You worked in Sarajevo in the Special Department for the Investigation of War Crimes. What department was it?
It was created in 2005 — at that time, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had been operating in The Hague for 10 years. Cases were heard there, investigations continued, but everyone understood that everything was slow and expensive. There were discussions in political and expert circles about how to move forward. Then Bosnia and Herzegovina faced the same problems that Ukraine has now. A huge number of cases — about 10 thousand. And in Ukraine, there are already more than 100 thousand.
By that time, the ICTY had already handed down 79 guilty verdicts, and 161 people had been indicted — this is a high figure for international tribunals, but still not enough. In addition, the ICTY then investigated cases against anyone, like the camp guards — yes, they committed terrible crimes, but they were not political or military leaders.
Therefore, they decided that these cases will also be considered by the Special Department for War Crimes at the Prosecutorʼs Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will include qualified international and national lawyers. The ICTY was supposed to deal with key high-ranking officials. Bosniaʼs courts and prosecutors had to focus on the middle level. And a number of regional prosecutorʼs offices throughout the country dealt with cases of the lowest level. By the way, this department is still working.
What exactly was your job?
I was an international employee. Iʼm from Croatia myself, and Bosnia is our closest neighbor, our languages are almost the same, itʼs like English in the US and UK. So I can work with local documents, talk to people. In the mid-2000s, many international experts helped Bosnia, as they help Ukraine now. Because at that time there were few experts on war crimes in the country, there were not even such courses in law schools. Also, international experts were needed because they could remain impartial, which is important for a fair process.
I worked as an analyst, because I am not a lawyer, but a historian. I helped prosecutors and investigators collect and analyze documents. Helped foreigners understand the context. Because they did not know the language, historical and cultural characteristics and could not always, for example, understand political speeches.
You spent several years there and must have interacted with the local population. What were peopleʼs expectations from these courts?
As in Ukraine now, people did not speak with one voice. Their expectations depended on what they had experienced, what damage they had suffered, who or what they had lost. War crimes investigations usually take many years, and peopleʼs perceptions change during that time.
The one thing they all have in common is the need for a formal process that recognizes the harm done. People were illegally imprisoned, beaten, their homes destroyed, relatives or pets stolen or killed — they need more people to hear about it. Someone wants severe punishment for the criminal, and someone just wants to be heard by people in robes and officially recognize the damage. People who have lost family members want to find them alive, and if they are dead, to find their bones to give them a proper burial.
It is important for Ukrainians to realize one thing — with the number of crimes that have already occurred during the war and are committed every day, there is no justice system that could ensure full justice and punish all criminals. No one will be able to investigate more than 100,000 cases. There is no such historical example. Therefore, for example, in Rwanda, there were gachacha courts, which dealt with crimes at the grassroots level, but they were not classic courts, as we understand them.
Funeral of the war victims, Modrach, Bosnia, September 1992. Funeral procession on February 7, 2024 in Lviv, Ukraine. Oleksandr Shargulenko, Taras Kizi and Denys Siryk died defending Ukraine.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
Were they some kind of truth commissions?
Almost. A more traditional dispute resolution mechanism, there were no professional lawyers and judges, but there were also punishments.
Therefore, it is important for Ukrainians to accept the painful fact — not all criminals will be punished. I will give some numbers. In the former Yugoslavia we had the International Tribunal and 20 years of trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia. All of them prosecuted a little more than a thousand people.
You donʼt have a tribunal, you have national courts and the International Criminal Court — there are now arrest warrants for two people, maybe in the end it will deal with up to 10 people at most. If after ten years 5-10% of cases are considered successfully and fairly, this will be a good result. Therefore, it is important to think about alternative mechanisms.
What other mechanisms can be offered to victims?
You have already mentioned the truth commission as a way to officially talk about a personʼs experiences in a public place — it can give a certain satisfaction. It is also important for historians who will later write studies and books. For example, the report of the Human Rights Watch on the investigation of what happened in Mariupol is information available to everyone, which narrows the space for denial and allows you to fight the theses that “itʼs all a fake”. In the former Yugoslavia, we also had to face such conversations.
Another thing is general psychosocial support for survivors, veterans or ex-POWs. Because it is important for them to have good care, medicine, psychological support, and work. Rebuilding your life will be more important to someone than seeing a criminal in prison.
In addition, it is important to look for missing persons. This is key for many families. Art projects, memorials, ways in which in society we can talk about trauma, about what happened to us. Itʼs not magic that will heal society, but it can ease the pain.
Protesters outside the courthouse on the day Ratko Mladićʼs sentence was announced, November 22, 2017, The Hague, Netherlands. Families of Ukrainian prisoners of war on Main Square in Krakow, Poland, on August 13, 2023.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
I have a note regarding truth commissions. People will have to talk about the traumatic experience and others will have to listen to it — this can be retraumatization.
Psychologists and trauma experts will tell you better about it. In the former Yugoslavia, these processes began 10-15 years after the war. There was a civil society initiative to create a joint truth commission, so that it would include people from Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia. The idea was for each society to tell its own version of the story. I am, of course, generalizing, there are always dissidents, opponents, debates. But, for example, Croatia has a fairly established narrative about what happened during the war. The same in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo.
So the idea was to second human rights defenders, historians, citizens, and journalists to these commissions. And talk about what happened. At the level of civil society, they worked, but the state did not officially do so.
Therefore, I think that in 20 years you will be able to talk to some Russians about what happened. And it can be useful, but not now. You are still in the process of war, so this is definitely not the time. Someone will never want to talk at all — thatʼs their right.
The Serbs still havenʼt recognized the results of the ICTY. They still treat people who committed crimes in Bosnia or Croatia as heroes. I am sure that it will be the same in Russia. On the other hand, there is the example of Germany, which changed after Nuremberg trial. Why did Germany change, but Serbia did not?
Serbia has never officially recognized what happened in Srebrenica as genocide. Never. I think it will be the same in Russia, at least as long as Putin and his friends are in power. Putin is not necessarily all of Russia. There are people who left Russia because they do not agree, journalists are rotting in Russian prisons. These are the people you might start talking to in the first place one day—the ones who are feeling embarrassed now.
Do not hand Putin the victory, saying that Putin is Russia! This is not so. He has a lot of support, thatʼs a fact. But what can it be if people do not have access to knowledge and true information? We had the same thing in Serbia with Milosevic. There were pensioners who watched Serbian national television and believed that Serbia was simply protecting Serbs.
Throughout the war, there were contacts between human rights defenders from different countries who worked together to investigate war crimes. People in Serbia risked their lives and safety to fight against their own state. And it is they who call the events in Srebrenica genocide.
A Bosnian woman cleans a grave at the Potočari Memorial Cemetery near Srebrenica, Bosnia, where victims of the massacre are buried, July 8, 2010.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
As for Germany, it lost the war, and therefore Nuremberg took place. And letʼs be honest, they were actually occupied, they had no choice. But 5-10 years passed after Nuremberg, and many Nazi judges returned to their jobs. Right now there is quite a large right wing in Germany. So itʼs hardly a brilliant example. Of course, there are Holocaust memorials in Berlin, but donʼt idealize that situation.
Prosecution of war crimes cannot transform society by itself, more is needed. It is necessary for the country to have opponents of these crimes. It is extremely important for Russia to have an opposition that could recognize that what Russia was doing in Ukraine was illegal, criminal and immoral. But the problem is that the Russian opposition is either abroad, in prison, or dead.
Letʼs return to the work of the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What were the mistakes? What should Ukraine do to avoid such mistakes?
It all depends on what we consider mistakes and what challenges. You now have over 100,000 court cases. But it is not clear what the prosecutors mean when they say such a number — is it really a case or is it a file in which one page says that a shell hit a market in city X, people died. In addition, the whole world documents crimes in Ukraine — these are piles of materials. And it is not clear whether they are all mutually agreed upon.
With such a number, it is important for you to have a good database. And then we need a strategy, how we determine the priority of cases. Because you may end up spending a lot of time prosecuting a Russian soldier for one murder and not having time to investigate mass murders. I have also seen a lot of absentee trials in Ukraine, but many experts agree that a fair trial is hardly possible without the accused, because the accused cannot defend himself. It may be appropriate to focus on cases where there is an opportunity to arrest the suspect. Or concentrate on the most serious crimes, where there are many victims, or on extremely violent cases.
A man mourns the body of a civilian victim of the siege of Sarajevo, killed by a sniper. The siege of the city lasted from 1992 until the ceasefire in 1995. Grandfather sits next to the body of 9-year-old granddaughter Vika, who was killed in the Desnyansky district of Kyiv during a rocket attack. Together with the girl, her 34-year-old mother Olha died.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
Bosnia and Herzegovina had a similar situation. The strategy was drawn up there, but it was quite general, so different prosecutors applied it in their own way, it was ineffective.
Separately, you need to think about communication from the prosecutorʼs office and the state to explain to people why their case is not moving forward. Because there will be thousands of cases without a future due to lack of information.
You criticize the consideration of cases in absentia. But it is almost impossible to detain Russian soldiers who have committed crimes.
I know and understand that. There have been many such cases in Croatia, hundreds if not thousands, but whatʼs the point? They still wonʼt go to jail because they werenʼt caught. And if a person is suddenly detained, then according to Croatian law, the trial must go through from the very beginning. Why waste energy and time?
In 2023, you released your research on Serbian paramilitary groups that operated in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Was there a legal difference between them and regular troops?
Absolutely. Both in the former Yugoslavia, as well as in Russia and Ukraine, the military is a formalized structure, which means that there are laws and rules by which they operate. There are commanders, powers, documents, orders that go from top to bottom, reports and reports that go from bottom to top. The military keeps track of how much ammunition they use, where their tanks are, their personnel, who is wounded, who is in the hospital, and who is due to return to duty.
Militias do none of this or do it secretly. I studied groups that supported Slobodan Milosevicʼs regime and were active in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Itʼs not exactly like "Wagnerʼs PMC", but itʼs a bit like them. And then Russia or Serbia can say: "We have no idea who these people are, and we have nothing to do with them." But at the same time, they secretly advance their territorial and demographic goals through these formations. Since it is secret, it is more difficult to find evidence in such cases. Therefore, regular troops are easier to pursue than paramilitary.
A training camp for the Knindza, or Red Berets, under the command of Dragan Vasilkovic, known as Captain Dragan, on April 11, 1994, in Bruca, near the town of Knin, Croatia. Members of the Wagner's PMC prepare to depart from the headquarters of the Southern Military District and return to the base in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, on June 24, 2023.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
And how does "Wagnerʼs PMC" differ from them?
They are a more advanced version of what was in the former Yugoslavia. They are more than a paramilitary formation. It is a network of real and fake businesses, mining, smuggling operations, they are in about 10 different countries on three continents. They can be considered mercenaries in some countries. We, in the former Yugoslavia, did not have this.
Paramilitary formations do not have an official definition, different wars will have their own form of this phenomenon. In the book about the experience of ex-Yugoslavia, I determined that paramilitary groups are armed, organized and united groups that have their own distinguishing marks. They must also have a political purpose, even if they do not speak about it publicly. And formally they are not part of the state.
But thatʼs all is relevant to "Wagnerʼs PMC" in Ukraine.
In other countries, they may fall under the definition of mercenaries. In Ukraine, they are part of the war between Russia and Ukraine, a paramilitary formation.
The war in Ukraine fundamentally changed them. Before that, they were a shadowy group that hired armed guys with a lot of experience to gain access to mines in mineral-rich regions of Africa, for example. When they started visiting prisons, they increased their number by about 40,000 to 50,000.
How was the connection between paramilitary groups and the official authorities proven at the International Tribunal?
It was difficult. Often, such units operate through state security agencies. That was the case in Serbia. These people are not stupid, they donʼt leave traces: they donʼt sign contracts, they donʼt take pictures when they donʼt have to. In the former Yugoslavia, members of top secret units were paid in cash and signed papers with nicknames rather than their real names. Units often changed names and seals. All this significantly complicates the work of investigators and the court.
It was easy for prosecutors to establish the chain of command of former general Ratko Mladic in Bosnia, because it is a regular army. There was no state border, many documents, photos, images, videos, statements, reports, orders remained. There was a big problem with paramilitary formations, because the brain of the operation was in Belgrade, and the units operated in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
So, if one day someone from the "Wagnerians" is brought to justice, it will be difficult with the evidence base.
General Ratko Mladic during negotiations at Sarajevo airport, June 1993.
One of the demonstrative cases regarding paramilitary formations was the case of [Jovica] Stanisic and [Franko] Simatovic. It was possible to establish a connection between the paramilitary formations and the Serbian authorities.
Yes. It was an interesting but difficult business. The process lasted 20 years. They were arrested in 2003, but were fully acquitted during the first trial. Then the case was re-considered. They skilfully hid connections and evidence, but investigators obtained notes from some meetings, as well as testimony, for example, from military commanders in Bosnia who saw Stanisic and testified that he knew well which units were active, how many people were sent and where. Many things in those testimonies were secret, there is no such thing in public access.
Simatovic was actually an operational commander who often wore a uniform. People testified that he was in the camps where these formations underwent training and issued orders. There were intercepts of telephone conversations between people in Belgrade and Stanisic or other people in Bosnia asking for units to be sent to them and mentioning Stanisic.
Former Serbian secret police chief Jovica Stanisic, left, and his former deputy Franko Simatovic, right, sit in court before a trial chamber hearing at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, May 30, 2013.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
Can we draw parallels with groups that have been active in Donbas since 2014 and were financed by Russia?
Yes. We had similar groups in the former Yugoslavia, not necessarily even Serbs. But everything they had — money, weapons, equipment — everything came from Belgrade.
What else from your research on paramilitary groups could be useful for Ukraine?
I have an important piece of advice: take your time. There is always a lot of pressure, demands to investigate and condemn immediately. But this is the wrong approach. This also applies to Putin himself. High-profile cases are difficult to investigate and prove. It is easier for the defense to collapse the case when the prosecution does not have access to documents and occupied territories. And the prosecution will have to put together a puzzle from small details — slowly and consistently.
For example, in the former Yugoslavia there were many so-called insider witnesses — these are people who knew about who said what somewhere at the table, but without a record. Therefore, it is worth trying to talk to people who work for Russian state security, people who participated in separatism in the east or in Crimea. It is possible to agree that they will testify against management in exchange for a shorter term.
Mladic and Karadzic were first charged in 1995-1996. And I am glad that they were not detained then and there was no trial, because then they could have been acquitted. At that time, most of the bodies in Srebrenica had not yet been found, and investigators received many documents only years later. I am glad that Mladic and Karadzic hid for 15 years, because during that time the prosecutor was able to prepare well and say: "Here is a room full of evidence. Here are 25 witnesses — Serbian military, intelligence, politicians who will tell about what happened."
When I came to The Hague in 2009, Karadzic had only been arrested, and Mladic was wanted for another year or two. When I am asked what are the chances that Putin will be arrested, I always answer that now it is not very high, but it is now. Because everything changes.
Ukrainian demonstrators at a rally for the Independence Day of Ukraine, Warsaw, Poland, August 24, 2023.
Getty Images / «Babel'»
Translated from Ukrainian by Anton Semyzhenko.
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