Alexander Vindman, a former Director for Foreign Affairs at the U.S National Security Council, and Dominic Cruz Bustillos, a Research Associate at the Lawfare Institute, wrote an essay on Foreign Affairs exploring the opportunities for Ukraine’s post-war democratic renewal. The authors are sure the war will end with the Russian defeat and that a sovereign and independent Ukraine will emerge as a new European power. Yet, immediately after the war, Ukraine will need assistance in reconstruction – a prerequisite to resolute democracy and a thriving economy. Based on preliminary estimations, Ukraine would need up to one trillion dollars for reconstruction – aid as needed as the current military assistance provided by the allies. Vindman and Bustillos believe the rebuilding has to start immediately, especially in oblasts like Kyiv and Chernihiv, which are far from the frontline. The authors outline a step-by-step plan setting the Ukraine reconstruction funds coordinated by US and EU. They also offer mechanisms that would ensure effective fundraising and decision-making, enabling a fast and smooth revival of Ukraine as “a truly twenty-first-century democracy, complete with modern cities and infrastructure”. The authors recognize the issue of corruption rooted in Ukraine, that might harm the renovation process. At the same time, they believe the Ukrainian political environment after February 24 is most conducive for reforms, including those preventing and countering corruption.
The Atlantic’s Yasmeen Serhan talked to a former secretary-general of NATO from 2009 to 2014, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, about Putin’s reaction to NATO expansion, Russian invasion plans, and prognoses for the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Here are the bullet points from the interview:
- As Putin promised to react if NATO came closer to Russia, his recent remarks that he is not bothered with Finland and Sweden joining the alliance are ridiculous. He says it because he has to accept the inevitable;
- If Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he will not stop. His following goals would be Moldova, Georgia, and finally, the Baltic states. As Finland and Sweden are joining NATO, the defense of the three Baltic States would be much easier and more efficient now.
- Rasmussen traveled to Kyiv in response to President’s Zelensky request for Rasmussen to lead the international group preparing recommendations on how to guarantee future security and independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine;
- According to this plan, Ukraine should be allowed a security force with no limitations or restrictions dictated by Russia. This would be the best security guarantee for Ukraine;
- NATO sent the wrong message to Putin in 2008 after he invaded Georgia and in 2014, following his invasion of Ukraine. Macron is attempting to repeat the same mistake by insisting on offering Putin an “off-ramp”;
- Rasmussen offers to consider economic attacks similarly to military aggression, by the principle“ an attack on one is an attack on all” (NATO article 5). His long-term vision is to establish a common market of democracies;
- A protracted war in Ukraine would benefit Putin’s purpose by preventing Kyiv from beginning the rebuilding and creating hurdles on Ukraineʼs path to NATO. The allies’ goal should be to end this soon by delivering all the weapons Ukrainians need without restrictions.
The Associated Press writes about the long-term consequences of economic sanctions for Russia. Now it seems EU countries are struggling with the energy crisis and record inflation while Kremlin is prospering because of high energy costs fueled by the war. Yet, writes AP, in the long term, Russia will pay a high price for the war. AP describes how sanctions affect EU countries - from the increased cost of living to jeopardized EU economic growth. In Russia, on the other hand, the ruble’s exchange rate and declining inflation present a misleadingly bright picture. The exchange rate is rigged by federal rules preventing money from leaving the country and biding exporters to exchange foreign earnings into rubles. The inflation rate, according to Janis Kluge, an expert on the Russian economy at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, “has partially lost its meaning” as it does not account for the disappearing western goods and might reflect a decrease in demand. Kluge believes that even if Moscow created extra government jobs to prevent mass unemployment following the exodus of foreign employers, the economy would be less productive, and the average real incomes would be lower.
In the face of the upcoming major International Airshow in England, the Financial Times writes about the emerging opportunities for improved EU defense strategy based on collaboration and increased funding. Following years of defense spending decrease, European countries want to invest more in the ability to confront increasingly aggressive Russia. Moreover, a full-scale war inside Europe seems to be an extraordinary stimulus for greater collaboration on military programs and streamlining weapons production. Nevertheless, there are potential challenges EU countries would face on their way to defense modernization. First, the 200 mln of total European budget increase would be primarily spent on boosting the armed forcesʼ salaries and replenishing weapons aided to Ukraine. Second, the immediate need for weapons would force EU countries to purchase them abroad, thus creating hurdles to European security independence. An additional challenge for the unified European approach to defense and security is that governments are used to treating these issues as sovereign matters rather than joint EU efforts. In 2020 only 11 percent of the EU defense budget was spent on collaborative projects. Thus, according to an anonymous EU senior official FT talked to, [the Russo-Ukrainian war presents] “a huge opportunity to use this big increase in defense spending to overhaul the EU’s defense capabilities — and for the first time do it in a joined-up way, where countries stop this silly inefficient thing of ignoring the benefits of joined-up purchases”.