How did Ukraine prepare for war with Russia? How did politicians interfere with the army plans? Why did the military not retreat from Bakhmut? — tells Valery Zaluzhnyiʼs adviser in the book “The Iron General”

1

The military predicted a war with Russia back in 2006. They developed the Ukrainian Armed Forces Development Program — seven scenarios for the development of events in the security environment around Ukraine. The first three related to the liquidation of the consequences of disasters, piracy and peacekeeping operations, and were inherent in peacetime.

"The fourth is actually what happened in Crimea. The fifth is what happened in Donbas. The sixth is what happened in Donbas after the invasion of Russian troops. And the seventh is a full-scale war with Russia. And all this was written down in the documents already then," recalls Viktor Nazarov, Zaluzhnyiʼs adviser.

During the rule of Viktor Yanukovych, the program developers were considered crazy. Starting from 2010, no attempt to legalize, update the plan or involve Yanukovych himself was successful. He never arrived at the General Headquarters and did not familiarize himself with the documents. The last version of the idea, which was sent at the end of 2013, came back as unaccomplished.

2

Zaluzhnyi said to prepare for war in the fall of 2021. The Armed Forces of Ukraine began training "Joint Efforts — 2021" in September. At the same time, the Commander-in-Chief stopped the rotation of troops in the Donbas area, so that "it would not happen that for a monent there would be no one there at all."

At the same time, the military leadership studied the possible actions of the enemy. Zaluzhnyi ordered to constantly move anti-aircraft defense and aviation — thanks to this, she later survived. He also allowed lethal fire in the Donbas area.

"It is necessary to inflict maximum losses on them and discourage their desire to conduct an offensive," he explained. “You have to show your teeth. Because the enemy did not observe any truce, he cannot be trusted."

On October 15, 2021, the National Security and Defence Council approved the defense plan of Ukraine. The General Staff worked on it for almost two years. The plan described in detail various danger scenarios and how to respond to them, for example, to repulse armed aggression by Russia.

The "Zametil-2022" command and staff training began on February 9, 2022. Their public goal is to build up the capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but in reality the General Staff deployed troops in the directions with the greatest threat of attack, prepared for the defense of Kyiv and other cities, and created a system of fortifications.

In February, the troops constantly moved command posts and aviation. 35,000 troops were in the Donbas area, and 75,000 moved inconspicuously at night, occupying defensive positions. However, the troops could not physically close the front, which reached 2,500 kilometers.

3

Towards the end of the summer of 2022, higher authorities intervened in the planning and conduct of military operations. For politicians, the military element is only one of the arsenal of means used to achieve geostrategic goals. The political leadership needed quick victories at the front to talk to partners about military and financial aid and to maintain support at home.

The General Staff looked at the situation from a military point of view — where, when and how to attack or defend was determined by our capabilities and the possible actions of the enemy. General Zaluzhnyi repeatedly repeated: "It is necessary to advance not where it is possible, but where it is necessary."

The large-scale plan for the phased de-occupation of all of Ukraine, which Ukraine presented at a joint meeting of the general staffs of Ukraine, Britain, and the United States in July 2022, had to be adjusted, taking into account the partnersʼ ability to help with artillery systems and combat armored vehicles.

In September 2022, the military "in the field" said that the Soledar-Bakhmut defense line should be abandoned. And the army needs to occupy the dominant heights deep in the Donetsk region. The General Staff was also inclined to this approach. But in the end, another strategy was approved — to keep Bakhmut. As a result, a group of several thousand enemy troops accumulated there. At the cost of overwhelming forces, our military restrained and destroyed this influx.

Under standard conditions, the city would have had operational importance, but it became of strategic one. After Zelenskyiʼs visit in December 2022, and the story with the flag that the president presented to US President Joe Biden, and the information efforts of the state, Bakhmut became a symbol — a "fortress".

The military believes that the de-occupation of Kherson is just a partial success. The victory was of strategic importance. We returned the regional center — the only one that the Russians were able to capture. But we failed to completely destroy the 25,000-strong group of enemy troops, which was located on the right bank of the Dnipro River. Artillery shells and time for the operation were of shortage.

4

Zaluzhnyi did not hold standard meetings — he communicated directly in order to quickly make decisions. Every commander and even a brigade commander could call or write to him. What Zaluzhnyi hated most in the army was when subordinates tried to shift part of the responsibility to the leader.

"I hate it. And I didnʼt want to do that with the president. I am the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Iʼm running an operation. I just update him on the progress. I honestly told what was happening, what we would do next, but I didnʼt want to shift the responsibility to him," says Zaluzhnyi.

Zaluzhnyi did not appear with the media in order to avoid tension in relations with the president. He could not talk about strategic things, preparations for war, our defensive and offensive operations, the provision of the army, without touching on the political component. After all, any military actions are preceded by political decisions. And the correct political decisions were not made until February 2022. And this is one of the reasons why the Russians were able to capture part of the territories.

Later, when the military saved Kyiv and stabilized the front line, politicians felt like commanders and began to interfere in the planning of operations, demanding quick victories. To say this publicly means to sign a decree of dismissal with your own hand. Lying is not an option for Zaluzhnyi. There is only one way out — to remain silent.

Another reason is jealousy of his popularity on the part of the presidentʼs entourage. Constant measurement of ratings, media monitoring — political leadership tries to keep its finger on the pulse and prevent the appearance of competitors. In order to avoid further claims about "excessive" informational presence and tension in relations with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Zaluzhnyi chose to write "no" to every journalistʼs request for an interview.

Political issues made work difficult — it was necessary to maintain a balance and not overshadow the political leadership, repel some of the Office of the President communication tasks, or perform them with minimal reputational losses.

Shortly after the appointment of Valery Zaluzhnyi [on July 27, 2021], a scandal arose. The then speaker of the Verkhovna Rada [Dmytro Razumkov] was not allowed to come to the area of hostilities. We immediately explained that the replacement of the army commanders is in progress, therefore politicians and officials are prohibited from being here for a certain period of time. This is necessary in order not to distract the military leadership from rotation.

In the evening, a draft of another statement was received from the Presidentʼs Office. It was demanded to be made public on behalf of Zaluzhnyi. The text was politicized, emotional and insulting to the speaker. I did not advise to publish it. In response, the OP official shouted that she would report this to the president. But I understood that the statement would take Zaluhnyi out of his professional sphere and transfer him to the rank of political players and OP puppets. And this would be disastrous both for the commander-in-chief and for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.