The corps reform of the Ukrainian army has been going on for 6 months. What is its current status? Here is what is known from open sources — we show it on the map

In early 2025, the Ukrainian army reported the transition to a new command system — corps.

This means that the operational-strategic group (OSG), operational-tactical group (OTG), and tactical groups (TG) are to disappear from the command system. In the last six months, they have been transformed into corps, grouped into 4 groups. This process is still ongoing.

The largest number of corps is concentrated in the area of the former Donetsk OTG, where the situation remains difficult. For example, in early August, the First Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine “Azov” occupied a defensive strip in the Pokrovsk direction. It was there that the enemy broke through 10 km deep into Ukrainian positions a day earlier. The corps stabilized the situation and stopped the breakthrough. In parallel, the 7th Corps of the Airborne Assault Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine cleared Pokrovsk of enemy groups and individual Russian soldiers.

In February 2025, the deputy commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade (3rd Assault Brigade) Maksym Zhorin recalled that corps existed in Ukraine before, but had a key drawback: their units were scattered across different sectors of the front, which made coordination almost impossible. He emphasized that corps units must operate in one operational direction.

This problem remains today. For example, the 30th Marine Corps, which was supposed to be responsible for the defense of the Kherson region, is still not fully formed. Its main brigades are scattered across different parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In July, Lieutenant Colonel Bohdan “Tavr” Krotevych criticized the transition to the corps model.

The main problem with the corps reform, from his point of view, is that coordinating the corps requires significant reserves, which are not available. In addition, corps commanders and their staff officers do not have experience in managing such large structures. From his point of view, the transition to a divisional system would be more effective.

Here are some key points from Bohdan Krotevych:

• To work effectively, a corps or division must undergo coordination at all levels — from companies to brigades. Commanders must know their units and practice joint actions, for example, during maneuvers where one brigade attacks and the other covers the flanks. Such training is possible only in the rear. But now the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have enough reserves to replace even one brigade at the front.
• The corps model involves increasing the scale of command: instead of 3 brigades, as in a division, a corps encompasses 5 to 6. This means that for full coordination, 5 to 6 brigades must be withdrawn from the front simultaneously — which is practically impossible without reserves.
• Commanders are given command of large formations immediately, without having to go through all the levels of command. Ideally, a commanderʼs career path should look like this: platoon → company → battalion → brigade → division → corps. Moving from brigade to corps without an intermediate stage complicates management and increases the risk of errors.
• Corps effectively operate as tactical groups. Commanders control only one or two brigades, while the rest are temporarily “attached” to the corps and subordinate to their original structures. Because of this, the reform risks being reduced to a simple change of names, without any real increase in combat capability.
• Krotevychʼs alternative. He proposes a gradual reform: to unite exhausted brigades into a smaller number of combat-ready divisions. They should be withdrawn to the rear, supplemented with men, equipment, artillery, trained, and returned to the front as coherent units. This approach allows for minimal weakening of the defense and gives commanders a chance to gain experience by moving to higher positions.

Journalist and military officer Yuriy Butusov explained the advantages of corps reform using the example of the work of the 3rd Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

He emphasizes that the main reason for the large Ukrainian losses is not in the strength of the enemy, but in the problems of organization and command of troops.

• The 3rd Corps, commanded by Colonel Andriy Biletsky, was one of the first to be deployed in an extremely difficult situation. It took control of about 120 km of the front on the Oskil River, where three Russian armies were advancing at once. Before the corpsʼs strip was handed over, the enemy had captured 198 km². After that, in a month and a half, the Russians were able to advance only 16 km², while Ukrainian forces recaptured 8 km².
• Average monthly casualties in the corpsʼ zone have been halved compared to the period before its formation, even with increased fighting intensity. This has happened without a significant increase in replenishment, additional drone deliveries, or ammunition.
• Corps command has stopped chaotic oncoming battles and unprepared counterattacks “for reports”. Units are being brought into battle in an orderly manner, and interaction, reconnaissance, and firepower have improved.
• Andriy Biletsky received broad authority over personnel decisions. This allowed for the rapid promotion of effective commanders and the implementation of successful management models. Thanks to this, chaos and lies in reports disappeared, all positions, even in the encirclement, remained in contact with the corps.
• Although replenishment of men and ammunition remains limited, it has become planned. Commanders can count on reinforcements and do not have to break up brigades into small groups to "plug" neighbouring breakthroughs.

Yuri Butusov primarily analyzes the management model of the 3rd Corps, recognizing that there are corps whose units are still scattered across different sectors of the front.