After returning from the army, I joined the “Come Back Alive” foundation.
Initially, I joined as a manager for working with the military. Now itʼs me who head the department where such managers work. In this department, different people are responsible for the branches and types of troops: they receive requests, process [them], verify [them], and meet their needs. Someone works with the Ground Forces, someone with the Special Operation Forces (SOF), someone with the Air Assault Troops. I coordinate everyone, and choose priorities.
I try to go to the frontline as often as possible. It happens about once a month, and sometimes more often. I usually communicate with the corps command, as well as with the command of the branches and types of troops. I try to build new contacts at the brigade level, and sometimes — at the battalion level.
We can say that the Russian summer offensive failed.
Their main political task is to take the Donetsk region. That is where they are throwing resources, where they are suffering the greatest losses and — we must admit — they are advancing little by little.
It if happennig in Kostyantynivka, on the outskirts of Slovyansk, in the area of occupied Pokrovsk, sometimes in the area of Dobropillia. So we did not completely stop the enemyʼs advance. In this point, there is no victory. But there is no total betrayal either.
Letʼs remember the years 2024-2025. We were faced with the fact that the tactics of infiltration gave the Russians the greatest effect. On the example of Dobropillia, we saw what active infiltration can lead to. If they really went to our rear and connected armored vehicles, there would be a big disaster. Great respect to those units that were able to stop them.
The Russians always set themselves max, even inadequate goals. For instance, to take the Donetsk region by the end of autumn. Although, if we measure them by such goals, then their offensive did not just fail, but failed a lot.
At the same time, there are some questions:
- Did they get closer to Slovyansk? Yes.
- Has life in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk become much more difficult? 100% yes.
This is what the Foundation managers who are there say. The situation in the cities is completely bad compared to what it was even a few months ago: artillery is starting to fire, the number of FPV is increasing. This also applies to Kostyantynivka. It cannot be said that the city is completely under our control.
So have we stopped them completely? No.
They are constantly pressing [on us] and holding the initiative. But we have definitely ruined their biggest plans, and maybe even their not-the-biggest plans. Summer is usually the most active period for Russians.
This summer they did not get as much as they dreamed of.
Since the mobilization problem has not been solved, we are holding back the enemy thanks to our technological superiority and the fact that the front is saturated with pilots.
Pilots are the new infantry. People are retraining to become pilots from mortar crews, from snipers. Once there were 4-5 crews of “mavics” in a brigade, and that was all [of them]. Now there are dozens of crews in brigades: “mavics”, FPV, bombers, large attack wings, large reconnaissance wings. Our frontline is thin, but it is so saturated with resources that the enemy suffers exorbitant losses. They need to climb out of the trenches and holes to move forward.
What we are seeing on the front now is the delayed effect of middle strikes and deep strikes. A destroyed fuel and lubricants depot sometimes weighs more for a Russian brigade than the loss of a detachment. Even in case they will recruit the new detachment, and while they are organizing supplies from a new depot — that brigade (and if it is poorly prepared) will be in collapse for 4 days, and cannot advance [anywhere]. For example, the Third Army Corps reported that they had moved the enemyʼs logistics lines almost beyond the state border.
The main task now is to equalize the capabilities of units along the front line. For instance, the advanced corps were the first who master middle strikes.
By the way, it is worth to see the difference between middle strikes. They exist for different tasks:
- the light ones destroy vehicles
- the heavy ones destroy warehouses.
When all our corps master middle strikes at least at an average level, the Russians will be very sad everywhere they are.
The Corps Reform is not yet complete, but it already has had a positive effect.
Brigadier Generals Andriy Biletsky and Denys Prokopenko are now responsible for the entire Eastern Front. Within the framework of the corps reform, they have probably exceeded all expectations — they have not simply brought all the brigades together in one line, they have aligned all their work. They have adjusted the work of the headquarters and media, introduced battle captains, and even unified the chevrons. These are huge managerial tasks.
It is too early to say how the front control system is changing under the new Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapaty. Itʼs too little time has passed. But the new groups "Center" and "Azov" are clearly part of the new vision.
Previously, the entire sector was controlled by the "East" command unit. Now there will be two groups. It seems like a logical step — it is impossible for one person (or one headquarters) to keep the three main directions of the enemyʼs attack in focus. But now the commanders face a new challenge.
- How many people will be in the new headquarters?
- Where will they come from?
Obviously, the group commanders will pull people from the corps headquarters.
- Will the corps lose their positions as a result?
This is a serious challenge. At one time, in order to pull up all the brigades of the Third Corps, to bring them to a new level, many people transferred there from the Third Assault Brigade.
Now, Generals Biletsky and Prokopenko will need to coordinate not five brigades, but more than a dozen — they must ensure that information is transmitted clearly and that the corps are provided with everything necessary.