“We should have ended this war three years ago, and we could have done it.” Finnish general and MEP Pekka Toveri speaks about aid to Ukraine, risks for NATO, frozen assets, and Europe’s fear

Author:
Yuliia Hyra
Team:
Kateryna Tryfonenko, Glib Gusiev
Date:
“We should have ended this war three years ago, and we could have done it.” Finnish general and MEP Pekka Toveri speaks about aid to Ukraine, risks for NATO, frozen assets, and Europe’s fear

A retired Finnish Major General and a Member of the European Parliament Pekka Toveri during the Kyiv Security Forum, where he spoke at a panel discussion dedicated to innovations and technologies of future warfare, May 8, 2025.

Kyiv Security Forum / Facebook

Russia may try to test NATOʼs Article 5 in the next two years, while Donald Trump remains US president. A retired Major General Pekka Toveri says the target could be Narva, Spitsbergen or one of the countries of Southeastern Europe. He served in the Finnish Defense Forces for over 35 years, commanded an armored brigade, headed Finnish military intelligence and worked as a military attaché in the US and Canada. Currently, Toveri is a member of the European Parliament from the European Peopleʼs Party group, a member of the Security and Defense and Agriculture committees, and also the head of the European Parliament delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee. The Babel correspondent Yuliia Hyra spoke with him about the adaptation and weaknesses of the Russian army, a possible scenario of a Russian attack on a NATO country, frozen Russian assets and the conditions for Ukraineʼs accession to the EU.

"Russian generals are ruthless, but not completely stupid"

In your opinion, Russia is “wasting its army”, while Ukraine is creating a new model of war. At the same time, the Russians are rapidly improving drones, electronic warfare, and tactics. Where is the line between the exhaustion of the Russian army and its ability to adapt today? And what is it doing better than you expected at the start of a full-scale war?

My profession was to try to understand the Russians. I thought they had evolved a little and stopped throwing people under machine gun fire to certain death. But they are still willing to sacrifice people on a scale we haven’t seen since World War II.

Russian generals are ruthless, but — unfortunately — not completely stupid. They know how to make the best use of their imperfect military machine. They understand their own strengths and act accordingly: “Okay, let’s go to a war of attrition. Let’s use our artillery (which we have more of) let’s use everything we have in abundance, and try to kill Ukraine slowly but surely, like death by a thousand cuts.”

They adapted their tactics quite successfully to counter the Ukrainian defense. They also performed quite well on the operational level. For example, in the fall of 2022, they realized that they had to retreat. They had been beaten so badly that there was a threat that Ukraine would push them out of the south. So they went on the defensive and built lines that eventually stopped the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023.

No one dared to tell Putin that they were screwed and should go on the defensive, but they did it in time. Similarly, when [in the summer and fall of 2022] you cut the bridges across the Dnipro River [in preparation for the offensive in the Kherson region], the Russians realized that their 30-35 000 soldiers were under threat, and decided to withdraw them (probably without asking permission).

They anticipated events, and this helped to avoid defeat in certain sections of the front.

Despite all the changes and adaptations, where does the Russian army remain systemically weak?

Their weakness is that they are not as flexible as the Ukrainian Armed Forces when it comes to new ideas and technologies. But when the Russians do master something, they produce it in huge quantities, and that creates a problem. They saw that jet drones work effectively, so they created the capacity to produce three thousand of these drones a month.

But a war of attrition also has its limitations. Even if the Russians manage to break through the Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk — and I don’t believe they can, especially after Operation Vivaldi — what will they do next?

The Russian army is mostly infantry and is used to advancing a few hundred meters a day. It cannot suddenly switch to blitzkrieg and cover 20, 30, or 100 kilometers a day. It lacks the training, military culture, and equipment to do so.

Even if they manage to mobilize 300 000 to 500 000 new soldiers, that will mean another 300 000 to 500 000 Russians killed.

The Commander of the Third Army Corps, Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Mykhailo Drapaty, and the head of the “Azov” Group of Forces Denys "Redis" Prokopenko, at the farewell ceremony for Colonel Yevhen Konovalets in Kyiv, August 14, 2026.

Третій армійський корпус / Facebook

However, the biggest problem of the Russian army is the unhealthy relationship between the military and political leadership. In a healthy system, the military speaks the facts, explains what is possible, and gives professional advice, while politicians make the decisions.

In Russia, everyone lies and everyone knows that everyone lies. For some reason, the dictator believes that no one will dare to lie to him, and makes decisions based on a reality that does not exist.

This makes it much harder for them to win the war, and I donʼt think they will. A short war can be won with superior forces, tactics, and operational planning, like the Israelis did in the Six-Day War. But when the war goes on for months and years, the economy becomes the deciding factor.

Russia can still fight this war for a few more years, because itʼs a dictatorship — all the money can be taken from the people to cover the rapidly growing national debt. Although, I still donʼt think it will survive Ukraine.

Western armies and NATO are studying Ukraineʼs experience. Are Western armies preparing to fight the same way themselves?

First of all, we see that Russia is preparing for a major war with the West. That is why it continues to produce tanks. It has at least as many tanks as it had before the full-scale invasion. The Russians have compensated for their losses. The best machines — the T-90M, T-80BVM and others — are being kept in reserve. They will probably be saved for the new forces that Russia will create after the war. They are creating new formations, turning brigades into divisions.

“Division” sounds much better than “brigade”, although at least for the next few years such divisions will not have significant combat power. In essence, these are the same brigades, only with fancy names.

However, we do not want and do not plan to go into a “Ukrainian War 2.0” scenario if Russia attacks us. We will fight our way and will not let Russia dictate to us how the war should be conducted.

The Russians would like to have a situation similar to the Ukrainian one, when they use drones and long-range weapons to strike first and punish us as they punished Ukraine. We are not going to play this game. We have absolute air superiority and our own long-range capabilities. Our soldiers are much better trained, and we have even more of them than Russia.

We will attack them, not just tolerate Russian strikes.

Canadian military personnel hone their skills in using drones on the battlefield during exercises in Latvia, August 31, 2026.
BALTOPS 2026 exercise, in which ships and crews from NATO countries practice protecting maritime communications and underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, June 1, 2026.
The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, during his visit to Kyiv, together with representatives of 32 Alliance member countries, discussed with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Mykhailo Drapaty, Ukraineʼs military priorities and the lessons of war that will help strengthen the Alliesʼ readiness for current and future threats, on October 7, 2026.

Canadian military personnel hone their skills in using drones on the battlefield during exercises in Latvia, August 31, 2026. BALTOPS 2026 exercise, in which ships and crews from NATO countries practice protecting maritime communications and underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, June 1, 2026. The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, during his visit to Kyiv, together with representatives of 32 Alliance member countries, discussed with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Mykhailo Drapaty, Ukraineʼs military priorities and the lessons of war that will help strengthen the Alliesʼ readiness for current and future threats, on October 7, 2026.

Admiral Giuseppe CAVO DRAGONE / X

"Russia can test Article 5 while Trump remains president. Everyone knows heʼs an idiot."

If Russia decides to test NATO with a limited military operation, which scenario do you think is the most likely?

Russia is not capable of challenging NATO militarily, but it can try to challenge Article 5 — the unity of the Alliance. It is the unity of the Ukrainian people that is the greatest obstacle to Putin’s victory.

To fight, Ukraine needs Western support, and that support is coming as long as the EU and NATO remain united. So this winter, the Russians will probably try to keep us on edge with drones, and perhaps missiles.

In such cases, you can always come up with a plausible excuse, kind of: it was a mistake; it was a Ukrainian missile; it was a missile that went off course due to a malfunction.

There will always be an explanation that will allow you to deny a deliberate attack.

But if Russia really wants to test Article 5, I think it will do so within two years, while Trump is still president of the United States. Everyone knows he is an idiot. No one knows what he will do because he is so stupid that he does not understand how important NATO is to the United States.

At the same time, everyone understands that the next president — even if it were J.D. Vance — would know how important the Alliance is.

So Russia may decide to act now. It will probably choose one of the smaller NATO countries and launch a massive information campaign.

The Russians are very good at spreading lies. They could, for example, claim that Estonians are committing genocide by killing the Russian-speaking population. At the same time, they will put political pressure on the leadership of Western countries.

They will carry out a limited operation then, for example, they will try to seize part of the territory of Estonia or some NATO facility. And they will say: "We are only here to protect our people, as our law requires. We have the right to do this and we do not want anything more. If you attack us, we will use nuclear weapons."

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the US President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte during a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, July 8, 2026.

Getty Images / «Babel'»

Most likely — even under Trump — NATO would have responded to the attack and defeated the Russian forces. If the Alliance cannot make a decision under Article 5, then it will be possible to act within the framework of other formats of cooperation.

That is why there are, for example, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) with the participation of Great Britain and a number of other countries. They allow you to make a separate decision and act: "Okay, guys, you can continue to argue in the North Atlantic Council, but we will go and kick the Russians out."

This would be a very risky move for Russia, but Putin has nothing to lose. He is a dictator, he has no retirement plan. The day he gives up power or loses it, he will die.

If he tries and loses, so what? He will lose a few thousand soldiers. Who cares? Human life means nothing to this idiot, not even the lives of Russians. So I think such a scenario is quite possible. Everyone has been talking about Narva for a long time.

This is reminiscent of the scenario from Carlo Masalaʼs book "If Russia Wins". What is happening now resembles the scenario described there: firstly — the migration crisis to divert Europeʼs attention, then — Narva and the Russian-speaking people (who supposedly need to be protected). We have seen this before.

Yes, it could make sense, because there are significant Russian minorities in the border areas. On the other hand, this is exactly the scenario that everyone expects, which is why NATO is already present in the region. There are even American troops there, ready to fight. The Russians would immediately find themselves in a firefight with the Germans, Americans, or British. This would greatly complicate the operation.

So they might try something else. It could be Southeast Europe or Spitsbergen. In the north, Russia has a geographical advantage — its fleet is better adapted to operations in the Arctic than Western fleets. Therefore, it is more difficult to project Western naval power there.

The Russians have always been good at achieving operational surprise. So they might even go back to the Baltics because everyone expects it.

It could be Finland, although I donʼt believe it. The Russians have learned that attacking Finland is a bad idea. Geography and climate are on our side, we are better prepared and have a much larger army than, for example, the Baltics.

Swedish military personnel during the international military exercise "Nordic Response" near the border of Finland and Norway, March 9, 2024.
NATO exercise "Lapland Steel" 25 in Rovajärvi, Finland, December 2, 2025.

Swedish military personnel during the international military exercise "Nordic Response" near the border of Finland and Norway, March 9, 2024. NATO exercise "Lapland Steel" 25 in Rovajärvi, Finland, December 2, 2025.

Getty Images / «Babel'»

We are talking about how NATO can respond to such an attack. But what the Alliance do to prevent it?

Exercises have been going on in the Baltic region all fall. Spearhead Forces have been deployed there. Larger-scale exercises are ahead. A readiness system has been created that allows for the rapid transfer of reinforcements. There is ammunition, troops, and readiness to immediately enter battle.

The Estonians are also concentrating their forces closer to the border to react more quickly. They are demonstrating their readiness and showing that they are keeping a close eye on the Russians. Estonian forces are circling around Kaliningrad almost every day, and this is very unnerving for the Russians.

Their nuclear threats — they say, “if you do anything to Kaliningrad, we will use [our] nuclear weapons” — show very good how worried they are.

Poland could crush Kaliningrad in a matter of days. If war breaks out between us, Russia will not be able to support Kaliningrad.

"If we admit that we are at war with Russia, we will have to do something about it, not just discuss it"

We see hybrid attacks — drones, cyberattacks, information operations — directed against European countries, but they are not always immediately linked to Russia. For example, in August, a drone with explosives was found near Ukrainian planes at the “Leipzig” airport in Germany. Berlin has publicly accused Moscow. What evidence of Russian involvement is needed for NATO to respond to such an attack?

First of all, I hate the notion “hybrid war”. It’s not a Russian notion, it’s a Western one that politicians are now using to avoid talking about the war we’re actually in with Russia. If we admit that we’re at war with Russia, we’re going to have to do something about it, not just talk about it.

There are nine phases of war in the Gerasimov doctrine. The 6th and 9th — as I understand the model — are already a war that can ultimately end with the use of nuclear weapons. We are now at the 3rd level and moving towards the 4th, when they start using military force in various ways to create problems for the enemy.

At this stage, when we are still in the gray zone, the most important thing is plausible deniability.

Russia is doing everything so that we cannot prove its involvement 100%. This is especially effective against the West, because we are democratic states with legal systems. In Western political culture, people often think, like, “if we can prove guilt in court, then we can say that Russia did it and [then] punish it”. This is a completely wrong approach.

What do we need to do?

In the “Leipzig” case, we saw the first steps. Instead of talking to lawyers first, we need to talk to intelligence. Ask [yourself] “How likely is it that Russia is behind this?” Sometimes intelligence can provide 100% proof that cannot be used in court.

As a former intelligence chief, I know that we will not reveal our sources to the court because we do not want to lose them. So intelligence can say something like “you cannot use this publicly, but we have evidence”. Or even without definitive evidence, assess that there is a 90% probability that Russia is behind the incident. In this case, the decision should be made based on that assessment.

A German police drone inspects the area near a Ukrainian An-124 transport plane at "Leipzig/Halle" Airport, August 5, 2026.
Police officers and a robot sapper inspect the area near the Ukrainian An-124 at "Leipzig/Halle" Airport the day after the Russian attack.

A German police drone inspects the area near a Ukrainian An-124 transport plane at "Leipzig/Halle" Airport, August 5, 2026. Police officers and a robot sapper inspect the area near the Ukrainian An-124 at "Leipzig/Halle" Airport the day after the Russian attack.

Getty Images / «Babel'»

Russia is very happy with the current situation. For them, this is the best option — everyone knows that it is Russia, and that is what they want. They want everyone to fear them and understand who is behind the attacks. But since we cannot prove involvement, we do nothing.

The only way to stop this is to say: “Piss off! We will punish you.”

Every time something like this happens, there should be punishment. At least the Germans have started to act. This is a good first step — they have directly punished Russia for certain actions. They have done not enough, but they have done it.

Every time there is a major drone incident, we could hand over $1 billion of frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. That is entirely possible. The only problem is that Western politicians are the most short-sighted, spineless, and cowardly people.

I know, because I was one of them. It is difficult to get them to make a decision until the situation becomes absolutely critical. But by then it is usually too late.

You mentioned frozen Russian assets. Now they are discussing again the possibility of transferring them to Ukraine. How do you assess the prospects of this decision?

The discussion is ongoing. Belgium is being persuaded to agree to this step, and the other EU countries have to give them guarantees to use these assets. The options are simple — either we pay for Ukraine’s support ourselves, or we use frozen Russian funds.

The economies of many EU countries are not in the best shape right now, so they think: “Do we have to pay? Maybe it’s better to use the frozen assets.”

I think we will eventually get to that point. We will say: “Piss off, we will use this money.” It really annoys me that we allowed the war to go on for so long and didn’t do it sooner.

Now, there is a presidential election in France, and there is a risk that Marine Le Pen (who supports Putin) or another pro-Russian politician will come to power. After that, it will be much more difficult to act.

Although, look at Germany, where the Alternative for Germany (AfG) is gaining strength. We should have ended this war three years ago. And we could have done it if we had acted more decisively. But it is what it is.

We should not cry over spilt milk. We must move on and find a way to use the frozen assets.

Could elections in EU countries in the coming years weaken support for Ukraine? Are the European Union discussing measures in case of Russian interference?

If you look at the polls, Ukraine continues to be supported in Europe, although the level of this support varies in different countries, as does the willingness to provide various types of assistance.

People just do not connect this with their own dissatisfaction with domestic politics. They protest against what is happening in their countries and are looking for new faces. This is connected, for example, with the popularity of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). These are corrupt politicians funded by Russia. They believe that we need to stop supporting Ukraine and start buying Russian gas and oil again.

But ordinary voters are not too concerned about this. They want their own economy to work. The AfD promises to ensure this. And since Friedrich Merz was unable to fulfill his promises, people think: "Then I will vote for new ones."

Alice Weidel, Ulrich Sigmund and Tino Hrupalla celebrate the first results of the Saxony-Anhalt state election, which put the AfD in first place. Magdeburg, Germany, September 6, 2026.

Getty Images / «Babel'»

Elections are primarily a national matter. The EU cannot directly interfere in the electoral process, because then we would be doing the same thing as Russia. What we can do is adopt legislation that would limit the ability of non-EU states to conduct information campaigns. For example, we can require platforms to remove bots that are used in campaigns supported by foreign states.

We have no problem with a person writing on the Internet under their own name 24/7 and criticizing pro-Ukrainian or pro-European politicians. But if the Russians launch a million bots, then that is a problem.

"You canʼt demand EU standards from Ukraine and at the same time close the market to it"

Letʼs talk about Ukraineʼs European integration. The European Commission has proposed a new approach to EU enlargement, which, in particular, involves restricting the Ukrainian agricultural sectorʼs access to the European market and financing. Does this mean that Ukraine can join the EU under special conditions?

First of all, the new European Commission document addresses a problem that we have finally come to realize: the EU accession process is broken. Many countries that started this process, like Ukraine, back in the early 2010s, are still in the queue and are not seeing significant progress. So the idea is to change the process.

Everyone understands the strategic importance of Ukraine. Europe will be safer and stronger if Ukraine becomes a member. Although, there are always two issues — corruption and agriculture. In my opinion, corruption is easier to deal with.

You have already done a lot of good work. You still have institutional problems at the highest level, but I think you are moving in the right direction. But agriculture will be a much more difficult issue.

If you tell Ukraine that it cannot sell its agricultural products to Europe, but at the same time it must switch to European standards, it will create huge costs. For example, the cost of soybean production could increase by about 150 euros per hectare. Ukraine will risk losing world markets, where it still exports about 90% of its products. We cannot do that.

Damaged after a UAV attack, the "Kernel" terminal in the port of Chornomorsk, June 5, 2026.
On September 12, 2024, the Russians attacked the AYA ship, which was transporting grain from the Ukrainian port of Chornomorsk to Egypt. In the photo, crew members are cleaning up the aftermath of the attack.

Damaged after a UAV attack, the "Kernel" terminal in the port of Chornomorsk, June 5, 2026. On September 12, 2024, the Russians attacked the AYA ship, which was transporting grain from the Ukrainian port of Chornomorsk to Egypt. In the photo, crew members are cleaning up the aftermath of the attack.

пресслужба Kernel; Getty Images / «Babel'»

I will explode with anger at this absurd situation. Russia is blocking the export of Ukrainian grain, and EU countries are refusing to allow it to be transported through their territories.

At the same time, Russian grain and Ukrainian grain, some of which Russia has stolen from Ukraine, are exported through the EU to world markets. Excuse my language, but what the hell is wrong with you guys? Ukraine has been fighting for its freedom for four and a half years, giving Europe time to prepare — and then it gets this offer.

Unfortunately, we cannot change the rules only for Ukraine. However, it is worth looking at Poland and its development since joining the EU in 2004.

Since then, its economy has grown significantly, and its GDP per capita, taking into account the cost of living, has increased by about three times. The EU membership has been a huge boost for the Polish economy. I see the same opportunities for Ukraine.

The best thing that can happen to your country is joining the EU.

What can Europe do now to prevent Russia from continuing the war?

I hate it when our political leaders say they will support Ukraine as long as it takes. Thatʼs stupid, because thatʼs not a strategy. Unless your strategy is to let Ukraine bleed to death slowly.

We need to make a political decision: we will end this war in a year. And then gather economists and military experts and say: “Okay, come up with a plan. How do we achieve this? How do we destroy the Russian economy? How do we provide Ukraine with the military support it needs to win in a year?”

With our resources, it is quite possible. We only need one thing — the most important and the most difficult to obtain — political will. Because most political leaders are cowards.

Look at what happened a few days ago, when the Russians sank two ships off Bulgaria. We are again debating what to do. Although, this is an act of war. The least we need to do is impose sanctions on the rest of the Russian shadow fleet, create a NATO maritime task force to protect shipping, including Ukrainian shipping, and use frozen Russian assets to pay for repairs and compensation for the sunken ships and the lost sailors.

That is the least we need to do. Such a step would give the Kremlin something to think about. But our politicians do not understand the Russians. We have many politicians, but very few statesmen and women who dare to make difficult decisions to protect themselves from these criminals.

Pekka Toveri during his visit to Kyiv in May 2025.

Pekka Toveri / Facebook