The Washington Post wrote about the involvement of Palantir, a developer of software for the US military and special services, in the events at the front. As it turned out, the company, whose activity in Ukraine was only announced, already has an office in Kyiv, and the soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces use its developments. David Ignatius, a journalist of the publication, was shown the program in action: the location of enemy equipment can be seen on the Bakhmut satellite map, which uses data from numerous commercial satellites, from scouts on the battlefield or enemy territory, as well as infrared images that show recent movement or shots of equipment. After assessing the situation, the program suggests which of the weapons available to the Ukrainians would be best to hit this or that target. When the unit commander chooses the method of attack, artillery units or operators of MLRS installations receive the corresponding command in the same program. And this is a simplified example of using a system that relies on data from several hundred satellites, thousands of drones, Starlink for high-speed data transmission, as well as specialists from NATO countries who, being abroad, also receive and analyze this data. They see the effectiveness of Ukrainian and Russian attacks, identify regularities in the arrays of information received, in order to increase the accuracy of subsequent strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Artificial intelligence is also involved. According to the article, advice from Western military headquarters regarding the goals and method of strikes was manifested in operations in the Kharkiv region, in particular in Izyum, in the Kherson region, and in the Donetsk region. Ukrainian IT specialists helped and are helping to coordinate the actions: each Ukrainian brigade has a soldier who is solely responsible for the operation of the software. It was software that often played a decisive role in determining the exact location of Russian headquarters or military bases. "This is the first war where algorithms play such a big role," the article says. "It is even more surprising that at the same time we see many trenches in the style of the World War I." The Russians are also trying to use the latest technologies, but their developments are slow, they have limited access to high-quality satellite data, and units transmit information to each other too slowly. "Due to the newness of the approach, the advantage in the digital component of warfare is still unclear," says Palantir CEO Alex Karp. "However, in the end, the difference in power between "digital" and "analog" armies is the same as the difference between a country with nuclear warheads and one with only conventional weapons." The advantage in technology and high morale makes it possible to win the war, even with a significant difference in the number of people and weapons — which Ukraine has been demonstrating for many months, the publication concludes.
The Associated Press news agency writes about Ukraineʼs resolute rejection of everything related to Russian. The material summarizes the cultural priorities of Ukrainian society after the large-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in the very first sentence: "Fyodor Dostoyevsky is leaving here, and Andy Warhol is taking his place." The process, which after the start of the war in 2014 was called de-Communization and was rather mild — as the media companies explained to the journalist, so as not to irritate the large Russian-speaking population of the country, has now become de-Russification, and it does not lack determination. If in the eight years until 2022, two hundred toponyms were renamed in Kyiv, then starting from February, the same number of streets, alleys, squares and alleys received new names — and another hundred are planned to be renamed. The names of first- and second-rate Russian figures disappear from Ukrainian maps and houses, instead, foreign figures appear, as well as Ukrainian ones, whom Russiaʼs colonial policy deliberately pushed into oblivion. AP mentions one of the most eloquent examples of the "crossing" of a toponym — the former capitalʼs Druzhba Narodiv boulevard, which referred to the "unity" of peoples enslaved by Russia. Now the name of this boulevard has the opposite meaning — the important transport artery for the city is dedicated to one of the ideologues of Ukrainian nationalism, Mykola Mikhnovsky.
John Hardy, deputy director of Russia-related programs of the American Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and head of the Center for Military and Political Power of the same foundation, Bradley Bowman, urge to provide Ukraine with GLSDBs ― Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs ― as soon as possible in a publication on the specialized defense website Breaking Defense. GLSDB is a joint development of the Swedish company Saab and the American Boeing, which combines two systems: the GBU-39 bomb, the warhead of which weighs 113 kilograms and costs about $40 thousand, which is not so much, and the M26 missile, which has a flight range of up to 150 kilometers and shot accuracy of one meter. These munitions can be launched, in particular, from HIMARS and M270 installations — and this would significantly strengthen Ukraineʼs capabilities at the front. Especially if you consider that different types of bombs can be intended for very strong armor or for moving targets. Yes, munitions with such a range theoretically increase the risk of strikes on Russian territory — however, until now Ukraine has adhered to its obligations not to strike targets in Russia with, in particular, HIMARS. There is no reason to believe that this time Ukraine will not keep its promise, Hardy and Bowman write. However, the sooner Kyiv receives these munitions, the sooner this war can end, the authors of the article are sure, because it is precise strikes on the rear bases of the Russians that determine successful Ukrainian counterattacks.