For two weeks, Ukrainian and foreign media have been discussing what was happening with Ukrainian grain and what Israel has to do with it. When our interview comes out, this topic will have died down a bit, so letʼs remind ourselves. What happened?
The Russians took grain from the occupied territories of Ukraine and unloaded it in Israel. To do this, they used a “transshipment” scheme in the port of Kavkaz. This scheme is difficult to prove, because the ship that picks up [and takes the grain to the final point] does not formally violate the laws — it is located in Russian waters.
Other ships enter the ports of the occupied territories and load the grain. Then they do not go directly to the country of destination, but approach the ship (which is located in the area of the port of Kavkaz) and transfer the cargo to it.
In addition, Russia issues fake documents, indicating the wrong port where the cargo is loaded. For example, grain is loaded in Feodosia, but the documents say "port of the Caucasus" or "one Black Sea Russian port".
«Babel'»
We didn’t work specifically on Israel — we just managed to find evidence specifically on the Abinsk ship. We recorded that a ship from Kerch had transshipped a batch of grain onto it.
Then we passed this data on to our state bodies — they also had their own information. On this basis, interaction with Israel began. It began on time, but Israel did not react.
The ship arrived in the Israeli port of Haifa on March 23 and just stood near the port for three weeks. On April 12, it finally entered the port. That same day, I was the first to write about this situation. The Israeli media became interested in the topic. People who support Ukraine began to write, including Ukrainians and other citizens, even Russians.
On April 15, the ship left the port of Haifa. At that time, we could not claim that it had unloaded — there was no confirmation. Israel was also silent. Then, my colleagues from Turkey and I recorded this ship in the Bosphorus.
We compared [the pictures] when it was heading to Israel and when it was returning. The difference in draft showed that the ship went to Israel loaded, and returned empty. That is, it was unloaded in Haifa.
The ship "Abinsk" is loaded, March 19 (left). The ship "Abinsk" is unloaded, April 20 (right).
You are now talking about the ship "Abinsk". But later another ship, the "Panormitis," approached the Israeli port.
So, after the Abinsk left the port [of Haifa], a second ship arrived there. Also with grain from the occupied territories, from Berdyansk. I wrote about it again, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also commented on it. After that, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted — we were accused of “twitter diplomacy”.
In the end, the ship weighed anchor and departed from the port [of Haifa]. After that, the Israeli media wrote that the company that bought the grain refused the cargo and informed the Russian contractors that it could not be delivered to Israel.
This is not the first time you have disclosed that a ship carrying stolen Ukrainian grain wanted to enter an Israeli port. In 2023, you wrote about a similar case. Was this the first time then?
We knew about this for a long time. But to write an investigative article, you need to collect evidence. We had some fragments [of the overall picture] that said that Israel was cooperating with Russia, but we could not claim this. But in 2023, we managed to collect the necessary evidence for the first time.
It was the Turkish ship “Sword Lion". The scheme was as follows: it did not enter the occupied Crimean ports, but stood in the Russian port of Kavkaz. The grain was brought there by another ship “Akubensk”. It went from Crimea several times and reloaded it onto the “Sword Lion”.
The captain of the Turkish ship could not help but know what he was exporting. If I know about it from a distance, then the captain knows even more. We managed to put together a complete picture.
We established that the grain was bought by a large transnational American agricultural corporation — “Archer Daniels Midland" — which has significant assets in Ukraine. But there was no public outcry in Israel at the time. The ship was parked near Haifa for about a week, then it left: Israel probably refused to accept this grain.
I understand correctly that you managed to officially confirm for the first time that Israel was accepting stolen Ukrainian grain in 2023, but did this happen before?
Yes, we know that Israel accepted stolen grain even before the great war.
You did this together with the “SeaKrime” team. How did you get involved in this project? We know that in 2013-2015 you participated in the “Automaidan Kharkiv”. There are mentions of how, together with other activists, you blocked a truck that was taking equipment out of Crimea using forged documents, and worked in a project that was perhaps the first to begin identifying Russian war criminals (“InformNapalm”). Is that correct?
Yes, it is. When [the Russian-Ukrainian war began in 2014], I was in Kharkiv, where I come from. The war was already felt very strongly in Kharkiv at that time. We are thirty kilometers from the border. The air was literally heavy.
Then a powerful volunteer movement arose in Kharkiv. We went with the "Automaidan" to the military who were stationed near Kharkiv, on the border. They had absolutely nothing: all the equipment was broken, there was a tank that didnʼt even drive. They had a list of what they needed — basic tools for repairs. So I started helping the military. I started writing about it on social media.
Kateryna Yaresko handed over the instruments to the military, April 16, 2015.
In 2015, I got acquainted with InformNapalm, with "Myrotvorets". After that, I started a blog on “InformNapalm”. In 2016, my team and I recorded a case when an interesting ship arrived in Feodosia.
It was secretly unloading in unusual conditions. We then got together as a group and decided to investigate. It was quite loud and resonant.
After that, a specialist came to me with experience in ship management and the shipping business. At that time, I was a complete “zero” in maritime matters. And this person said: “Do you understand what you have done? Just don’t give up on this.”
That’s how we created the “SeaKrime” project.
Kateryna Yaresko
It turns out that one amateur investigation became the beginning of a big project that we are now seeing. Tell us about it.
The ship was called "Nadalina". It entered Feodosia and was unloading in unusual conditions. At night, the port was surrounded by people in uniforms, the area was illuminated with spotlights, sometimes they were turned off. At some point, it resembled an operation with military chests — similar to those in which large shells are transported or something similar.
The ship arrived from Syria. We couldnʼt establish exactly what it was carrying. But then I said: even if there were oranges, it was still a violation, because the port was closed. We recorded that the ship arrived, was unloading something, and we made it public. It was up to the state authorities to establish the details. That was the logic we followed.
The ship "Nadalina".
You said that you came to the project with "zero knowledge" about maritime investigations. What is your education? What have you been doing besides community and volunteer work?
Now I am getting my third education. The first was technical and mathematical. My second education is law. Then life got in the way: for a while I taught social pedagogy and was involved in social advertising.
Since 2009, the International Childrenʼs Television Festival "Dytiatko" has been held in Kharkiv (later renamed the Media Festival "Dytiatko") — I was a member of the jury.
Now I am getting a third degree, already in journalism. At the same time, I teach journalistic investigations, OSINT, and anti-crisis communications at the Semyon Kuznets Kharkiv National Economic University.
I remember how in 2022, when it all started, our university was the first among Kharkiv universities to start regular distance learning on March 21. In early June, we already held a thesis defense.
“SeaKrime” is essentially an OSINT project, not just journalism, it requires skills in working with open data, understanding of maritime law, and logistics. How long did it take you to fully immerse yourself in the topic?
About a year. Iʼm only speaking for myself, because the project is not just me, itʼs a group of people. Iʼm just the only one whoʼs public, and everyone else is non-public.
To put it very broadly, at “SeaKrime” you investigate illegal activities in the Black Sea, and from 2022, the Azov Sea. And to be a little more specific: what exactly does your work cover? In addition to tracking the illegal export of Ukrainian grain.
From the very beginning, we focused on the Crimean ports. We monitored what was happening there, who was loading what, who was exporting what. We submitted all this information to state authorities. In some places it worked, illegal routes were closed.
In November 2021, we recorded changes in the work of Crimean ports. Several large ships arrived that had not been there before. They began to export grain in large batches: if earlier these were ships of three to five thousand tons, now there are already 25-27 thousand tons.
The second change we noticed was that they started brazenly transporting grain to Turkey.
The thing is that back in 2017, a memorandum was adopted in Turkey. It was the work of Mustafa Dzhemilev, Andriy Sybiha (who was then the Ukrainian ambassador in Ankara, and former ARC prosecutor Gunduz Mammadov. They held negotiations with the Turkish side, and Turkey agreed not to accept cargo from the occupied Crimean ports and not to send direct flights there.
This greatly facilitated the situation, because Turkey is the closest logistics route across the Black Sea. When the memorandum came into effect, the situation improved, although it was not always adhered to.
Meeting during which the Ukrainian side handed over to Turkey a list of violating vessels entering the ports of occupied Crimea, 2017.
X (Twitter) / «Бабель»
However, at the end of 2021, we saw a surge in traffic again. We didnʼt fully understand what was causing it at the time. And then a full-scale invasion began.
And the reason for such activity became clear?
Yes, our project continued to work, and we tracked everything. More and more grain was being exported. In February, more than in January, in March, more than in February, in April, even more.
The question arose: where did this grain come from? Because what was collected in Crimea should have already been exported. And then we returned to what we observed at the end of 2021.
Now we understand that this was related to preparation: they were freeing up the elevators in order to then accept the grain. This was a systemic policy of the Russian authorities. The first thing they did when they occupied new territories was seize the grain and export it. This is a war crime.
I looked at the “SeaKrime” website. It is clear that Russia has been exporting Ukrainian grain since 2016, in particular to Syria. So this is not a new scheme. You have spoken about this publicly. Was there any official reaction?
Yes. We provided a documentary basis to our state bodies, they were finally able to do something. After we collected evidence [that Russia was violating international law], we communicated, in particular, with Turkey.
For example, a ferry started running between Turkey and Sevastopol. Thanks to our work, it was stopped. There were massive regular deliveries from Turkey to Crimea, which were also stopped. Several ships were arrested. We investigated the “Usko Mfu” ship, and later it was detained on the Danube.
I remember we corresponded with the Romanian embassy in Ukraine because the ships that entered Crimea had management registered in Romania. These were Syrians who worked through Romanian jurisdiction. As a result, they left Crimea. This is not only our merit, it is the work of state bodies, which were helped by our achievements.
You regularly write that ships carrying stolen grain enter the ports of Syria, Algeria, and Egypt. Why are these routes identified more often? In these countries, are the Russians less likely to hide such shipments?
No, these routes simply exist. Syria is a very illustrative direction, it happens there on a massive scale. When Bashar al-Assad was the president [of Syria], as I understand it, [he didnʼt even try] to stop it, because Syria was to some extent under Russian occupation.
Then the government changed there, and the supply of grain stolen from Ukraine stopped. The ship, which was unloading, closed the hatches and left Syria.
After some time, [the ships] moved to Egypt, and Egypt opened its doors to them. Then, a few months later, everything resumed. Now Syria is again among the main destinations for [stolen] grain.
Moreover, the grain is purchased by a state operator. These are not private deliveries, the state knows about it for sure.
The “Grumant” ship with grain from occupied Feodosia is heading to the port of Egypt.
Where are the “Abinsk” and “Panormitis” ships now? If the “Panormitis” is in neutral waters, do you see any signs that it is heading to a “safe” port like Tartus?
The “Panormitis” is near the port of Haifa, it left the harbor and moved a little to the side, where it remains. It is obvious that now those who control this grain need to decide what to do with it next — either renegotiate the contract with another company in another country, or change the route, because it will no longer be accepted in Israel.
Maybe they will try to transport it to Egypt. It is important that the Ukrainian side continues to keep it in focus. In April, the President of Ukraine spoke with the President of Egypt [Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi], who assured that Egypt would not accept stolen grain.
And indeed, one of the ships [with grain] was unloaded in another place at that time. But we see that the ships are still entering [Egyptian ports]. There is a gap between political statements and practice.
It is important not to have illusions that this will simply stop. If there is grain and there is demand, it will be exported. The routes will simply change — through other countries, transshipment, other logistical schemes.
But each such investigation complicates the process for them and increases costs — and this is, in fact, something that we can influence.
The ship "Panormitis".
We are still watching Israel. Do I understand correctly that Russia continues to cooperate with Syria, Algeria, and Egypt?
It is difficult to say what “cooperates”. Syria really gives stolen grain a “green light” at the state level. In Algeria, we do not see such shipments now, but last year we recorded ships with coal from occupied Mariupol. In Egypt, grain often goes not to the state, but to private companies.
When there was a situation with Israel, various explanations were given — they say, the ports could be under the control of Indian or Chinese companies, and what could Israel do then. But this is not so.
The state gives permission for a ship to enter. It checks the quality of the grain, receives customs payments to the budget. The role of the state in these processes is significant, especially when it comes to transporting grain.
Itʼs not just some coffee maker that was brought in. The [food] security of the state, the security of society, depends on grain.