RUSI: Russian Aerospace Forces Threaten NATO More Than in 2022. Here are the main data of the study — in infographics

During the four years of full-scale war, Russia lost or irreversibly damaged almost 130 combat aircraft.

However, these losses did not weaken its position in the air: the aircraft fleet did not decrease, and for some types of aircraft it even increased. A prime example is the Su-34 front-line bombers.

In 2020, Russia had approximately 115 of these aircraft. During the years of hostilities, it lost almost 40 Su-34s, but these losses were compensated for by serial production. As a result, as of 2025, Russia has approximately 125 Su-34s.

The situation is similar with other combat aircraft. Before the full-scale war, Russia had about 90 Su-35S fighters and almost 150 Su-30SM/SM2. Over the four years of the war, it lost about two dozen aircraft that are no longer able to be restored.

However, as in the case of the Su-34, the production and modernization of these aircraft did not stop, and deliveries of new aircraft continued. As a result, as of 2025, Russia has an estimated 140 Su-35S and approximately 145 Su-30SM/SM2.

Russia is also gradually introducing Su-57 fighters into service.

Before the full-scale war, Russia had only one such aircraft, now there are about twenty of them. The Su-57 is a fifth-generation fighter. To understand the level of this aircraft, it can be conditionally compared to the American F-35 fighter, which is a standard NATO combat aircraft.

The Su-57 can fly at an altitude of up to 20 kilometers. Its main air-to-air missile is the R-77M, which can hit targets at a distance of 180-200 kilometers. There is also the long-range R-37M missile, which theoretically can fly 200-300 kilometers. The Su-57 radar can see a fighter at a distance of about 180-220 kilometers, and large aircraft at a distance of up to 350-400 kilometers.

The F-35, which is used in NATO countries, has a slightly lower maximum flight altitude of up to 15 kilometers. Its main air-to-air missile is the AIM-120D AMRAAM, which flies about 160-180 kilometers. This aircraft does not have an ultra-long-range missile like the Su-57.

But the F-35 sees the target well and receives data from various sensors, so it is often the first to notice the enemy. Its radar sees fighters at a distance of 180-220 kilometers, and large aircraft at a distance of more than 300 kilometers.

More than a thousand F-35s have already been produced. The Su-57 can still be analyzed only at the level of the manufacturerʼs statements, and how effective it is in combat is not known for sure.

«Babel'»

«Babel'»

The Russian Aerospace Forces were able to save most of their pilots.

The losses of the flight crew were (and are) much lower than the losses of the aircraft themselves. In the first month of the war in 2022, many pilots were shot down over Ukraine, but most of the survivors returned home through prisoner exchanges.

Since the spring of 2022, the Russians have almost stopped risky deep flights over Ukrainian territory. Pilots now fly in a safer zone, where they are more difficult to shoot down. Because of this, those who ejected after their planes were hit usually survived, landing on Russian-controlled land.

In addition, a significant part of the losses of Russian aviation occurred not in the air, but on the ground — during strikes by Ukrainian drones and missiles on air bases. In such cases, the planes were usually without crews.

Until 2022, Russian pilots flew little — much less than their colleagues in NATO countries. At the same time, only a few of the most senior pilots in each regiment had the main experience, and most of the crews had hardly flown. Russiaʼs participation in the war in Syria partially changed the situation: pilots began to be sent on regular rotations, they gained practical experience.

However, despite the difficult flight conditions, there was almost no real threat to Russian aviation there, so the benefit of this experience was not significant.

However, over the past four years of the war in Ukraine, Russian pilots have gained real combat experience. They have regularly used weapons against both ground and air targets.

Russian aviation has switched from close combat to the tactic of striking from a safe distance.

This primarily concerns the Su-35 and Su-30 fighters, which previously used medium-range R-77-1 missiles with a launch range of approximately 80-110 kilometers.

They are now massively armed with ultra-long-range R-37M missiles capable of flying 200-300 kilometers. This allows Russian pilots to attack Ukrainian aircraft from deep behind their own rear — hundreds of kilometers from the front line.

Since the beginning of 2024, Su-34 aircraft have actually been repurposed to drop heavy aerial bombs from a long distance.

Previously, Su-34s had to fly close to the target and drop bombs almost directly above it. Because of this, the planes entered the Ukrainian air defense zone and could easily be shot down.

Since 2024, the planes have begun to drop bombs from a long distance. Wings and navigation have been added to the bombs, so after dropping they do not fall straight down, but far forward, reaching the target at a distance of 60-130 kilometers. The plane immediately turns around and does not approach the danger zone.

Since mid-2023, Russian long-range anti-aircraft systems have been operating in a more coordinated manner.

They now work together with A-50U observation aircraft and fighter jets patrolling near the front. The aircraft track Ukrainian targets and transmit their coordinates to anti-aircraft batteries.

Thanks to this, the S-400 (SA-21) systems can launch 48N6 missiles at aircraft at low altitudes even at long distances, when the battery’s own radars cannot see them. The missile receives target data from the aircraft or A-50U and automatically targets it.

Russia has abandoned launching missiles in separate groups and has switched to the “combined fist” tactic.

The essence of this tactic is to launch different types of weapons with the expectation that they will reach the target at approximately the same time, despite different flight speeds.

Cheap drones like Geranium or “Gerbera” are launched several hours before the strike, cruise missiles about an hour before, and ballistic missiles in a matter of minutes. As a result, at a certain moment, dozens or hundreds of targets appear on the screens of Ukrainian air defense simultaneously.

When the radar detects, conditionally, 100 objects in the air, it is difficult for computer systems and operators to instantly distinguish real missiles from cheap plastic drones without explosives. Air defense is forced to respond to all threats at once, wasting expensive anti-aircraft missiles on “garbage” targets.

The missiles themselves have also become “smarter”. They can change their flight path almost at the last moment, bypassing the areas where Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems are located.

In addition, devices for shooting traps and electronic warfare units have begun to be installed on the Kh-101 cruise missiles. This creates interference and false marks on radar screens, which makes it much more difficult for Ukrainian air defense systems to “capture” a real target.

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