holidays has also increased. A powerful volunteer movement and mutual aid have become an important social glue. Sociologists often speak of the emergence of a “horizontal society” where people actively support each other without the mediation of the state.
As I have already said, it is important for many Ukrainians that the end of the war is perceived as fair — that the aggressor bears responsibility and the victims receive recognition and support. Such an outcome can greatly contribute to national consolidation.
Otherwise, there is a risk of spreading resentment, which can negatively affect the consolidation of society.
Rebuilding the country and European integration can become a new joint project. Such processes after major crises often create a sense of a common goal and future. For most citizens, the course of integration with the European Union is an important strategic goal.
Support for joining the EU in various polls exceeds 80%, making this idea one of the most powerful symbols of the countryʼs future development. Regional differences in geopolitical orientations, attitudes towards the EU, NATO and various countries of the world have now almost disappeared.
Negative attitudes towards Russia and Russians and the perception of them as a threat will also remain a factor in the integration of our society for a long time.
Are Ukrainians ready and willing to engage in dialogue with Russians, for example, to establish the truth, find and punish criminals, and ensure non-repetition?
The Ukrainians agree to negotiations at the state level, especially regarding the exchange of prisoners, the search and punishment of criminals, humanitarian issues, in particular the return of children. But they are against any dialogue with the Russians.
What, according to Ukrainians, will guarantee that Russia will not attack again?
Ukrainians generally do not believe in such guarantees. Approximately 70% of citizens do not believe in the success of the current peace negotiations, and 57% believe that even if there are various guarantees and peace is signed, Russia will still attack Ukraine again.
However, most Ukrainians are ready for peace with a “freezing” of the borders on the contact line under certain conditions. Of course, the best option would be joining NATO, but everyone understands that this is unrealistic now.
Among other conditions, Ukrainians believe it is possible to sign a peace agreement when there are three types of guarantees:
- the agreements are ratified by the parliaments of the guarantor countries;
- allied troops will be on the territory of Ukraine (and not somewhere in the rear, but close to the demarcation line);
- a strong Ukrainian army and a lot of weapons.
Another guarantee could be rapid accession to the EU.