Most wars donʼt last long, and a truce comes after a few months of fighting at most. The reasons for this are clear: war is one of the least effective ways to resolve political disputes. At the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, most observers did not expect it to last for many months ― however, there is no end in sight to the confrontation. Christopher Blattman, a political scientist from the American Columbia University, explains why this happened in his article for Foreign Affairs. According to him, there are three reasons for the long war. The first is when the fate of the leader of at least one of the warring parties depends on winning or losing this war. This is precisely Putinʼs case, so he will continue the hostilities, regardless of the interests of Russia as a state, or Russians as a population. The second reason is when the parties cannot adequately assess their own and the enemyʼs forces. This was the case at the beginning of this war: the Ukrainian army turned out to be much stronger than everyone expected, and the Russian army, although large in numbers and in terms of weapons, was insignificant in terms of the quality of the mental component. In most cases, after a few months of war, the boundaries of each side become clear, but the Russian-Ukrainian war is not that case. There are still many unknowns that make this war full of intrigue: will the winter be harsh and will the West continue to support Kyiv despite inflation and rising fuel prices? Will Ukraine receive new types of high-quality modern weapons? Can Russia improve its battlefield performance with mobilized soldiers? The latter will become clear in at least two months, and so far the parties do not believe that the fate of the conflict has been decided. The third reason for the long duration of the war is the most important for the rest of the world: it is taking place in the conditions of a democracy, which is Ukraine. The opinion of society is important here. And if, from a tactical point of view, it might be worth ceding a part of sovereignty and ending this conflict, Ukrainian society will not allow it to be done. The struggle is not for any one good ― but for a system of values, and such a situation leaves much less room for compromise. There have already been many such cases in history, Blattman recalls. For example, in the American Revolutionary War, 13 militarily weaker states with no allies were fighting a much stronger enemy. In theory, it would make sense to end the conflict by bargaining for more political and economic autonomy in London. However, the American military and political leaders appealed to the will of the people: they said that society would not allow them to do this. This was true, and state leaders could not act against the will of society. The second such case concerns the Afghan governmentʼs negotiations with the Taliban in 2002 and 2004. It is known for sure that the Taliban offered the government of Hamid Karzai to make peace, and that it was pragmatically beneficial for both sides. However, since the war was about principles, the American curators of Afghanistan did not agree to this. Blattman concludes that as more and more nations become advanced democracies, the values of realpolitik (sacrificing some principle for pragmatic gain) are losing ground. Therefore, the wars of the future with the participation of democracies may last longer than in the past.
"Hardly in any other country in Europe, the Russian-Ukrainian war is being followed as closely as in Kosovo", ― this is how the article of Deutsche Welle begins, dedicated to the mood of Kosovars due to Russiaʼs invasion of Ukraine. According to the authors of the material, Pristina perfectly understands the situation in which Ukraine found itself: the larger and more powerful neighbor ― Serbia ― also does not recognize them as a separate nation and wants to deprive the Kosovars of their statehood. Belgrade, like Moscow, opposes NATO and has actually turned into a Russian proxy on the European continent. After February 24, commitment to a forceful solution to the "Kosovo issue" has grown in Serbia, and some local politicians are already calling for the "denazification" of neighboring European countries. In Pristina, they are worried that if Russia succeeds in Ukraine, the Serbs will try their luck in Kosovo. However, unlike us, an important factor plays in favor of the Kosovars: NATO troops are present on the territory of the partially recognized state. If it werenʼt for them, the next round of wars in the Balkans, Kosovo political scientist Arden Harjullagu is sure, would have already started.
Splitting the Russian-Ukrainian war into two is proposed by ex-NATO troops commander James Stavridis in his Bloomberg column. The first war is a ground war, and the Ukrainians confidently win in it. Yes, the successful counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson regions, which shocked the world, at the same time shortened the front for the Russians, so it will be more difficult for the Ukrainians to move forward. The Russians also increased the army at the expense of the mobilized ― but these are extremely unmotivated and inexperienced soldiers who have to look for winter clothes themselves and buy female sanitary tampons for bandages. Therefore, "in a war on land, I would bet on the Ukrainians," writes Stavridis. But Russia is currently winning the war in the second part of the confrontation. Its air fleet is larger, experienced due to operations in Syria. A large stockpile of missiles and, until recently, kamikaze drones destroy many Ukrainian military and civilian facilities. As soon as Russia can gain dominance in the sky, the story for Ukraine will become much worse. Because how did Russia achieve its effect in Syria? Its pilots simply dropped hundreds of unguided bombs on civilian targets, suppressing any resistance from Bashar al-Assadʼs opponents. Currently, Putin also has no restrictions on old unguided bombs, nor sentiments about the Ukrainian civilian population ― he will raze Ukrainian cities to dust if his bombers can fly over them with impunity, Stavridis writes. Therefore, it is precisely in this direction that the help of the West is needed the most ― at the expense of high-tech air defense systems (in particular, the Israeli-American Iron Dome and the American Patriot), and old Soviet aircraft, and F16 fighters, of which there are many in American warehouses and the management of which relatively easy to learn. On land, Ukrainians and Russians have already achieved relative parity of power. It must be done in heaven, writes Stavridis ― and then a weakened Kremlin can beg for negotiations on a real end to the war already at the beginning of spring, he predicts.