The New York Times published an interactive piece featuring maps and figures of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, demonstrating a change of plans in the Kremlin. The maps show the positions and gains of Ukrainian and Russian troops on the frontline. Even following failed attempt to seize Kyiv, the invaders still are disseminating their forces to too many places at once. Russians regularly send units from Izium to Sloviansk, but they keep failing to overwhelm Ukrainian fighters there. They are gaining some success near Lyman, however, they cannot cross the Siversky Donets river being attacked and killed by Ukrainian defenders. Sievierodonetsk might face a siege similar to what happened in Mariupol, with Ukrainian troops holding the city as long as possible. Russians have also captured Popasna after shelling the town to the ground. The outlet writes these victories are not enough for Russia to take control over Donbas. Moreover, Russian forces do not have a reliable supply of fighters and equipment like Ukraine. The farther that Russian troops push, the longer their supply lines become and the more exposed they are to Ukrainian counterattacks, so Russia must reposition troops to defend territory it has already won. If Russia does not make significant advances soon, the war might drift into a stalemate with the battle for Donbas being the last major offensive of the war, concludes The New York Times.
The Economist writes about why Turkey is preventing NATO from northern expansion and the possible price Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants for changing his decision. The official reason why Turkish leader opposes Finnish and Swedish applications to NATO is that they harbor members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and supporters of Fethullah Gulen, leader of the Islamist movement, which Turkey recognizes as terrorist groups. One of the critical demands of Turkey is for Sweden and Finland to extradite supporters of these two groups, which is not likely to happen. At the same time, Erdogan’s position might have more to do with Turkey-US relations, and in particular, Turkey might bargain for expediting a deal letting Turkey purchase 40 new F-16 jets. It also might hope for other NATO members to resume arms sales that were partially halted after it launched a military offensive against the Kurds in Syria. Lastly, Erdogan might be doing a favor to Putin, as Turkey’s position in Ukraine’s war has been unclear. For now, the White House plays calm, with President Biden saying he would not go to Turkey to broker a deal, which might be a play in the hope of lowering Turkey’s price.
American political scientist Dominic Tierney offers a look into the lessons of the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, which might help develop a strategy for ending the war in Ukraine in his op-ed on the Foreign Affairs. Thirty years ago, in 1989, the Soviet army retreated from Afghanistan, pretending that its mission there was successfully over. In reality, the Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted for years leading to thousands of official Soviet fatalities and a failed attempt to install a pro-Soviet government in Kabul. Ultimately, this failure demonstrated the weakness of the Soviet system and led to further reforms and the collapse of the USSR. The current Russian invasion of Ukraine has many things in common with the Soviet war in Afghanistan – as it is another destructive and unwinnable conflict, initially aiming to set a proxy regime but instead causing heavy losses to the invading army. Many western commentators urge the West and Ukraine to offer Putin what Sun Tzu called the “golden bridge” out of the war – something that Putin could present a victory at home. Looking back into the end of Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the West and Ukraine might offer Putin the “gilded bridge” – something attractive enough for Kremlin but, with time, seen as cheap and shameful. Some of the offers that Ukraine might have to consider to end the war would be conceding Moscowʼs withdrawal from Crimea and Donbas and the requirement for massive Russian reparations. Tierney stresses that in no case should Western allies pressure Ukraine to make those decisions and cede its territorial integrity. Still, the West can help Ukraine find symbolic choices to create a gilded bridge to get Russia out. For example, as NATO has no plans to admit Ukraine, Ukraine could pledge to shelve its’ aspirations to join the Alliance – this will let Putin declare he “stopped NATO”. Ukraine also could enact measures to safeguard the rights of Russian speakers providing the Kremlin with another “victory” narrative. Tierney believes that the humiliation of Russians is not an effective strategy providing the example of the Treaty of Versailles that fueled the rise of Adolf Hitler. The author believes that Ukraine and its western allies should aim for a long-term victory, offering a peace treaty solution now and hoping that the Russian failed war in Ukraine would lead to the same consequences as failed Soviet war in Afghanistan.