After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia increased cooperation with Iran and signed a treaty with it on a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. However, both countries continued to actively spy on each other.
This is evidenced by documents from the First Service of the FSB (counterintelligence), which are available to the Russian media outlet The Insider. Media sources in the special services explain that despite everything, Russia views Iran more as an enemy than an ally and does not want Tehran to possess nuclear weapons.
One of these documents is “Recommendations for Planning Operational and Service Activities on the Iranian Line”. This document is developed annually. The 2024 document notes that although Russia and Iran are officially deepening cooperation and calling each other strategic partners, Iranian intelligence services continue to spy on Russia.
Iranian agents are interested in Russian military technology, including rocket engines, drones, electronic warfare systems, and nuclear developments. The Iranians try to obtain these technologies by circumventing the law and also recruit Russian specialists who have access to classified information. This is often done under the guise of scientific exchanges, business trips, lectures, or trips abroad. The agents are motivated with money or are gradually attracted to cooperation.
Several Iranian structures are conducting espionage activities in Russia: the Ministry of Information, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Second Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces. They work through the Iranian embassy in Moscow and try to penetrate Russian industrial, research, and design enterprises.
In addition to gathering information, Iran promotes a Shiite version of Islam in Russia and influences Muslim communities to pursue its strategic interests.
Russia is also engaged in espionage in Iran. In the "Recommendations" for 2024, counterintelligence officers directly write that it is necessary to penetrate Iranian special services and collect information about their activities in the Russian Federation, in particular about attempts to influence Muslim communities that could provoke interfaith conflicts, and about the likely successor to Iranʼs supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Russian spies are also faced with the following tasks:
- prevent Iran from attempting to illegally obtain Russian technology, especially related to weapons of mass destruction;
- obtain intelligence on what could reduce Iranʼs motivation to work closely with Russia, including the resumption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iranʼs nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions by the United States;
- collect information about the activities of the embassies of Ukraine and Western countries in Iran;
- to recruit people from Iran and graduates of Iranian religious educational institutions.
It is noteworthy that despite the large-scale changes in world politics in recent years, the goals and methods of the FSB have remained practically unchanged. In the similar “Recommendations” of 2021, the text of the document is almost identical, but less detailed.
The Insiderʼs source in the FSBʼs military counterintelligence service noted that during Medvedevʼs presidency, Russia began to view Iran as a threat rather than an ally. And the Kremlin has always held the view that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons.
The FSBʼs "Recommendations" for 2024 emphasize the need to prevent Iranʼs attempts to gain access to information about Russian nuclear technologies.
The same source notes that even after the rapprochement with Iran, Russia continued to cooperate with Israel through the GRU. Iran is aware of this, which increases mutual distrust. A GRU representative made a similar comment: since 2010, Russia has been supporting Israel more in the conflict between Iran and Israel, and now the new conflict between Iran and Israel puts Russia in an awkward position.
For more news and in-depth stories from Ukraine, please follow us on X.