The New Yorker tried to clarify Russiaʼs latest decisions in the war. Its journalist spoke with Rob Lee from the American Institute for International Policy Studies and an expert on Russia. Here are the main points of this conversation:
― recently appointed head of the invasion of Ukraine, head of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, is credited with developing a failed plan for a full-scale war. However, although he was clearly involved in its development, it is unlikely that the capture of Kyiv in three days and the poor preparation of Russian troops for the invasion was his idea. Most likely, the initial campaign was led by the FSB, which forced the military to obey the wishes of Putin and the special services. Gerasimov could not resist absurd decisions that contradicted even the military doctrines he was developing. Maybe now he has more freedom of action, so there is a risk that he will be more effective. Although Gerasimov may have been appointed only to balance the tandem of Sergey Surovikin and Viktor Prigozhin: the head of Wagner PMC and the ex-head of the "special military operation" were actually playing for the same goal, opposing a significant part of the army. That is, the reshuffle could take place purely due to the struggle of the centers of influence against the background of military failures;
― the conflicts between Wagner PMC and the Russian Ministry of Defense began even in Syria, when, envious of the successes of Prigozhinʼs fighters, Shoigu began to allocate less weapons and supplies to them. However, mercenaries have one advantage: even in the Middle East and Africa, they got their hands on fast recruiting and can quickly replenish the ranks of the military ― though this can be the level of "cannon fodder" from convicts. This makes them useful at the moment, because the official Russian system of military commissars was unable to efficiently and effectively mobilize the military. At the same time, Prigozhinʼs love for publicity worsens the prospects of the "Wagnerians". He appears so often at the front that an ordinary Russian may get the impression that "Putinʼs cook" is the main person currently in charge of the war, according to Lee;
― the mass attacks of the Russians on the Ukrainian infrastructure did not break the will of the people to resist, but this could turn out not to be occupiersʼ only goal. Another goal that was achieved was to make the war more expensive for both Ukraine and its allies. Now the damage caused to Ukraineʼs economy has become more significant, it is more difficult to do business here than it was in September, and the allies have to spend additionally on air defense complexes and generators and components for the Ukrainian energy system;
― tanks are needed by Ukraine to attack relatively well-protected enemy positions ― however, this is far from the only condition for the successful recapture of territories. We need more long-range projectiles, more air defense equipment, as well as good coordination between different types of troops and operators of new weapons. The success of Ukraine will largely depend on the extent to which the Armed Forces of Ukraine manage to obtain all these weapons by spring and master them;
― the world expected that a full-scale Russian invasion would follow the same scenario as the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, only with more troops and military equipment. In fact, the February-April campaign was more reminiscent of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Afghanistan in 1979. The occupiers assumed that in order to conquer a country, it is not necessary to destroy its army: a relatively friendly official government and a high number of collaborators will make this unneeded. In Georgia, the Kremlin understood that no one would greet Russians with flowers there ― and acted harshly from the beginning. In Ukraine, for some reason, it hoped for soft reply ― and this became one of the main surprises for Western analysts and, probably, the main reason for Russiaʼs defeat.