About the peace plan and the Special Tribunal
The main topic in Ukraine right now is the so-called US-Russia peace plan. There is a clause in it about a full amnesty. Does this mean that the work that Ukraine has been doing since 2022 to punish Russian war criminals in the Special Tribunal is under threat?
I believe that there should be peace, but it should be fair. I am not part of our negotiating delegation, but as an international lawyer I understand the price of compromises when you are faced with an aggressor state like the Russian Federation.
Territorial integrity, sovereignty of the country and the responsibility of the aggressor should not be a subject of bargaining. Denial of responsibility is not peace. It is an invitation to a new war.
So, is punishing Russian criminals a red line that we will not cross?
All this time my messages have been clear. No new instructions have been given to me as an official of the Office. We are continuing to work on the establishment of the Special Tribunal. The European Union has decided to allocate €10 million to start the work of a front-line team in the Netherlands, which will search for premises and equip it.
Ukraine signed an agreement with the Council of Europe to establish a Special Tribunal this summer. Other countries are expected to join the process later. Has anyone joined yet? If not, are there any predictions as to when this will happen?
The agreement with the Council of Europe, which we ratified in the summer, is not enough to create a Special Tribunal. The next document that should appear in the near future is an expanded partial agreement. It must be agreed and supported by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. We expect this to happen in December. And it is to this that other countries will join.
In early November, I was at the International Law Week at the UN in New York. At meetings with legal advisors from the G7, the Baltic States, and the European Union, many countries have preliminarily confirmed their desire to join this partial agreement.
We also expect that those countries that were members of the Core Group (Coalition of States) will join — these are 39 countries and two international organizations. The United States was originally a member of this group, but at the last meeting it suspended its participation.
That is, it did not block the creation of the Special Tribunal, it did not refuse, but it suspended its participation and was not at the last meeting.
During International Law Week at the UN, the Ukrainian team held dozens of meetings in bilateral formats and at the G7 and Nordic-Baltic Eight levels. They invited us to join both the Special Tribunal and the Compensation Mechanism.
The Special Tribunal is critical for us — if we do not punish the highest political and military leadership of Russia for the invasion, justice will not be complete. The International Criminal Court (ICC) cannot punish Russia for the crime of aggression. Why am I talking about both the Special Tribunal and ICC, because they have been trying to undermine the credibility of this court recently. And we need both the Special Tribunal and ICC, which can prosecute the highest Russian leadership for other international crimes. All attempts to discredit the ICC are the path to the impunity of dictators.
You mentioned that a building for the Special Tribunal is currently being selected. There was previously information that it could be the building of the former International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Is this option being discussed?
It is not yet known. From the very beginning, for security reasons, the Netherlands wanted to build a building from scratch. They even thought about doing it outside The Hague.
They understand who will be on the dock and who they will be dealing with. But when they realized how much such construction would cost and how long it would take, they asked to abandon this idea.
There are several options now: the premises of one of the former courts are also being considered, but I am not sure whether it is the premises of ICTY, or perhaps the premises where the trials regarding Kosovo are currently being completed.
The Ministry of Justice and Security of the Netherlands is dealing with this, and it was they who previously, together with the team from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were looking for premises for the Register of Damages.
A typical cell in which suspects of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia were held. Spectators during the hearing. The following year, the ICTY moved into the Aegon Insurance Company building in The Hague, where the Final Mechanism for the Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal are still located.
Wikimedia / «Бабель»
Is it already known how much the Special Tribunal will cost?
The Netherlands and the Council of Europe are currently working together on a common budget. This will determine how quickly and how many countries will join the expanded partial agreement. In some countries, these issues need to be ratified by parliament.
So, until the amount of contributions is clear, it is difficult to say how many countries will join the agreement. I really hope that this budget will be formed by the meeting of the Committee of Ministers in December.
About Yermak and the political crisis
We are speaking to you against the backdrop of a political crisis that is undermining the trust of Western partners in Ukraine. Yesterday (November 20) it became clear that the president is not yet dismissing the head of Presidentʼs Office Andriy Yermak, although some MPs of the “Servant of the People” faction and, according to our information, some Western partners have demanded this. It’s just that now these same Western partners are trying to find money to plug the hole in our budget. You are in constant contact with these people. Has the president done enough so far to restore their trust?
The question about Yermak is not entirely ethical, because he is my boss, and it is wrong to comment on this information. I have my own position on the fight against corruption. I am part of the negotiating delegation with IMF on the anti-corruption track.
I actively cooperate with civil society in the direction of restoring justice and judicial reform, so I understand the situation perfectly. Corruption risks increase in any country during wartime. But in Ukraine they are reacting to them.
Society, media, anti-corruption bodies should be our allies. After all, no one should be above the law. Do we have an independent anti-corruption system? Yes. Does it respond to challenges maturely enough? There are reasons to believe so. Should all this be used so publicly? I understand that there is a public request, but should society, media, journalists be so actively involved in this before a full investigation and analysis of all facts and evidence at the pre-trial investigation stage takes place? My personal opinion is no.
There are independent bodies that must investigate the facts, collect evidence and present it to an independent court, which must evaluate the evidence and make a lawful, objective, fair decision. We have no right to interfere with the investigation or to inflame emotions that the enemy will 100% use against us, and we already see that he is doing so.
The main thing is that we must stop experimenting with key positions in the executive branch. Trust, professionalism, international reputation — these should be the minimum requirements for candidates. The latest corruption scandal has finally demonstrated that experiments with such positions must end.
After the corruption scandal, Mudra has to answer additional questions from international partners.
Діма Вага / «Бабель»
Has it become more difficult to negotiate with international partners after the tape scandal?
If weʼre talking about the negotiations that Iʼm directly involved in, which are my international tracks, and our obligations under bilateral agreements with financial institutions, I wouldnʼt say itʼs difficult. There are a few additional questions that need to be answered.
The position of Minister of Justice is currently vacant. You previously worked as a deputy minister, and, according to our information, your name was among the candidates for the post of minister before it was taken by Herman Halushchenko. But, according to sources, it was Yermak who did not approve your candidacy. Now you are again on the list of candidates. Have you been made any offers?
I have read so many times about some of my appointments — either as an ambassador, then as a minister, then as a prosecutor general, then somewhere in NBU. Seriously, I have not received such an offer. If I had received one, I would have considered it. And let me remind you that the Minister of Justice is appointed by the parliament upon the proposal of the government and directly by the prime minister.
In the context of appointments, you are called a man of Yermak. Are you a man of Yermak?
I am a man of my employer. My employer is the state, so I am a man of the state and serve the interests of the state. And I have always done so: at “Oschadbank”, at the Ministry of Justice, and at the Office of the President.
About the budget and reparations
Letʼs talk about money. The Ukrainian budget for next year is short by about UAH 60 billion. And as of now, the available money will be enough until April 2026. Europe is looking for ways to help us. And the most discussed option is a reparations loan. Money that Europe could give us from Russian frozen assets as a loan at the expense of future reparations from Russia. Belgium, which has the largest number of frozen Russian assets, initially seemed to agree to this scheme, but now it does not, because it does not want to bear the risks itself. How can this situation be resolved?
This issue is one of my personal KPIs in this position. Ukraine insists that the entire amount of frozen assets (about $300 billion) should be used for Ukraine and for Ukraine — whether to pay compensation to victims, or to rebuild the country, restore energy infrastructure, or for defense needs so that the country can survive and receive a just and lasting peace.
That is, the issue of Russian assets is not just about finances and not about the fact that Ukraine needs some money. It is about world order. After all, if the aggressor does not face retribution, including financial ones, international law ceases to exist.
There is still no political will to use the entire amount of frozen Russian assets. A reparations loan is the most cautious and legally cleanest option. But it is not an alternative to asset confiscation. This is an interim option that shows that there is a state-offender, there are its assets, these assets should work for Ukraine, which is a victim of aggression.
Now they are looking for options for final confiscation, but until then, Ukraine needs to survive. That is why the question of a reparations loan arose. This mechanism does not carry risks, and it has been practically agreed upon by the EU countries.
We know Belgiumʼs position, it is not new, and Belgium and I have been talking about it for at least six months. We are helped in this by public organizations that actively advocate the confiscation of Russian assets. I thank them for that.
We explain to Belgium that this is not charity, this is collective security. Belgium is afraid that it may be left alone with legal risks and possible lawsuits from the Russian Federation against the entire country and the financial institution Euroclear. We have received legal opinions from luminaries of international legal law, financial lawyers.
Of course, lawyers will never say that there are no risks. But they say that the risks are quite theoretical and remote. Belgium says: if you think that the risks are unrealistic, please share them with us. We understand this position.
We are trying, together with lawyers from EU countries, to find a mechanism that is comfortable for Belgium. And so that at the summit in December this mechanism is adopted, at least its main elements.
At the summit on October 23, Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever said that without proper guarantees from the EU, his country would block a plan to provide a €140 billion reparations loan to Ukraine.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
Recently, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sent a letter to all EU member states with proposals on how to allocate funds to Ukraine. However, the proposals suggest a tougher burden on these countries than a reparations loan. Can this Plan B be used?
I still hope for Plan A, which is the approval of a reparations loan. But the fact that the Europeans are thinking and there is some understanding of Plan B is a good sign.
However, from a legal and moral point of view, it is wrong to allow Russia to remain unpunished and not pay for aggression, so that instead the taxpayers of our partner states pay for its consequences. Of course, we are grateful to them for this, but we cannot send a signal to the world that aggression can be profitable and profitable.
The summit, which will consider this reparation loan, is scheduled for December 18. We have a budget review in second reading and it is generally scheduled for December 2. I understand that the budget is not your topic, but it just turns out that we have to approve the budget when it is still unknown whether the Europeans will agree to this reparation loan or not...
I may not have all the information that the Ministry of Finance has, because after all, negotiations about money are more up to them.
But do you somehow take this fact into account in negotiations?
Of course, we voice this argument and say that there are risks of a financial crisis at the beginning of next year, and we name the approximate figures for the budget deficit.
Letʼs imagine that a reparations loan is approved and given to us. But from the very beginning, it was said that if Russia refuses to pay reparations, its frozen funds will go to the Fund, from which Ukrainians will be paid reparations for the damage caused by the Russians. If we now use part of these funds for our lives this year, will the remaining funds be enough for reparations?
The point is that European countries will issue bonds that will replace Russian money held in Euroclear and will transfer this money to us, and these bonds will attract their own funds secured by Russian assets.
Currently, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation has the right to demand Euroclear to return its investments. No one will touch this right of demand — after Russia pays compensation to Ukraine, we will be obliged to return this money to European countries.
Accordingly, the reparations loan is not a confiscation. It is an interest-free loan secured by future reparations. They will remain Russian. And this is the money that we will fill the Compensation Fund with, at least this is Ukraineʼs vision. Therefore, we say that the amount of Russian assets in the amount of $300 billion is not what Europe is issuing as a reparations loan to support Ukraine.
But it is still extremely important to reserve at least some of the money we will receive from this loan for a compensation mechanism. That is what we are working on.
Діма Вага / «Бабель»
The December summit is set to kick off the process of launching the Compensation Commission — this is the second stage of the entire Compensation Mechanism, which will assign and pay reparations to Ukrainians for damage caused by the Russians. Whatʼs next, what will be the next steps?
The first step is the launch of the International Registry of Losses, which is located in The Hague, and people are submitting their claims there. 14 categories have been opened, and another 29 categories will be opened in the first half of 2026.
The next step is the verification of these losses, the assessment of each claim. This will be done by the Compensation Commission, an impartial international body that will establish the amount to be paid for each claim. There is a draft Convention that will establish the Compensation Commission, and it will fully describe how it will work. The Convention is to be solemnly signed at a diplomatic conference in The Hague on December 16.
Next, 25 ratifications and half of the budget are needed, after which the establishment of this commission will begin. The process is a bit similar to the one we discussed about the creation of the Tribunal. But here it is simpler. The commission will be located in the same place where the Registry of Losses office operates today. It will be transformed into the Office of the Commission, as will its entire infrastructure.
In general, we expect the Commission to be operational in early 2027. The launch will continue throughout 2026: recruitment of staff, formation of the Commissionʼs bodies, approval of rules. We have not yet determined which applications the Commission will start working with in 2027, because so far there have not been many of them — only 73 thousand, much more are expected.
The third stage is the compensation fund, it is the most complicated. More precisely, creating a fund is the easiest thing that can be done, because you can use any existing fund. The most difficult thing is how to fill this fund.
Therefore, Ukraine continues to insist that Russiaʼs frozen assets, which are approximately $300 billion, should become the main source of payments.
Are there any other alternative options for replenishing the fund?
If the UN Security Council could adopt such a decision, as it has in other precedents, or if Russia agreed, as Iraq did after the attack on Kuwait, one could also talk about other sources, such as percentages of sales by Russia...
Oil or gas?
Not only oil and gas. Russia wants to return to international trade. A certain percentage of all its foreign economic activity could be directed to this fund. But, of course, Russiaʼs consent is needed here.
There is one more point: The Compensation Commission, like the Register, currently provides that those who have suffered from Russian aggression since February 24, 2022, can apply there. The Convention contains a wording that could allow compensation to be received by those who have suffered since 2014. But for this, the Convention will have to be amended. Experience shows that additional protocols to conventions are signed and ratified by far fewer countries than the Convention itself. What should be done about this issue?
I am Ukraineʼs representative in the Conference of the Parties to the Register of Damage. And we have already started talking about expanding the Registerʼs mandate starting in 2014, arguing this with the decision of ECHR, which recognized that Russia violates human rights in Ukraine and began its act of aggression no later than May 2014.
Despite the courtʼs decision, the discussion is going extremely difficult. At first, there was complete rejection. Now we are already being given arguments that this could create a dangerous precedent, because the act of aggression since 2014 was not recognized by the UN. But we are at least discussing it in a calmer tone now. There is no decision yet.
The ideal mechanism would be if the time frame could be extended by a decision of the parties at the Conference, rather than through additional ratifications.
Since the beginning of the Russian aggression in 2014, the Russian Federation has blocked all key resolutions in the UN Security Council that concern Ukraine. On March 15, 2014, Russia vetoed a resolution declaring the pseudo-referendum held by the Russian Federation in Crimea illegitimate.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
On EU requirements and justice reform
The European Union recently published its report on Ukraineʼs European integration, and before that, a shadow report by civil society organizations on the state of the law enforcement and judicial systems. The report notes some progress, but also talks about problems, such as the shortage of judges, the inability to appoint judges to the Constitutional Court, etc. What do you think about this?
Is judicial reform critical? Yes.
Are there questions about the functioning of all existing institutions? Yes, there are. We have restored the work of the High Council of Justice, the High Qualification Commission in accordance with integrity standards.
Are they working flawlessly? In my opinion, there is room for strengthening and improving their work. But in any case, I perceive criticism as our roadmap.
Just about HQCJ. The report mentioned the pressure of the State Bureau of Investigation on the commission. In addition, there is Serhiy Vlasenkoʼs TIC, whose actions also look like pressure. Additionally, the Verkhovna Rada separately voted on amendments to the law, and now the members of HQCJ will be selected not by independent internationalists, but by the Council of Judges, lawyers and other interested bodies. Will this change in any way?
I would not like to delve into the issue of cooperation between the temporary investigative commission (TIC) and HQCJ and this heated discussion in general. The only thing I want to say is that there are visible signs of violations and a possible conflict of interest in the selection of judges.
As a former compliance officer of a bank, I want to say that when members of HQCJ or the Supreme Judicial Council themselves, or their close relatives, participate in the competition for judicial positions and receive the highest scores, this may indicate that they are in a privileged position.
I am not stating that this was necessarily the case, but the question of a conflict of interest is there. Are these selections ideal? No. Is there room for improving the procedures? Yes. Are they transparent? Even taking into account how these works were checked, how quickly, with what quality, there is also.
But, in my opinion, this is not a discrediting of the work of HQCJ, but a signal to improve these procedures, to write out their criteria, methodology, and a clear procedure for involving third-party experts to verify the work. TIC also draws attention to this, although in such a natural manner...
In the report, the European Union demands that Ukraine expand the jurisdiction of NABU, including to the leadership of the Presidentʼs Office, heads of regional administrations, etc. How quickly will these changes be made, and will the Presidentʼs Office be involved in this?
Making changes is the responsibility of the parliament. In general, initiatives aimed at implementing the recommendations of the European Commission should be submitted by the government. Apparently, the Ministry of Justice will develop and submit them.
The EU report also criticizes the National Association of Bar Associations (NAAU) and notes that there is no progress in the reform of the bar. The shadow report states that such a reform is one of the strategic tasks. Are there any developments, draft laws, any progress in this regard?
In our draft strategy, we have provided a separate section for reforming the bar, as well as legal education, which, by the way, also needs reform. Here, lawyers themselves must understand the urgency of this reform. The fourth year has passed since the bar has not submitted candidates to the High Council of Justice.
Is this a deliberate blocking by NAAU?
I cannot say that, but I have heard such opinions among the legal community. I think that the war should not prevent lawyers from holding their congress. NAAU refers to the war and says that holding a congress is risky. But the congress of judges took place during the war — a great example that it is possible.
During the presentation of the shadow report, your quote was also cited, stating that some initiatives important for European integration are not being promoted in parliament. Why is this happening?
My message was that any changes should be introduced in dialogue with parliament. The executive branch cannot make commitments without involving parliament, without understanding whether parliament will support them.
And just to sum up my words about judicial reform — I donʼt want just cosmetic changes, I want to change the logic of the entire system, so that it is reliable and stable, works even during air raids, even during turbulence within the country. And so that it is trusted. It is precisely on the creation of such a system that we are working.
Діма Вага / «Бабель»