The main question now is — how much the humanitarian mission in Oleshky will affect the further defense of Kherson? During the ceasefire, the Russians regrouped and received reinforcements. At the same time, the ceasefire worked in both directions. Can we say that the Russians got more advantageous positions than they had before the humanitarian mission?
For the Russians [the ceasefire] was the only opportunity to regain the lost positions in and around Oleshky — in particular in Velyka Kardashynka and Hola Prystan. These are settlements located along the Dnipro River. They wanted to drag their artillery systems into the forests there.
After all, the 34th brigade [not counting the adjunct ones] had destroyed more than 110 Russian guns in the forests around Oleshky since January 1. The same applies to the “Grad” multiple rocket launchers.
During the ceasefire, [the Russians] managed to drag the artillery systems into the forest behind Oleshky.
«Babel'»
But [as a result of the humanitarian mission] they also got some disadvantages.
There are fewer people in Oleshky, so it is easier for us to detect Russians and destroy their shelters (houses and basements). For example, in the Zhytloselysche micro-district [on the eastern outskirts of Oleshky] there are the most of them. They are in the five-story buildings.
Now the Russians have a mood like "thank God we managed to drag food in Oleshky, so now we can sit in basements for a few weeks and not run around so that we donʼt get killed on the streets". Therefore, globally, the ceasefire has not affected anything, except that the risk to the civilian population has increased.
«Babel'»
Have you noticed any unusual actions by the Russians after the end of the ceasefire?
We see nothing new. The Russians are trying to push their "meat" onto the islands to restore their positions, accumulate sabotage groups, and crawl to the banks of the Dnipro River.
Already after [ending of the] ceasefire, we destroyed a certain number of servicemen who tried to do this. Although, the Russians have become more numerous. This is also due to the fact that we did not mine the forests or other areas through which their infantry and "foot soldiers" moved.
"Foot soldiers" are Russian military personnel who are engaged in logistics: they carry ammunition, fuel, and food to positions on foot.
Previously, a year ago, the Russians could safely drive in by car. Then they switched to ground robotic complexes (GRCs) that drove through the forests. Although they also began to blow up on mines.
Then the Russians began to carry loads on themselves — and so these "food sildiers" appeared. They are also regularly destroyed, but it is impossible to intercept all of them: fog, rain, and other weather conditions interfere.
Therefore, some of the Russians still manage to infiltrate in Oleshky.
A Ukrainian FPV drone flies into a “foot soldier”.
Сили безпілотних систем / Птахи Мадяра
We saw that the Ukrainian military managed to deliver provisions to the townspeople using drones. Does this mean that the Russians cannot fully control the skies over Oleshky?
The Russians do not control the skies over Oleshky. They have positions, including in five-story buildings, but they are effectively blocked in the city. They cannot shoot, chase drones, or deploy mobile fire groups. Our reconnaissance drones operate over Oleshky for 24/7.
If someone tries to move [out], an FPV drone will fly on them in a few minutes. Now, while they have something to eat, they are not showing any signs of life. The “foot soldiers” are not coming [to them] yet either.
If Oleshky cannot be considered a reliable stronghold for the Russians, then where are their main strongholds in this direction? Can we talk, for example, about Radensk?
For the Russians, Oleshky is already the frontline. Vynohradovo, Brylivka, Velyki Kopani — which are behind Radensk — are their strongholds. Our drones do not reach there. But Radensk itself [which is 20 km from Oleshky] we have taken under air control. When we detect something, our FPV drones and other strike drones quickly destroy the target.
Although, of course, it is difficult to conduct aerial reconnaissance there, because it is too far for the mavic drones. In recent months, the Russians have suffered very heavy losses [in Radensk].
There is also Pidlisne, a kind of transit point. From there the Russians are trying to advance in small groups towards Oleshky. It is much more difficult to get them there.
«Babel'»
Before the humanitarian mission, I communicated with the residents of Oleshky. When evacuation became impossible, there were people who managed to “evacuate” by walking along the road to Radensk. How was this possible if Radensk was occupied?
The road [to Radensk] is under the control of our forces. For the past month and a half, the residents of Oleshky have been able to get to Radensk without hindrance — on foot, by bicycle, alone or in groups. There they go to the market, buy food, and return. There are no Russian soldiers on this road.
We also do not mine the road so that people do not blow themselves up. In addition, we have enough FPV drones that can quickly hit any target — a car, a buggy, an ATV or a Russian soldier.
Therefore, we can control the road without mining. Thanks to control over this section, as well as the fact that the Russian military in Oleshky is hiding in the basements (there are at least a hundred of them in the city), we can conduct humanitarian air operations and deliver aid to the residents.
We will continue to do so, because at least a thousand people remain in the city.
About the "islands" in the Dnipro River delta between Kherson and Oleshky. They constantly appear in the news when it comes to Kherson. What are these islands?
It is about the “islands” of Oleksiivsky, Kruhlyk, Velykyi Vilkhovyi, and Karantynnyi. These are not so much islands as an island agglomeration: trees, reeds, bushes, summer cottage settlements along the Dnipro River on both sides in front of the Antonivskyi Bridge.
They can be called “island floodplains”. The Russians are afraid that we will advance to Oleshky through the islands and our sabotage groups will begin to enter the city.
Last fall, we mined all the exits through the Konka River and other rivers that flow from Oleshky and the Kozachi Laheri to the Dnipro River. This was necessary so that the Russians could not storm and land on boats in the direction of Kherson.
Although, the situation has changed. Now the Russians are mining these rivers to prevent our landing on the islands. Hundreds of Russian soldiers have died on the islands this year. Two, three, and sometimes four die there every day.
«Babel'»
Who controls these islands?
This is a gray area, but we control the sky. I would like to note that on the left bank along Kherson, in the defense zone of the 34th brigade, we have many positions that have not disappeared anywhere.
Therefore, the Russians are afraid that we will start advancing in sabotage groups towards Oleshky.
Can you tell us about a specific Russian operation related to the islands? Because itʼs probably not just a regular boat crossing in foggy weather. What other tactics do they use?
Last fall and winter, the Russians tried to enter the islands from the rear, taking boats out of the rivers near Hola Prystan and landing in fog or at night at Dachi along the Dnipro river delta, near the Antonivskyi Bridge.
This way, they wanted to avoid a difficult route where their infantry was destroyed by drones or blown up by mines.
«Babel'»
Although, this tactic failed. All the boats were destroyed, and the Russian soldiers who managed to land near the Antonivskyi Bridge were eliminated. One of the last such landings was in the winter. Then they were destroyed by drones in half an hour.
Now the Russians are no longer trying to enter the islands in this way, but simply send infantry there. Their command deceives their fighters, convincing them that the Russians have established themselves there. In fact, there have been no living Russian soldiers at these positions for a long time. The islands are strewn with corpses.
One of the Russiansʼ priorities may be Karantynnyi Island, since it is relatively easy to get to the Korabel neighborhood from there. Is this true? Can we say that after all — one after one — Russians were able to achieve their goal?
At the end of October, the Russians tried to land in the Korabel neighborhood, taking advantage of heavy fog. They entered from the Hydropark. Six Russian soldiers came out: three were captured, the rest were destroyed. This group was supposed to establish itself on the shore and transmit a signal [to the command] that our positions were not there. Although, as soon as they landed, they encountered our defense line.
Later, there were rumors that they were landing again, but our units were cleaning up the houses [especially during the ceasefire], and no one found them. That is, the Russians either lied, or landed somewhere on other islands, or drowned.
Although, the landings can be repeated. This is a war, and Korabel is an absolute priority for the Russians. Not because it will be easier for them to advance to Kherson from there, but because there are already many of our units there.
It is important for them to raise the flag and report [about it]. This is a geopolitical task for them. Karanrynnyi Island was, is and will be a tasty morsel for them. If there is fog, the probability of a new landing attempt is very high.
«Babel'»
Many people are currently concerned about whether there are threats to Kherson. Are there any? If so, what are they? If this is not a ground attack, can you say that Kherson will soon be attacked from the sky?
In winter, their firepower will be lower.
Firstly, the leaves have fallen, the cold has set in, so due to the weather conditions it will be much more difficult for them to conduct operations across the river. Secondly, after the armistice, we immediately began to seize the initiative. We began to actively strike at the Russians on the left bank, using everything we have.
There are no global threats to Kherson. We see and hear absolutely everything that is happening on the left bank, and everyone who is there.
The only threat is the chaotic artillery strikes on the city, which are dangerous for civilians. Kherson is on the front line, so no matter how much we want to, we cannot guarantee that not a single shell will fly here again.
There is also the threat of attacks by FPV drones. The situation with them was very difficult in the summer. After the ceasefire, the number of Russian reconnaissance drones flying over the right bank increased by 90 percent. Artillery shelling increased by about 40% — the Russians brought up their guns.
We are not seeing large-scale raids by the same drones now.
What Russian units are operating in your direction? Can we roughly compare their forces with those of the 34th Brigade?
In the summer, soldiers from the 50th separate brigade of UAVs of the Russian Federation “Varyags” were stationed here.
They were removed and transferred somewhere to the Donetsk region. The detachment that was stationed here suffered the greatest losses among all the “Varyag” units. Now, UAV units of the 98th Guards Airborne Division of the Russian Federation are operating here.
There is no “Rubicon” [in this area]. As of today, our UAV potential is much higher than that of the enemy on the left bank. Every hour, dozens of our drones fly to the left bank in search of targets.
Can you give figures on how many Russians the brigade currently kills per day, who are trying to infiltrate in any way towards Kherson (from the islands, in particular)?
In October, [the 34th Brigade] destroyed 94 Russian soldiers. In fact, this figure is higher, but we cannot confirm all the losses.
For example, after a night strike by a heavy bomber in the forest [near Oleshky] or on the islands, intelligence may report two or three “two hundredths”.
Although, if we know about the destroyed Russians in Radensk, for example as a result of strikes on their shelters, then even though our drones fly over the area, recording the bodies of the dead in the destroyed shelter is a difficult task.
Without photo or video confirmation, we cannot include them among the confirmed losses. Therefore, the official figure does not reflect all the [real] results.