“The US is 4–6 years away from a truly effective laser. Ukraine is only a year or two.” The US Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery on how the Ukrainian army can seize the initiative in war

In one of your interviews you said that you visit Ukraine three times a year and spend a few weeks there. What exactly do you do here?

I work for the American think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies. We support democracies under pressure, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Ukraine, Israel — countries that oppose Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, that is, the axis of evil. I manage several programs. One of them is the program to counter Russian authoritarianism. As part of this program, we cooperate with the Ukraine Freedom Fund and conduct courses for the Ukrainian military on combat planning. These courses are approved by the Ukrainian General Staff. This initiative was launched at the end of 2022 by Marine Corps General Bill Mullin.

And when did you first come to Ukraine?

I first came here in 2023 as part of this program. But I was actually here as a boy. My father was in the embassy in Moscow. So I came to Kyiv two or three times, before Chernobyl, around 1982-1983. When I was with the U.S. European Command, I came four or five more times. And Senator McCain sent me here twice to help with cyber issues. So Iʼve probably been here 15 or 20 times in total.

You have been observing the Ukrainian army for a very long time and can you tell how it has changed since 2022. Are these changes positive or negative?

The Ukrainian army has shown very good results. Are there things that can be improved? Absolutely. On the other hand, the Ukrainian army does things that no one else in the world does, except, perhaps, the Russian army. We see rapid adaptation to new defense technologies and processes in war. In particular, this applies to drones, but not only. And new generations of drones are mastered here every two, three, four months — these are fantastic things that were not in the United States. However, the main challenge is the sustainability of the armed forces and the sustainability of society. And I see it now.

Letʼs talk about how to become better. During the first year of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian army showed very good results: we knocked out the Russians from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions, and returned some territories in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. But then the Ukrainian army lost the initiative, and many experts believe that this happened after the counteroffensive. Recently, former commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyy stated that the counteroffensive failed because several brigades that were supposed to operate in the Kherson region were taken to another front line. Could three brigades have changed the situation and why, in your opinion, did the counteroffensive fail?

The initial successes in 2022-2023 were partly the result of good Ukrainian planning, and partly of Russian blunders. When the counteroffensive began, the Russian army was much better prepared. Then they revised their approaches, involved a lot of people — they started to massively involve prisoners, Prigozhinʼs "Wagner PMC" fought effectively. Regarding the specific tactical question: if the offensive had been carried out by well-trained, well-equipped brigades, could it have been more successful? Yes. But I cannot say what the side effects would have been if those brigades had been taken from other directions. Would those directions have become vulnerable to Russian counterattacks? I donʼt know. So itʼs very difficult. I donʼt want to seem like a couch potato and suggest what could have happened.

But analysis is important to avoid repeating mistakes in the future.

Yes. And it is also necessary to study the successes and problems of the Kursk operation. The Soviet system did not conduct such an analysis. Therefore, the armies that grew up in this system are not inclined to effective analysis. In the USA, this is the most important thing — to harshly assess what happened. But even despite this system of analysis, the American army still made serious mistakes. That is, it does not protect against failure, but it increases the chances of success.

Speaking of the Ukrainian army, in your opinion, does the military command have clearly defined war goals and a strategy for achieving them? And how do you assess the current strategy — its advantages and disadvantages?

Yes, there is a strategic approach. But no strategy will look guaranteed to be successful when the enemy is much stronger and larger, and resources are unpredictable due to the US position on the supply of spare parts, ammunition, or intelligence support. Therefore, Ukrainian military strategists must be very careful — they cannot guarantee all the expected resources. Under such conditions, the strategy will likely be more conservative, less risky than one would like. And from the outside, this may look like an overly passive or defensive approach.

And speaking of the mistakes made by the command, can you name them?

Iʼm not sure that these are mistakes. Let me tell you what I would have done differently. But first, I want to emphasize: the Ukrainian army and its commanders are doing a very good job.

If we talk about changes at the nuance level, one of them is how aggressively we use the air component, the air force. We use the term "division of effort" — what percentage of their efforts are directed to offense and what percentage is directed to defense. In the history of the US Air Force, when they fight in joint forces, I, as the commander of the joint forces, would say: your division should be much more aggressive — 70% offense, 30% defense, and maybe 80% to 20%. Right now, this division does not suit the Ukrainian Air Force...

Yes, because we donʼt have enough planes that could do it...

Thatʼs right. But it could still be, say, 20% offense and 80% defense, or 10% offense and 90% defense. I think itʼs even less now. So I would allocate a little more to offense. But that requires the right weapons systems — and some of them are available, like the GBU-39. You need enough of the right aircraft — and some weapons are coming, like the ERAM. These assets can be used to attack and push the Russians further away: increase the zone of impact from 90-100 kilometers to 400 kilometers. Then it will be harder for the Russians. But that requires a lot of weapons, which the United States has to supply, Europe has to buy, Ukraine has to use, and commanders have to distribute forces correctly.

Another point is that the army should work together with the Air Force. I donʼt see such integration as in the US or, say, in the UK. But we have been building this system for 70 years. Ukraine is trying to get to this point very quickly, I hope it will happen soon.

Speaking of weapons, will the US sell them?

The weapons I mentioned have already been sold — Iʼve seen public information about over 1,100 units. They will arrive over the next year, but they may purchase even more.

Ukraine has been asking for Tomahawks for a long time, because these missiles hit even further.

I love Tomahawks and have launched them a lot. The enemy didn’t like them. They are very good weapons, but the number of these missiles is limited. Just like the number of ground-based launchers. And I’m not 100% sure whether the Tomahawks that Ukraine will receive will have all the survivability characteristics that allow American Tomahawks to reach their targets. Maybe, maybe not. And they are expensive compared to other means of destruction. The President [Trump] said “maybe,” but that was a long time ago, and I haven’t seen any concrete steps.

I respect President Zelenskyʼs right to talk about the weapons he wants. But I would probably insist on doubling the number of ERAMs. The most important thing is that the US supplies offensive munitions, and which ones — Tomahawk, ATACMS, ERAM — is not so important. We want you to win.

Do you think the Trump administration wants us to win?

I want you to win. I am disappointed in President Trumpʼs approach. Very disappointed in Steve Witkoff. He is completely unqualified for the job, and it shows in every meeting with Putin. We continue to treat Putin as if he is not a war criminal who imprisoned and then effectively executed his opponent, Alexander Navalny.

Well, he has also started aggression against another country.

Yes, he started the war. And when Witkoff says that these are all trifles, they are not trifles for Ukraine. As if Witkoff doesn’t know how the war started. Although, perhaps, he really doesn’t. Putin responds only to force and does not seek consensus, he wants to win. The US should be a better mediator. We probably need someone else instead of Witkoff. President Zelenskyy cannot say this, but I can: Witkoff’s negotiations are not bringing either Ukraine or America closer to justice.

But we have strayed a bit from the topic of long-range strikes. You shouldnʼt focus only on the Tomahawk. Your Flamingos already fly as far as the Tomahawk. Moreover, your Flamingos have a larger warhead, they are more powerful, but less survivable. The Tomahawk has a better chance of breaking through. There was a big Flamingo strike recently.

Are there any other errors or tips?

I don’t give advice based on mistakes. Our training is based on how the US prepares headquarters for maneuver warfare. We work with corps and brigades. Some headquarters are brilliant, others have little experience. And interestingly, the quality of the headquarters does not depend on whether the officer served before 2014. New officers who came to the army after 2014 are just as effective, and sometimes better.

At the beginning of the Ukrainian armyʼs transition to the corps system, you praised this decision. But now the units that make up the corps are scattered across the front lines in the lanes of other corps. In addition, we often see manual control, sometimes commanders from Kyiv give orders directly to brigades or battalions, destroying the structure. And soldiers are sometimes afraid to immediately report a withdrawal from positions, which complicates maneuver.

These are fair questions. I support the reorganization of corps and task forces. The overall structure looks right. Perhaps I would call some of the structures differently — corps are more like divisions. But thatʼs not important. However, you should not expect everything to work perfectly right away. The famous American general David Petraeus once said that you canʼt rebuild an airplane in flight. Thatʼs exactly what you have to do. You are rebuilding an army during the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II. There will be uneven progress. Some corps will become stellar, others will lag behind. And the new structure will not solve the problems, it will not become a magic pill. It is a question of leadership, and it takes time. But the new structure provides better opportunities.

There is also the problem of communication between corps or units within corps.

This is the most difficult thing in any army — to have good vertical and horizontal interaction at the same time. This is the highest level of the art of war. Vertical communication is more or less there. But horizontal communication, when a brigade of one corps has to interact with a brigade of another corps — this needs to be improved. And you were right: people do not want to give bad news to their leaders. But this is not an organizational problem, but a problem of personal interaction. There is something to improve here. And even more difficult is to integrate the plans of the Air Force with the defensive and offensive plans of the ground forces.

That means it needs to be improved.

Yes. And this needs to be improved in almost all armies in the world, including the Russian one.

You said that Ukraine was able to control the Black Sea without a traditional fleet. How do you think the fleet should be developed?

I also said that this was the most successful year for the fleet in the last 20 years, and not a single ship went to sea. In the current situation, when the enemy is equipped with cruise, ballistic, hypersonic missiles and is ready to use them against ships in port, it will be very difficult for Ukraine to maintain medium or large surface ships. Therefore, the best fleet now is a combination of your " Neptunes ", or "Harpoons";, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, unmanned aircraft, reconnaissance, small boats — that is, all those types of weapons that can be launched from land at sea, and all types of reconnaissance to know where your enemy is. And some small ships that can go out and cause damage to the enemy.

Are you talking about the Mosquito Fleet ?

The Mosquito Fleet is a very specific system, it is still difficult for me to imagine that such ships would survive a naval battle for more than an hour now. But thanks to the actions of the Ukrainians, Russia can no longer control the sea off the coast of Ukraine, neither in the Black Sea nor in the Sea of Azov. Ukraine cannot establish its own control, but it can deprive Russia of control — this is a great victory.

So how do you improve the fleet or the situation in general? First, keep winning. Keep realizing that you are the best army, fighting a just war against an authoritarian regime. Part of it is a spiritual and emotional issue. But you also need to have the right weapons systems. Some of this is already being produced in Ukraine. Every year the percentage is growing, perhaps already over 50%.

This is the main idea — not to depend on other countries.

Just so you donʼt have to depend on others. Clearly define what you need: air defense systems, 155mm ammunition, Patriot, NASAMS, long-range weapons that I mentioned, and intelligence support. So, first, be strong. Second, produce as many of your own weapons as possible. Third, have a clear list of priorities for Europe to buy from the US and transfer to you. And finally, continue to develop technology. Iʼve already talked about innovations in the use of the Air Force, but a lot of innovations also concern the ground forces — better use of drones. Every three months I see better tactics, better technology, better operators. They are impressive. But we have to keep going. I say one generation is three months. We have to be two generations ahead of the Russians.

The fact that you fell behind the Russians in fiber optic drones hit hard, it shouldnʼt be like this.

Itʼs easy to say — to stay two generations ahead. But how to do it?

First, the command must be open to new ideas and support such an initiative. Invest in teams at the brigade and battalion levels. Encourage Ukrainian developers to continue working in the defense sector and bring good ideas to the military. Listen to operators to improve weapons. No other army does this.

Another question about technology. They are currently testing lasers for air defense systems. Do you believe that this will eventually work? Because I understand that it takes a lot of energy, these are massive systems.

These systems have generators. Will it work? Yes. Will the laser work against a ballistic missile in a year or two? No. Against a fast cruise missile? Probably not. Against a hypersonic one, no. But against Shahed drones, or Geran-2, yes. Against Geran-3, maybe. Against Geran-5, no. But the laser could be better in two years, and in five years it could be effective against ballistic missiles. In Ukraine, things are moving faster than anywhere else. In the US Navy or Army, I would say, there are four to six years left before a truly effective laser. In Ukraine, it’s a year or two. You’re willing to take risks. Sometimes you’ll fail, and that’s okay.

I want to talk a little bit about the Russian army. How has it changed since 2022?

Some of its weaknesses remain. They, like Ukraine, are not fully integrated and coherent. They have a much larger Air Force than Ukraine, but they are unable to use it effectively. They still have problems with large-scale maneuvers and logistics. And they have problems with personnel — from the national minorities they used in the war, they have now moved on to prisoners — people from the lower social classes who are effectively forced to go to war. The oligarchs do not send their children there.

But their technology is evolving. What Rubicon is doing in the drone space is in line with what Ukraine is doing. Their people, systems, and processes are getting better, and there are more of them. But they are still led by officers who are not ready to take the initiative and are tied to an outdated training philosophy. The Ukrainian officer corps is better — not perfect, but better.

There is a belief that the one who has the best technology wins the war. Do you agree?

Partly. I would say that you are more likely to win a war with new technology. But even with the best technology you can lose — the US has lost wars. But without better technology you definitely wonʼt win.

You said that Russia can only be defeated economically, when its economy starts to collapse. The US Congress has been developing a sanctions bill for a year now — that’s a long time. And even if it is passed, it will still be Trump who will decide whether to impose sanctions and what they will be. Is the US capable of imposing really tough sanctions?

I have two unpleasant thoughts in my head. The first is that this war will not end without strong economic pressure on Russia. The second is that Donald Trump is not the man to do it.

So weʼll have to somehow hold out for another two years?

Three years. But Russia can break down itself for various reasons. However, the main tool of pressure is economic: stop the shadow fleet, supplies to India and China, pipeline supplies to Hungary and Turkey. Oil sales finance 42-44% of the Russian budget, that is, the war. This must be stopped. This is the only way to force Putin to make concessions. The Russians have not changed their demands since 2022, we see everything the same now. The only people who think that everything is fine are Donald Trump and Steve Witkoff, and they are very wrong.

So it seems we just have to somehow get through these three years...

Itʼs entirely possible. Ukraine has shown the strongest social resilience in the world. People are stubborn and committed to the right thing, you canʼt even imagine how impressive that is.

You mentioned the shadow navy. Why do you think Trump suddenly decided to fight it, despite pandering to Putin in everything?

There were simply no more excuses left. He could no longer say he needed more time, to evaluate something. It sounded like nonsense. We know which companies take the fuel, blend it, make money from it, transport it. The shadow fleet is real. It finances the war machine. It must be cut off.

Is the way Trump is currently fighting the shadow fleet effective?

No. How are they intercepting now? France a little bit, sometimes the US intercepts some ships. We are making minor changes on the periphery. We are not creating serious economic pressure. The deal that President Trump just made with India, in which India promised to stop accepting shadow tankers, could help in theory. But my experience with US trade deals is that they are not very consistent or sustainable, there is no enforcement. And my experience with India is that they are not very reliable.

What needs to be done to better combat the Shadow Fleet?

This should be done in two stages. The first is to arrest the shadow fleet vessels, confiscate the oil from them, and sell it at a profit. The second is to impose sanctions on specific Chinese and Indian companies that receive it.

So, should the US and its allies do this too?

Yes. But they will join if we start doing it first.

Do you believe Trump will do this?

Iʼll be honest with you. I wish he would do it. Will he? I doubt it.

Recently, we see that Russia is betting on ballistic missiles, and drones are mostly a distraction. The protection of Ukrainian cities and Ukrainian infrastructure depends heavily on American Patriot missiles. Their stock in Europe has run out, and the US is constantly delaying the transfer of missiles that Ukraine and European countries buy, not ask for for free. What is the reason for such delays?

Patriot stocks in Europe are very low, and there are not enough for Ukraine. But some do come from European countries or from the US, when production provides them. Yes, for a while you will be able to protect fewer facilities and you will have to prioritize which facilities are more important. But in the long run, missiles will arrive, they will be newer and more capable, then the situation will improve. As we say, "it will get worse before it gets better."

And when will it get better?

Years, not months.

Sure, itʼs disappointing...

I will still come here. Yes, I think it is safe here.

In one of your interviews, you explained that the US will reduce its presence in Europe precisely at the expense of units located in Germany and Poland and performing logistical and training functions, in particular, assisting Ukraine...

There are three types of forces. Permanent — about 57 thousand. Rotational — 15-20 thousand, most of them in Poland, the Baltic countries, Romania. And the third type — another 10-15 thousand, these are training missions for Ukraine. They are already being reduced, because NATO is taking over the mission. I do not want to reduce permanent or rotational forces. Some training may remain — for example, training in servicing Abrams tanks. Only we can conduct such training. So we have to keep them in Poland and Germany, but the number of people will be much smaller.

You said that NATO is taking over the training mission. But recently the media published information about NATO training in Estonia, which showed that 10 Ukrainian drones are capable of destroying two NATO battalions in a day. So maybe the US is losing because none of the armies, except the Ukrainian one, has fresh combat experience?

The Hedgehog exercises were very valuable and important. The conclusions were drawn. NATO must learn to fight the way Ukraine is fighting against Russia, because Russia is also learning to fight in this war. We saw how effective Ukrainian drone operators are. We learned that some NATO units have not learned the basic lessons of Ukraine. But letʼs not exaggerate — this is an opportunity to learn. This does not mean that NATO cannot defeat Russia.

However, perhaps it is time for Ukraine to teach others?

It is possible. NATO will come to Ukraine to study, and Ukraine will be able to train Europeans. But it will be easier to do this after a real ceasefire.

But it is worth mentioning here that the United States is the largest army in NATO.

Yes, there are challenges. But I am proud to work with Ukrainians and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, because this is where authoritarian empires come to die.