How the international media covered the Russo-Ukrainian war, September 23

Author:
Sasha Sverdlova
Date:

Russia can no longer protect its allies, Maximilian Hess, an expert on Central Asia at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes in an analytical article on Foreign Policy. The war in Ukraine is taking all the Kremlinʼs energy and attention, and this is reflected in the events in Central Asia. Azerbaijan took advantage of the weakening of Russian support for Armenia to gain better positions in Nagorno-Karabash, writes Hess. Armenian Prime Minister Nikolay Pashinyan relied entirely on the Russian Federation to establish a ceasefire in 2020, and eventually allowed Russia to significantly expand its military presence in Armenia. Since Russia supplied weapons to both Azerbaijan and Armenia, Moscowʼs diplomatic efforts were aimed at freezing the conflict rather than solving it, the author writes. But now the Russian Federation does not fulfill these functions either, so Hess wonders whether the West will use the opportunity to expand its influence in the South Caucasus. As Azerbaijan is a gas exporter, Baku is currently of greater interest to Western leaders than Yerevan, so Armenia is looking for allies elsewhere, particularly in Iran. The vacuum in the region created by the actions of the Russian Federation risks becoming a "black hole" that swallows everything around ― and Armenia may be among the first victims.

The New Yorker author Isaac Chotiner spoke with Sam Green, a professor of Russian politics at Kingʼs College London, about the importance of mobilization in Russia, Putinʼs view of war and the dangers of Russian nationalism. Here are the main points of the conversation:

  • Putinʼs speech was probably aimed at looking at the publicʼs reaction. In response, the authorities saw protests across the country;
  • the low turnout in regional elections in the Russian Federation and the prevalence of falsifications indicate that the people are dissatisfied with the direction in which Putin is leading the country;
  • ethnic minorities suffer the most from the war in Russia, among them Dagestanis, Buryats and poor, uneducated ethnic Russians;
  • In the initial anti-war protests in the Russian Federation, the anti-war feminist resistance was the most prominent group. In general, women, especially young ones, were more visible than men;
  • for now, Russiansʼ tacit assent to the Kremlinʼs narrative is more likely to be based on the fact that the majority supports the official interpretation of events, although individuals may question it. If entire groups begin to question the veracity of official news, the public consensus may shift.

The Wall Street Journal writes about Ukraineʼs possible response to the announcement of partial mobilization in the Russian Federation. Having announced the draft, the Russian Federation seeks to strengthen its positions in the east and south and prevent further losses. However, Russia will need several months to integrate the mobilized into the army, so Ukraine should use this time as efficiently as possible. Even later, Ukraine will still have an advantage over a demoralized opponent thanks to the preparedness of its troops and Western weapons, claims Mykola Bielieskov from the Kyiv National Institute of Strategic Studies. Currently, the strategy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to explore the weak points of the Russians and preserve manpower and equipment, while the Ukrainian army will have to regroup forces and carry out a significant rotation. At the same time, mobilized troops poorly integrated into the Russian forces can weaken an already demoralized army.