Gideon Rose from the independent American analytical organization Council on Foreign Relations writes in a column on Foreign Policy that Ukraineʼs victory will help overcome the inter-party divide in the United States. Rose believes that the past 20 years have been disastrous for United States foreign policy, but this time Russia is the reckless aggressor, while America is wisely resisting with its allies. Joe Bidenʼs administration is managing to avoid previous US strategic mistakes. Rose was in Kyiv when the counteroffensive began and believes that its success is the result of strategic cooperation between Kyiv and Washington, and that the main task now is to stick to the chosen course. The author notes that it is a mistake to attribute all the gains to foreign support, because strong leadership, strong morale and competence of Ukrainians is what made it possible to use this support effectively and ensure success. Rose elaborates on examples of Ukrainian bravery and exploits, and also notes a striking contrast with Russia ― with its unstable leadership, low morale of its troops and questionable effectiveness of its operations. The current battle for Donbas, the author writes, has become a place where the fate of the world and the chances of restoring the liberal world order are being decided. For the US, Ukraineʼs victory is a chance to restore its reputation, tarnished by failures in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the Trump coup in 2021. Rose also speculates on the next steps for Putin, who he believes has three options: abandon his ambitions and withdraw from Ukraine, redouble his efforts by declaring total mobilization, or continue to try to break Ukraineʼs will with threats of nuclear weapons and mass attacks on civilian. Currently, he is biding his time, Rose believes, hoping for a weakening of Western support for Ukraine. Accordingly, allies must do everything they can to ensure that their support does not fall and that Putinʼs hopes eventually fade.
Anne Applebaum writes about the terrible consequences of the annexation of Ukrainian territory for the Russian Federation itself in an essay on The Atlantic. In 2014, Putin got away with annexing Crimea under the guise of an actual referendum, the author writes. This time, no one believes in "referendums", not even Russiaʼs allies. So this is a challenge to the world order and the principle of the inviolability of borders, and if Russiaʼs behavior is repeated by other countries, it itself may suffer in due course. Also, Putinʼs latest move is the height of contempt for the institution of elections and political pluralism. In the world offered by the modern Russian government, the only force is cruelty, directed including against minorities in the Russian Federation. After all, it was the Dagestanis, Buryats, Tuvans, and Crimean Tatars who became the objects of the most active mobilization. Applebaum calls this strategy a genocide not only of the Ukrainian people, but also of these ethnic groups living in the Russian Federation. Putin even encourages the mass flight of Russians abroad and perceives it as a certain purification of the nation. Also, mobilization is a way to "smear blood" on the hands of as many Russians as possible, and the threat of sending them to fight against Ukraine became a substitute for the threat of the Gulag in the Soviet Union. But, the author of the essay asserts, Putinʼs regime is not eternal, as is the annexation of territories that the Russian Federation does not even control.
The fact that the Third World War has already begun and the United States is a party to this war suggests the author Susan B. Glasser in an essay in The New Yorker. Escalation is Putinʼs favorite game, and the damage to the Nord Stream pipelines is likely designed to convince Western leaders that the Russian president is truly insane. Russia demands negotiations ― and this is an obvious blackmail that will not resolve the conflict, Glasser believes. She does not believe in the strategy of "giving Putin an opportunity to save face", because it was this approach that allowed him to fight in Georgia and Syria, as well as to invade Ukraine in 2014. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the West has tried to support Kyiv by avoiding direct conflict with Russia, but this is increasingly looking like self-deception. The conflict avoidance strategy has exhausted itself, Glasser quotes the American Russia expert Fiona Hill ― so isnʼt it time to reconsider it?