Russia recruited "non-professional agents" in Poland, including Ukrainians. Their tasks were to scout Polish seaports, place cameras along railways and hide surveillance devices in military cargo. In March, they received a new order to intercept trains carrying weapons to Ukraine.
This is stated in the material of the American newspaper The Washington Post.
Russia assembled a "team of amateurs", particularly with the help of Russian-language posts in Telegram channels in Poland, which are often visited by Ukrainian refugees — among job offers and housing advice. Publications began to appear at the beginning of this year. The Washington Post writes that 12 Ukrainians, three Belarusians, and one Russian have been detained in this case. The Ukrainians stated that their motive was more money than ideology.
Polish authorities now believe that the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU) was the mastermind and that the botched operation was the most serious Russian threat on NATO soil. Russiaʼs goal was to disrupt the supply of Western equipment to Ukraine (in 80% of cases, it goes through Poland).
According to an investigator from Polandʼs Internal Security Agency, the Russians promised to pay from a few dollars for graffiti to $12 for a poster. The leaflets and banners were supposed to have inscriptions such as "POLAND ≠ UKRAINE" and "NATO, GO HOME". The distribution of such materials pursued two goals: inflaming anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland and checking the readiness of recruits to perform tasks.
The Russians gave more serious tasks to those who provided photos confirming the completed "work". Some were ordered to buy disposable cell phones and cameras, which were passed through hiding places to other recruits who began traveling across Poland to collect reports and photographs from railway stations, airfields and seaports.
The mercenaries were paid in cryptocurrency and wire transfers from untraceable bank accounts. Derailment, arson, and murder tasks ranked highest on the pay scale, although even those cost only a few hundred dollars, according to Polish intelligence services.
Polish special services found a camera that was visible from behind trees and bushes along an important section of the railway. It was a standard video camera powered by a solar battery. It transmitted footage of the cargo passage to a special server that could be accessed remotely with the correct password. Using camera data, cell phone records and nearby cell towers, investigators were able to determine not only when the device was installed, but also who was nearby at the time — one of several glaring mistakes by poorly trained Russian recruits.
During the search of other sections of the track, other cameras were also found: one was on the trunk of a poplar tree near the bridge, where trains have to reduce speed, the other was on a branch overlooking the railroad junctions, where freight cars maneuver in anticipation of arrival.
A few days later, the authorities detained the suspect, who provided information about other members of the group, including his supervisor. Tracking, interception and a series of measures led to other cells.
According to the investigator, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, Russian spy services continue to operate in Poland and "will try to correct the mistakes made."