From the front to the rear and back: first Mykhailo Drapaty was appointed commander of the ground forces, and then put in charge of the Operational Strategic Group (OSG)
The President appointed Drapaty as Commander of the Ground Forces on November 29, 2024. There are two versions of how this happened. A member of the parliamentary defense committee Serhii Rakhmanin claims that Volodymyr Zelensky made this decision and put Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky before the fact. But according to two independent sources of Babel, it was Syrsky who advised the President to appoint Drapaty to this position. Before that, Volodymyr Zelensky considered him as a candidate for the position of Commander of the Joint Forces or Chief of the General Staff.
At that time, Mykhailo Drapaty commanded the Luhansk Operational Tactic Group (OTG) and already had a reputation as a combat general who had stabilized the most difficult sections of the front. Drapaty had almost no experience in non-combat positions. Now he was to command the Ground Forces, a logistics structure that should develop this type of troops: train personnel, introduce new technologies, manage mobilization (including the Central Military District and Joint Forces). It has a different scale, and the principles of management differ from those of the headquarters. Zelensky noted that Drapatyʼs main task was to increase the combat capability of the army. He was to improve the training of military personnel and introduce new approaches to managing people.
And already on December 13, Drapaty presented a plan for the reforms of the Ground Forces. He was supposed to change approaches to recruiting and military training, digitalize bureaucratic processes (electronic document management was introduced in the Ground Forces), change management, logistics, and social support for the military. Drapaty also promised to reform training centers and train recruits in a new way. Thanks to him, basic military training programs are now updated every month, taking into account new experience at the front, an interlocutor in the Ground Forces Command tells Babel. Front-line experience is also taken into account when studying at military academies, and senior cadets undergo training in combat brigades (not at the front).
But Drapaty did not have time to fully implement the reform. Already on January 26, 2025, the president returned him to the front — appointed him commander of the “Khortytsia” OSG. As several interlocutors told Babel, many persuaded Zelensky to return the combat general to the war. By that time, Russian troops had approached Pokrovsk. The main task of the new commander was to stabilize the Pokrovsk direction.
At one time, Oleksandr Syrsky was criticized for simultaneously holding two positions — commander of the Ground Forces and commander of the “Khortytsia” OSG — and not having time to manage both Commands. This mistake was repeated, says Babelʼs interlocutor: "One person cannot be responsible for a large part of the front and reform such a colossus as the Ground Forces Command."
«Babel'»
What did Mykhailo Drapaty succeed and fail in his position as commander of the ground forces?
Where did the powers of Drapaty and Syrsky intersect?
Syrsky personally distributes those mobilized from training centers to brigades. Previously, the Ground Forces Command had such powers: brigades report to him on losses and send requests for personnel needs. During the operation in Kursk, which Syrsky directly led, most of the people and ammunition went to this direction. Now Syrsky directly commands the Sumy direction.
Mykhailo Drapaty did not have complete freedom in the Ground Forces Command. Babelʼs interlocutors said back in November that Drapaty would be able to change something in the land forces only if he was allowed to bring his own team. He failed to do this completely in half a year.
In February-March 2025, after Mykhailo Drapatiy began to command the “Khortitsa” OSG, the situation in the Pokrovsk direction was temporarily stabilized. But in mid-May, the Russians began to advance again — they bypassed the city from the flanks.
“The front is sagging in some areas, in particular because Drapaty is not allowed to fully change the command headquarters of individual OTGs,” says a source familiar with the situation for Babel. This is confirmed by two more independent sources: “Drapaty tried to change the commanders of some OTGs in order to fulfill one of the main tasks, but the commander-in-chief [Oleksandr Syrsky] did not agree to the dismissal — he considered it unnecessary.”
While Drapaty is leading the fighting, he is temporarily replaced by the Chief of Staff of the Command, Brigadier General Oleksandr Hruzevych, who was appointed by Oleksandr Syrsky and is considered “Syrsky’s man”. Major General Oleksandr Nesterenko also remains in the position of Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces.
“If Nesterenko is still staying, it means that Syrsky is not allowing him to be dismissed,” an interlocutor in the General Staff tells Babel.
In 2021, Nesterenko received a combat knife from the then Commander of the Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrsky.
Mykhailo Drapaty managed to appoint the people he needed to some of the positions in the Land Forces Command. The training direction was to be headed by an experienced officer, Colonel Oleh Mykolaychuk. He still remains in the status of "acting" because Oleksandr Syrsky does not approve of his candidacy.
All of Babel’s interlocutors call Colonel Mykolaychuk a strong and professional officer. It was he who pulled the 155th brigade out after the scandal, when more than 1,700 soldiers voluntarily left the military unit.
“He retrained the brigade as much as he could,” says Babel’s interlocutor. However, those around Syrsky believe that Mykolaychuk failed to train another brigade — 156. Both Ground Forces began to form even before Drapaty and Mykolaychuk came to the Command. They asked Commander-in-Chief Syrsky for more time to train the brigades — but they were not given it. Now these brigades are gaining combat experience at the front, alongside more experienced units.
Mykhailo Drapaty also managed to replace the head of the personnel department: all personnel decisions, including the appointment of heads of the TRC, go through him. Babel’s interlocutors say that the previous head delayed the dismissal of civilian advisors to Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk (the previous commander of the ground forces) and sabotaged important appointments. Oleksandr Syrsky’s entourage accuses Mykhailo Drapaty of dismissing the Command’s expert advisor on gender issues (she now works in the General Staff).
Oleksandr Syrskyʼs entourage believes that Drapaty has started a political career and is monitoring his own rating. Several independent sources of Babel claim that Syrsky is telling the president about this. Mykhailo Drapatyʼs team denies this and calls it rumors that are intended to discredit him in front of Bankova.
"He is not corrupt, thinks outside the box and has always refused to ʼdecideʼ anything. That is why he is considered a white crow and is suspected of political ambitions. But he never had them — this is evident at least from the fact that he almost never appears in public," says Babelʼs interlocutor from Drapatyʼs entourage.
Russian troops attack Cherkasy training ground twice. Drapaty tries to reform it
On March 1, 2025, the Russians fired on the 239th training center in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
An enemy drone “hovered” over the area of interest and adjusted an “Iskander” ballistic missile with a cluster warhead. At that time, the official number of victims was not named, but journalist Yuriy Butusov stated that 130 servicemen were injured in the shelling, 30 of whom died.
Drapaty reacted sharply. He began an internal audit with the participation of military counterintelligence and promised the most serious punishments for those who worked negligently or formally. Commander-in-Chief Syrsky also appointed his own audit. Based on its results, he dismissed the commander of the Air Command "East" Ivan Trebukha and the then head of the 239th training center. Drapaty himself received a reprimand from the commander-in-chief. Syrsky also issued a number of recommendations — according to people in his entourage, the command of the Ground Forces did not implement them.
Hruzevych remained in the Ground Forces after Drapatyʼs arrival, and he was in charge when Drapaty was at the front in the “Khortytsia” OSG.
In defense of Mykhailo Drapaty, the interlocutors of Babel give the following arguments. In order to implement the recommendations, Mykhailo Drapaty issued a number of instructions: on the construction of shelters, the organization of alerts, interaction with the Air Force Command, the dispersal of personnel, and control that during an alarm all fighters went down to shelters. By that time, he was already directing combat operations in the “Khortytsia” OSG. The acting commander of the Ground Forces was General Oleksandr Hruzevych — he was supposed to monitor the implementation of the instructions. In addition to him, the training command, the commander of the Operational Command “East”, the commander of the training center, and the servicemen in the center itself, who are responsible for the personnel, were responsible.
On the morning of June 1, 2025, an “Iskander” missile with a warhead again flew into the same 239th training center.
The strike killed 13 soldiers and injured almost 70 more. Drapaty wrote a report on his dismissal and announced this on social networks. He explained that he could not ensure that his orders were carried out.
“I did not pressure, did not convince, did not change the attitude towards a person in the ranks. Circular responsibility and impunity are poison for the army,” he wrote.
Drapaty was outraged by the fact that the scenario of the attack was the same as the first: a drone was on duty over the area of interest, adjusting targets. Some of his subordinates ignored his instructions.
“The fact that there are dead people there indicates that people were not in shelters,” says an interlocutor in the Command. The final answer about what happened during the shelling will be given by an internal investigation, which lasted until June 10. The Command also initiated an investigation into the incident at the State Bureau of Investigation.
The General Staff perceived Drapatyʼs decision "as a move to the opposition". They were outraged that Drapaty did not inform the president, but wrote about his report on social networks.
What does the appointment of Mykhailo Drapaty to the Joint Forces Command mean?
By the NATO standards, the commander of the Ground Forces Command is the war commander. It is he who must decide how to use all the troops along the entire front line. This is exactly how the command of the troops was planned to be organized — before the start of a major war. This was even written into the bill, which has been in parliament for several years. In February 2025, the document was again included in the agenda, but its further fate is unknown.
De facto, the front is directly commanded by Oleksandr Syrsky. He distributes weapons and ammunition to units, manages the distribution of mobilized people who have undergone training, and some operations, and can even indicate where and what position to equip. It was the commander-in-chief who was responsible for the Kursk operation, and now he is in charge of the defense of the Sumy region. So for now, the position of commander of the Joint Forces is formal. At the front, Mykhailo Drapaty will continue to lead the “Khortytsia” OSG.
For the position of commander of the Ground Forces, the commander of the Marine Corps Dmytro Delyatsky and Serhiy Litvinov are currently being considered.
What powers Drapaty will receive as commander of the Joint Forces depends on Oleksandr Syrsky.