With the onset of cold weather, many Ukrainian and Western analysts predicted an activisation at the front, in particular, another possible major counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Bloomberg in its article tries to explain why it might not happen, although it is reasonable to say that on the last week land has already got frozen enough to be used by heavy wheeled equipment. Nevertheless, it is worth adding that due to the frost, fighters cannot leave their base for a long time, that the batteries of drones and smartphones drain twice as fast in the cold, and the visibility due to cloudiness is much worse. If earlier it was possible to see with the help of drones an area of 25 square kilometers, now the same forces can cover an area five times smaller. "Frosty weather is good for defense ― if there is enough food and firewood in the soldiersʼ trenches. But itʼs always more difficult to attack in winter," the article says. And the recent case in Makiivka, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine targeted the building of the vocational training school and destroyed several hundreds of Russian occupiers, confirms this: because of the Russians, the cold was kept in one building, which is easier to heat. In addition, even if it appears that the attack will begin, a thaw is possible in the near future, cutting off the advanced units from the supply channels. In addition, the article says, tanks may become useless in muddy conditions, as the refueler will not reach them. Presumably, in winter, the most active battles continue only in the area of Bakhmut and Soledar, where the Ukrainians are gradually destroying the Russian manpower. "As for a large-scale offensive, the Ukrainians have a better option," says Ed Arnold, a former British soldier and now a researcher at Londonʼs RUSI Institute, which studies military conflicts. "With all the [Western] weapons that they already have and that the West continues to give them, they have one chance to make a significant advance. And it is better not to start early."
The commander of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed for the third time in three months ― instead of Sergey Surovikin, Valery Gerasimov was put. The New York Times tried to analyze what this means, and the key conclusion of the article is that Putin replaces the fairly efficient ones with loyal ones. Speaking about the effectiveness of Surovikin, the publication admits that the actions of the Russian army have become more systematic and coordinated, the occupiers did not experience shameful defeats such as the escape in the Kharkiv region at the beginning of autumn. There were mistakes of a different kind ― for example, betting on missile attacks on the Ukrainian energy system, the Russians did not count on suppressing the Ukrainiansʼ will to defend their country (rather on the contrary), instead they spent their high-precision missiles. Also, Surovikinʼs tactics involve high losses among personnel: the Russian command sends soldiers "with only a few daysʼ military experience" to the front line ― and they, of course, die there. The publication assumes that Surovikin could oppose Putinʼs intentions, in particular, he achieved the retreat of the occupiers from the right-bank Kherson region ― the Russian dictator had not previously considered this as an option. Perhaps this opposition has led to the fact that Surovikin has now effectively been demoted to the level of one of the three deputies of the campaign leader. As for Valery Gerasimov, even the Russian "war journalists" have doubts that he may significantly change the situation on the front, writes the publication. He headed the General Staff of the Russian Army since 2012 and failed to significantly reform the army. He planned an invasion of Ukraine in February of last year ― and that campaign turned into a fiasco. Even the experts interviewed by the publication doubt that he is able to change something now. "Whatʼs happening on the front and whatʼs happening in Moscow are two different stories," Dara Massicot of the RAND Corporationʼs Washington-based think tank told the NYT.
Starting from mid-autumn, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the Russian PMC Wagner, has become increasingly visible in the Russian information space. If earlier he denied connection with mercenaries, and even the use of such a company, now he calls himself its founder and owner, and also actively criticizes the Russian military command ― and even admits that things are not going well with the Russians in Ukraine. CNN tried to find out why he does this. According to the article, the war became a prime time for the ex-convict and later, in essence, a mafioso who carried out orders from the Russian authorities. He wants to get more political points for himself ― and this is given to him at least because Prigozhin actually tomes to the front line, as opposed to the "official" Russian military command. In the eyes of Russians, he becomes someone who tells the "inconvenient truth" and is "close to a soldier." And why does the Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu often become the object of his attacks? The publication suggests that this is because Prigozhinʼs company once won large tenders for servicing the Russian army ― and then lost them. Putin keeps the opposition in the ranks of his "army men", believing that pins in the address of the "formal" leaders of the army will encourage them to take more active actions, the publication writes. Thus, Prigozhin and Chechen dictator Ramzan Kadyrov are "house critics." Another question is how much Prigozhin will be allowed to increase his influence and whether he will be able to slow down in time.