The Verge writes about a Russian malware group that is falsifying pro-Ukrainian apps. As the Russian war in Ukraine is ongoing, the researchers at Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) have found a Russian state-backed group Turla spreading malware disguised as a pro-Ukraine app, “Cyber Azov”. Text on the app website claimed the app would launch denial-of-service attacks on Russian websites. In reality, the VirusTotal analysis indicates it is a malicious app containing a Trojan. Besides apps like Cyber Azov, TAG also flagged exploitation of a newly uncovered Follina vulnerability in Microsoft Office, which allows hackers to manipulate computers. TAG informs the Follina is used by groups linked to the Russian General Intelligence Office to attack Ukrainian media organizations. These tools are part of a significant new cyber dimension trend that emerged following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine – the engagement of a large decentralized base of digital volunteers.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is teasing Putin during his visit to Turkey, writes The Guardian. The Russian president was left for nearly a minute awkwardly standing in a room in front of a group of reporters before being greeted by Erdogan, according to the meeting footage. The Guardian writes that it might have been payback for a 2020 meeting in Moscow when Erdogan was forced to wait for around two minutes before being admitted to the meeting room. It is common for Putin to make international leaders remain. Some even claim this is his calibrated psychological tactics. The Guardian listed several cases of when Putin was severely late: in 2003, he made the British Queen wait for him as he was 14 minutes late. In June 2015, Putin showed up an hour late to the meeting with Pope Francis in the Vatican.
Joseph Stieb, an assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote an essay on War on the Rocks, discussing the impact of the U.S War on Terror on the American role in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The US response to 9/11 in Iraq turned into a “violent quagmire”, leading to increased skepticism of the idea of external military interventions in general. As support for the Iraq war became a political liability, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have all sought to limit U.S external interventions. Stieb then discusses the differences between conservative and liberal approaches to a demonstration of US power and the consensus between them: demonstration of power without applying it directly to foes. The U.S longstanding, bipartisan commitment to promoting the “universal values” became a part of the post-9/11 consensus. Ukraine is in “the shadow of the Global War on Terror,” writes Stieb. President Biden has framed the war in Ukraine as a defense of global democracies versus rising authoritarianism, trying to transform a foreign society without putting American boots on the ground. The opponents among the anti-interventionist consensus circle, while not necessarily opposing military aid to Ukraine, also blame US and NATO for the crisis. Moreover, some nationalists openly admire Putin as he represents their value system. For the establishment, on the other side, the U.S role in Ukraine could rebuild its power by distancing it from the consequences of the Iraq war.