What will the flight of troops from Kherson mean for Putinʼs regime in Russia? This is what the journalists of The Washington Post try to find out. On the one hand, not long ago, Putin personally promised to make every effort to keep the occupied city. The cityʼs flag was hoisted at ceremonies in the Russian State Duma, the region is mentioned in the Russian constitution. On the other hand, for the majority of Russians, Putin is still a patriotic, kind, tsar-like ruler who is sometimes let down by traitors and incompetent officials ― and the loss of Kherson will not immediately change that. Especially considering how carefully the Russian dictator distanced himself from the events in the Kherson region: on the day when the regional center was lost, his only public appearance was a visit to the Moscow Center for Brain and Neural Technologies. However, although the majority of Russians may continue to support Putin, this support is increasingly illusory on the part of Russian "military bloggers", the billionaires, and the political elite. One of the businessmen said on the condition of anonymity that he really hoped for possible peace talks: this topic has been actively promoted by Russian officials in recent weeks, and it was also mentioned in the United States. However, now, in the wake of the success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the prospect of this is once again illusory. According to analyst Andrey Kolesnikov from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Putin is becoming more and more like Stalin in the last years of his reign: both dictators increasingly make decisions alone, without trusting anyone. However, according to other analysts of Russian origin interviewed by the publication, if Putin realizes that even after mobilization, the Russian troops are just as ineffective and suffer terrible losses, he may agree to peace on the condition that all captured territories, except for Crimea, be returned to Ukraine. The propaganda machine will do its job and the Kremlin will be able to explain to Russians the need for such a step, the publication concludes.
The New York Times writes about expectations for winter in the context of the Russian invasion. Like many other publications, the newspaper draws attention to the deterioration of the territoryʼs passability due to viscous soils. However, this is relevant for the Ukrainian army, which is advancing and has a limited supply of equipment. Russians will suffer more from the cold. Unlike the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which have their own warm uniforms and help with winter clothing from the Western allies, tens of thousands of mobilized Russians lack uniforms, and the ones they have will not protect them from heavy snow or frost. Therefore, the article says, the likely sharp increase in injuries of the occupying army is purely due to the cold. In parallel with a possible decrease in the intensity of hostilities on the front line, Russian attacks on Ukrainian civil infrastructure facilities are very likely. In particular, according to representatives of the Ukrainian authorities, we should expect attacks on water supply systems. Although it is not known whether Russia has many weapons for this type of attack: even the approximate number of cruise missiles in service with the Russian Federation is difficult to name, as well as Iranian drones. On the other hand, there is a probable increase in the activity of Ukrainian special services on the territory of Russia. The publication assumes that Kyiv may resort to further destruction of logistics routes and selective killings of Russian military leaders or high-ranking officials.
The Wall Street Journal writes about how Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of Wagnerʼs Private Military Company, is sharply scoring political points. If until recently he denied his connection with the mercenaries, then in the last few months Prigozhin confirmed that he is the head of the "wagnerians", and opened a business center of the military company in St. Petersburg, and also acted as an organizer of "territorial defense" courses in the border Ukraine in the regions of Russia ― so that civilians could somehow participate in the war, if it spreads to these territories. Also, the press service of Prigozhinʼs catering company recently distributed a message in which he assures that the structures under his control tried and will try to influence the elections in the USA. The publication goes into the question, why Prigozhin needs this. And it comes to the conclusion that, taking advantage of Russiaʼs military defeats at the front, he is trying to become an influential player in the Russian government with his demonstrative activity and audacity. This is connected, for example, with the fact that the "wagnerians" remained near Bakhmut, attacking the city, even when other Russian troops were losing positions near Kharkiv, Lyman, and Kherson. Bakhmut is not as strategically important a city as others lost by Russia. Prigozhinʼs mercenaries fought there to show that at least Putin could rely on them ― and on their leader. Itʼs starting to pay off, the WSJ writes. For example, Alexander Lapin, the head of the central group of Russian troops, recently resigned from his position. He was the object of fierce criticism, primarily by beauty.
"Thereʼs a rhythm to most surgeries at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston: the beep of a heart monitor, the surgeonʼs calls for "scalpel ... scissors ... clamp." But today, that rhythm sounds different. Itʼs mixed with quiet chatter in Ukrainian." ― this is how the NPR report on the new initiative of the medical institution begins. More precisely, it is the initiative of local surgeon Serhii Melnychuk, who is accompanied by Ukrainian specialists Volodymyr Voytko and Vitaly Sokolov. They learn to transplant organs, specifically at the moment of the journalistʼs presence ― work with a heart valve. Melnychuk has been working in Boston for more than ten years, and he comes from western Ukraine, his parents still live in one of the small local agricultural towns. With the beginning of a full-scale Russian invasion, Melnychuk came to Ukraine, considering how he could be useful. At first, he taught trauma surgery to local specialists, held courses in three hospitals at once, where injured civilians and soldiers were taken. One of the most common requests back then was organ transplants, Melnychuk recalls. And there was a lack of specialists capable of performing such operations in Ukraine ― especially those engaged in lung transplantation. Serhii has performed dozens of such operations, so this fall he gathered a group of 13 Ukrainian specialists who are now studying heart and lung transplants in Boston. At first, it was planned that these doctors would rent accommodation on AirBNB not far from the hospital ― but the Ukrainian Ministry of Health does not have the money for such a thing now. Fortunately, the local doctors had enough acquaintances who sheltered the Ukrainians for a certain time. They started their studies in October and plan to return to Ukraine in December.