1
Accusations of raiding
Letʼs start with your biography. You have been serving since 2014. In addition, in 2018 you had an unsuccessful experience competing for the position of Head of the State Service for War Veterans...
Well, canʼt say unsuccessful. It was successful for me. But I wasnʼt appointed because it was a political decision.
Yes, because then a scandal broke out. You were accused of raiding. They said that you were wanted, hiding abroad, in particular in Israel. At that time, Gennadiy Korbanʼs sister helped you, and then you testified against him. After that, the case against you for robbery was closed, and you returned to Ukraine. Can you comment on that?
I donʼt want to say anything about Korban. These were personal insults, and no one cares anymore who was slandering whom. As for the raiding: eleven years have passed. Can anyone at least tell me the name of the enterprise I robbed? Iʼll say it right away — there is no such thing. These were just political games.
In 2018, after winning the competition for the position of Head of the State Service for Veterans Affairs, Valentyn Manko came to his colleagues to discuss the work plan. At that time, additional verification of his candidacy began.
Manko Valentin / Facebook
But you were wanted, and Arsen Avakov confirmed this.
When I was "put" on the wanted list, I was linked to a case to which I had the same relationship as I have to do with ballet today. Now is not the time to investigate and punish anyone. I donʼt want to stir up all this. I have a certificate stating that I have no criminal record and no criminal cases against me.
And have you ever been charged with anything?
Never in my life. And they couldnʼt charge me because itʼs bogus, because they wanted to get me politically, as they say, by the balls. Everyone found out about it only because I was put on the wanted list, and an open red card appeared in the database. But in order to start secret investigative actions against a person and officially put them on the wanted list, you need some kind of case. There were no cases related to me, so they just threw me into another one. And then they closed it in the same way.
And as for Skif enterprise, do you know it?
Iʼve never heard of it. Please tell me what it is.
A member of self-defense forces in Velyka Novoselivka, Oleksandr Potuga, accused your unit of interrogating him, keeping him in the basement, and robbing the Skif enterprise.
Let me explain. I have seen this person twice in my life. He was detained by the police. How I was involved in this — I do not know. He was a member of the UKROP party. We can take him and say, “Let’s take a polygraph, tell me whether it happened or not.” But all this is political manipulation. And if something had happened, they would have brought charges in the last 11 years.
But, for example, Gennadiy Korbanʼs sister writes...
I donʼt want to talk about Korbanʼs sister. I have devoted eleven years of my life defending you and our country. Do you want to talk about some made-up cases?
A wanted notice for Valentyn Manko on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in 2015.
We want to talk about everything.
Iʼve already said everything on this subject.
2
Service in the GUR and meeting with Oleksandr Syrsky
Okay. Do we understand correctly that when the full-scale war began, you were serving in the Main Intelligence Directorate?
My brothers-in-arms and I [were preparing for the great war] in advance. At 4 a.m. on February 24, we gathered our families and already knew where we would take them, closer to the west of Ukraine. We ourselves returned to the Kyiv region and started fighting. Then we joined the GUR. And from there we formed a unit, then a brigade. Our numbers grew, and we moved to larger troops.
Why did you leave GUR? There is information that you left because of some problems.
We simply didnʼt have enough space there. I was recovering from an injury at the time, and more and more guys were joining. We just didnʼt have enough space. In the GUR, you canʼt use everything at once — artillery, tanks, and everything else. And I had tank crewmen, pilots, and everyone else. So, of course, we then transferred to other troops.
Valentyn Manko with his comrades during the defense of the Kyiv region, March 2, 2022.
Manko Valentin / Facebook
During which operation were you injured? We have information that it was during the assault on Energodar.
No. It was in that direction, but I canʼt say for sure about the operation. Itʼs classified.
And on what dates were you admitted to the hospital with an injury?
I donʼt remember. I ended up in the hospital with an injury, then I returned. I was completely numb, my nerves were paralyzed, [and I] probably tried to stay with the guys for a few weeks.
Valentyn Manko published this photo in November 2022, which coincides with the dates of his service in the State Security Service and his dismissal.
Manko Valentin / Facebook
We spoke to many people while preparing for the interview. One of the versions we heard is that you left the GUR because there were issues with the organization of the unitʼs work and the planning of operations, as they were failing.
This is complete nonsense. All the operations that we had planned were carried out from A to Z. I have been in battles many times since 2014. It was Donetsk airport, Ilovaisk, Pisky and many, many different directions. All of them were successful. There is not a single operation where we messed up. I always participated in those operations myself. So, I wonder who said such a thing. I don’t think that any of the commanders could say such a thing about me. Well, jealous people can make up something.
Letʼs talk about your new position. Why were you appointed to the head of the Assault Forcesʼ command? Does this mean you will be the commander of the Assault Forces if they appear?
We donʼt have many [assault] units. About ten. There are commanders. We look at experience, at how people manage. The comrades support me in this position, the commander understands, the commanders, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I am not anyoneʼs godfather, relative or brother. I have a lot of experience. Apparently, they chose me based on the results of my work. I am constantly on the front line. This year, I have been home for a couple of days several times, and also not out of good will, but due to health. I live by war. Will I be a commander? I donʼt know. There will be an order, weʼll see.
Oleksandr Syrskyi arrived in the Dobropil direction. Our counteroffensive operation is currently underway there, where assault units are actively involved.
Manko Valentin / Facebook
Is it already known what the structure of the Assault Forces will be, how much money will be spent on maintaining their headquarters?
I canʼt announce it yet. We wonʼt have anything superfluous. We will not weaken the Airborne Assault Forces or take anyone away from them. On the contrary, we are for strengthening the Airborne Assault Forces. Because they are either walking alongside us or following us.
In terms of money, the Assault Forces command will increase by literally a hundred and so people. This will be at the expense of the regiments: that is, the command will be rebuilt from the same regimental positions. So, there will be no increase in funding for the maintenance of the command. We are not starting from scratch — we already exist. And we just simply need a military command structure.
Will the 5th Assault Brigade and the 92nd Assault Brigade also be in the Assault Forces?
Yes, the 5th Assault Brigade is ours. Battalions from the 92nd Assault Brigade are currently being selected to form the new regiment.
What will be the role of Serhii Korotkykh (Botsman) in the Assault Forces? He has a mixed reputation, which is why we have singled him out.
Serhii is a great fighter. He has been in battle himself. Now he works in the training department, and heʼs good at it.
Recruit training?
No. He conducts analysis, draws up schemes. He has his own area of work. But Serhii has been fighting since 2022, both in the 116th brigade, and in the SBU, and in the GUR. Everyone says that he has a [questionable] past, but when he was in the GUR, he was tested on a polygraph two or three times. Even before that, he was in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where he was also checked. And if the test results had been negative, he would not have been even close to the military.
You said that you met Syrsky back in 2014. Do you remember the circumstances?
I think it was during the Debaltseve operation. We often came across each other during planning and operations. I know many sector commanders.
And when did you get close enough that he began to trust you?
You know, I never fought on billboards or on TV. My people and I proved with actions what we know and can do. I think that as the commander-in-chief, he knows better from his position who is fighting more successfully. We have our own approaches, our own training center — I built it with my own money, with my familyʼs money. Today, it is one of the best. We constantly conduct analysis on the front lines. Then the materials go to the training center. The training center develops methods for todayʼs war. All this is passed on to the instructor and teachers. They train servicemen, and then we go to the front lines, and thatʼs why we succeed.
Valentyn Manko at a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky, summer 2023.
Manko Valentin / Facebook
When did you feel that Syrsky was listening to you?
It was 2022 — we started with the Kyiv operation, participated in the battles for Irpin, Stoyanka, Makariv, Vasylkiv. He saw how we operated, what results we achieved. [And when] problem areas arose, he could call Budanov, ask: "Kyrylo Oleksiiovych, give us Mankoʼs unit, we need to do some delicate work here." And we went out, and we always helped.
And have you ever said: "No, Oleksandr Stanislavovych, we canʼt, itʼs impossible"?
Yes. But he never asks for the impossible. Take a look at the statistics of how the enemy advanced in 2022, 2023, and then in 2024, when we appeared on a slightly larger scale. How unsuccessful is the enemyʼs advance now? Their numbers have increased significantly, attacks along the entire front have increased significantly, and the enemy has achieved less. This speaks to our correct approach: encounter battles, counterattack, etc. And how many successful offensives have we had? Take the Kharkiv, Kursk, and Zaporizhzhia operations.
But the Kursk operation ended in nothing.
The enemy was supposed to attack in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia regions, Donbas, but they all converged [in the Kursk region], and we crushed them. On their territory, not on ours. Everything is clear if you compare. Letʼs take the people in the Sumy region. What did they say when the enemy was advancing on Sumy, and what are they saying now? At first, they said that the Kursk operation was unnecessary. And then they asked to stay there as long as possible to prevent the enemy from moving further.
Valentyn Mankoʼs unit in the Kursk region.
Manko Valentin / Facebook
As far as we understand, the Russians gathered their forces in the Kursk region just as we entered the area. When our forces withdrew, they moved on to Sumy, and then we had to fight back there.
Before that, we had crushed a huge number of troops from the entire front there. We had to fight back a year later. In addition, the Koreans helped them a lot: 20,000, including two special forces units. We could not have predicted that other countries would also get involved. But we stopped them. And even now, we keep part of Kursk under our control. Yes, it is a small one, but it is a buffer zone — on their side, not ours.
We took an incredible number of prisoners in Kursk, transferred the war to them, wore down all their units, pulled the war away from the entire front — because we could not be 100% sure that we would be able to hold the entire front line. Now we [are working] along the entire front line and understand their tactics. We meet them and do not allow them to develop their successes. Here in the Dobropillia direction, we conducted a simply brilliant operation — now it is entering its final stage.
3
Assault Forces and Airborne Assault Forces
We will return to the Dobropillia operation a little later. Letʼs talk about the assault troopsʼ beret. It has a leopard on its cockade. "Leopard" is Syrskyʼs call sign. The assault troops are, in essence, "Syrskyʼs guard"?
To make you understand, we had units and training centres — back then, they were still called BIG CATS. Some were called “Panthers,” some “Tigers,” some just “Cats,” in different ways. That’s how it all started. Since 2014, we have even had tattoos on our bodies with these cats; they were symbols of the units. Just be patient, you’ll see everything later.
September 2025. Volodymyr Zelensky arrived at the command post of the Airborne Assault Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Beret of the Assault Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Manko Valentin / Facebook
You say that the Assault Forces are the so-called rapid response group. Their first task is to recapture a section of the front line if it has collapsed. The second task is to storm. These are the tasks often assigned to Airborne Forces, which already have experience and a well-established command structure. During an offensive, the Airborne Forces improve the position in the direction, and during defense, they stabilize the front and act as a combined arms reserve.
Thatʼs right.
That is, your functions and tasks are the same.
Completely different.
But the description of both the Assault Forces and the Airborne Forces is the same. You gave the same description in the interview, and now you have confirmed it.
I didnʼt say that. I said that we are a rapid response group. And we are different from the Airborne Forces. I reduced the time of our movement to half a day. In half a day, we can move from another city — say, from Sumy to Zaporizhzhia — and enter the battle. Thatʼs the first point. Second, we work in small tactical groups. They work in larger units: battalions or battalion-tactical groups.
Today, assaults are underway along the entire front line. If we take, say, ten brigades, they will close 10–20 directions [of enemy assaults], and there can be 60–80 such directions at the same time. And thatʼs where we come in. We conduct counter-assault operations, stabilize the area, restore positions. Then we bring in units that have lost positions or through which the enemy has infiltrated.
As for Airborne Assault Forces, they are more globally designated. Letʼs take the Kursk operation — we were a striking, and the airborne assault forces were securing the rear. The airborne assault forces are supposed to expand the front, create a bridgehead and then go on the offensive — either attack or go into active defense. And we carry out all these breakthroughs.
While preparing for the interview, we spoke with the Airborne Assault Forces. The paratroopers say that they have long practiced rolling over at night. These are the same half-days that you are talking about.
Let me explain the difference once again. They operate in battalions, we operate in small tactical groups. Today, [the enemy is storming] 60-70 directions on the front line. A small tactical group consists of about 24 assault troopers. A separate tactical group is formed for each problem area — it consists of specialists who are needed in that particular area. We have a lot of these units, because our training is completely different. The Airborne Forces [operate] more globally. They enter the zone [and take up defense], while we do not.
If there is a problem [on the front line], the Airborne Assault Forces go out as a battalion, stand in a lane and continue working. And we stabilize the situation. Letʼs say the enemy has infiltrated in five places in the Dnipropetrovsk region, but these holes are 2-4 km apart. The battalion cannot go there — that would be the wrong application. We need to stop all five directions at once. I go out with my small tactical groups, push the enemy back and level the lane. If there is a large breakthrough, I can also go out there, hold it, and then a large landing force comes in.
They become part of the [defense] zone where there is a problem. And we are the rapid response group.
Newly arrived artillerymen of the 33rd Assault Regiment overcome an obstacle course during combat training.
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It turns out that the tasks of the Airborne Assault Forces is to carry out targeted operations, but they are forced to remain on the defensive. The Airborne Assault Forces formed two corps and became, in essence, elite infantry unit.
This is another question. But once again, they are a powerful unit, they have more comprehensive tasks than we do. Letʼs take the Zaporizhzhia direction. Today, there were about twenty advances there at the same time. Each one must be stopped. If you break up a battalion or brigade of the Airborne Assault Forces in all these directions, thatʼs it, itʼs gone. Then the enemy gathers a strike force — three or four brigades — and makes a breakthrough in one direction.
We also have various special tasks. We can jump in and prepare a small bridgehead. As was the case in Kursk. Then a battalion or brigade of the DShV comes in, expands the bridgehead and already carries out global actions. In the meantime, we counterattack, distract — and this brings victory to everyone. Both to us, and to the DShV, and to the infantry that will take this direction.
Your tasks is to close the gaps. Why do you think these gaps are forming?
Because the enemy has chosen such tactics. They have more personnel and equipment than we do. But we are ready for this. We just need a command that will manage the entire front line. Iʼm already doing that, without a command. But here are combat orders, a bunch of documents…. With a command, it will be a little easier because there are internal orders. And the secrecy regime is important for us. If we have our own command, we don’t need to [exchange documents] with anyone else so that they know about us. Only the leadership knows.
4
Mobilization and losses
Letʼs talk about people. According to our information, you receive many more people than other brigades. For example, in one month, one regiment of assault troops received the same number of people as a third of all the Airborne Assault Forces brigades on the front line receive in the same month.
Thatʼs not true at all. First, there is no such thing as someone getting more, someone getting less. Whoever wants to get as many as they want, recruits as many as they want. There is a right of priority selection [of mobilized personnel]. For the GUR, for the SBU, for the AAF, for us, for the assault units. This means we can come [to the training center] at the same time and have the right of first selection.
But the Airborne Forces receive less than you. [According to a Babelʼs source in one of the AAF headquarters, over the past month, one assault battalion has received as many recruits from training centers as an entire AAF brigade.]
Not true. Who told you that? If you have documentary evidence, Iʼd be happy to talk about it.
You understand that we have no right to give numbers. Neither do you. Then give your comparison in percentages.
Iʼm not used to speaking so freely. Iʼll say this — we make up about a tenth [of the AAF]. Compared to the paratroopers, weʼre about 10% of their number. Weʼre very small.
Thatʼs right. They say you gain more people and lose more people than the Airborne Assault Forces.
Thatʼs not true. Do you understand what losses are for assault troopers? Letʼs say a brigade is standing in the line of defense. The brigade has suffered losses, about 100 soldiers are WIA. Then there is a breakthrough, and assault troopers arrive. They can suffer losses on the first day when they stop the breakthrough. And their losses in a day will not be as great as the brigade lost in a month.
Combat work of artillerymen of the 33rd assault regiment.
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We will suffer the least losses among those standing in the lines. Because we are constantly moving. When you are constantly moving, and the closer you are to the enemy, the less you are exposed to artillery, shelling, etc. And if you stand in a static defense — with trenches, bunkers, ramparts, other fortifications — the enemy finds you and systematically destroys you.
We compare it with the Kursk operation. One of your assault regiments was moving alongside the AAF. And the paratroopers lost half as many people as the regiment.
Twice as many as we did. Of all the units that were in Kursk, the stormtroopers suffered the fewest losses.
Why then are your regiments called "meat grinders"?
Because someone doesnʼt want us to be formed. And this applies more to the commander-in-chief. Someone wants to undermine him, I guess. For me, this is a painful topic. We are stopping [breakthroughs at the front]. We are not leaving the front line. I donʼt see my family. And it hurts me to hear that we are butchers.
Now you are saving the situation at Dobropillia. But the breakthrough would not have occurred if the units defending there had had enough people. Isnʼt that right?
They had people. But people must be managed, and before that, you need to understand the enemy. The enemy is not stupid. We were expecting one brigade, and seven brigades attacked at the same time. Any line of defense can collapse if it is successfully pressured by large numbers of troops.
Why then did you fail in the Belgorod direction ?
If we are talking about the 2023 operation, then it was an operation of a different structure.
Instead, the battles in the Belgorod region in 2024–2025 should be considered as part of the Kursk operation. That direction was our right flank, and it was there that our units accomplished their main task — they drew significant enemy forces to themselves, providing time for preparing defense in the Sumy region.
If we understand correctly, you donʼt have your own recruitment. You receive either mobilized people or those who have agreed to fight in exchange for being released from prison.
We have our own recruitment, including in other countries. Many volunteers have been coming to us since 2014 and continue to do so today.
But not all of them are volunteers. There are recruits who are grabbed on the streets, and there are former prisoners. Is there a difference in the attitude towards a mobilized person and a former prisoner?
No. First, we call them [former prisoners] a “special contingent.” For us, they are equal, sometimes even more productive in combat missions. Many of them say that they have been asking to go to the front for a year, three years, five years. But they were not allowed to. Of course, we are especially careful with them. Because a person can say “I will go to fight” to get freedom, and then turn around and run away. They need to be watched.
How do you do that?
We provide security so that they canʼt escape from the start. Then they go into battle — they can run away from the battle, but you see, theyʼre fighting.
And do you use force against people?
I donʼt.
Valentyn Manko with his dog.
Manko Valentin / Facebook
And the others?
I donʼt know. But letʼs say a person comes to the unit drunk or on drugs and starts doing something. What should be done with him? If possible, they try to talk him out of it. If that doesnʼt work, they restrain and isolate him.
Are your subordinates afraid of you?
Thereʼs no need to be afraid of me. I donʼt know, ask your subordinates.
Are subordinates afraid of the commanders of other regiments?
You canʼt generalize that someone is afraid or respects someone. I strive to be respected. Until this winter, I always went to fights with guys — I wanted to show by my example that fear can be controlled. If I set such a task, I want to show that I can complete it myself. Maybe someone has a different approach, but first of all, I strive for respect.