Bohdan “Tavr” Krotevych gave an interview to the “Bombardyr” channel. He criticizes the commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi and reveals unknown details of the 2023 counteroffensive

Lieutenant Colonel Bohdan Krotevych has been resigning from his position as Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade of the “Azov” National Guard for two weeks. He does not say what he will do next, but says that "it is definitely not politics". In a new interview with Roman Bebekh, he talks about the defense of Mariupol, captivity, disputes with the General Staff and the Presidentʼs Office. The main thesis of his story is that Ukrainians will join the army again when trust in its leadership returns — and for this the leadership needs to be changed. Babel retells two of the most interesting episodes from the interview: in the first one, Bohdan Krotevych tells unknown details of the 2023 counteroffensive, and in the second one, he lists the reasons why, in his opinion, the Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi needs to be changed.

Bohdan Krotevych talks about the role of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Brigade and its commander Dmytro Ryumshin during the unsuccessful counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The counteroffensive began in early June 2023. In total, 12 brigades, grouped into corps, participated in it (according to RUSI). The main direction was the Orikhiv — Tokmak — Melitopol arc. Among other brigades, the 33rd Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 47th Motorized Rifle Brigade "Magura" were to advance on it. The “Azov” Brigade was on the defensive in this direction, and in order to reach the line of combat contact, the 33rd Motorized Rifle Brigade had to pass through its ranks.

The agreement did not take place because the command of the 33rd brigade did not arrive at the “Azov” headquarters, and when Bohdan Krotevych tried to get to the corps headquarters meeting, he was not allowed in. In the first days of the counteroffensive, the 33rd brigade, instead of passing through the “Azov” lines, opened fire on them with tanks, artillery, and mortars. When it did pass through their lines, it was unable to overcome the line of combat contact and abandoned Western equipment in the “gray zone”: Leopard tanks and YPR armored personnel carriers. The General Staff forbade “Azov” to take it away, and within a week the equipment was destroyed by Russian artillery.

According to Bohdan Krotevych, Colonel Dmytro Ryumshin commanded the 33rd Brigade during the counteroffensive. After the counteroffensive failed, Dmytro Ryumshin was appointed to command first the 47th Brigade, and then the 155th Brigade. He is now under arrest and under investigation. He is accused of not reacting to AWOLs of his fighters during training in France.

Bohdan Krotevych lists several reasons why, in his opinion, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi should be replaced.

The main one is that “this person thinks not about victory and personnel, but about praising the president [Volodymyr Zelensky]”. He is convenient for the country’s leadership, and always says “yes”.

As far as Colonel Krotevych’s words can be understood, Syrskyi tends to surround himself with people who do not argue with him. He conflicts with commanders who show independence, such as Vadym Sukharevsky, commander of the UAV Forces, and creates impossible conditions for them to work. There is a risk that this will also happen to the commander of the “Khortytsia” Operational-Strategic Group, Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi.

Finally, he removes and shuffles the brigade command, which discusses and questions his orders. For example, according to Colonel Krotevych, on the eve of the offensive in Kursk, he removed Colonel Emil Ishkulov, the brigade commander of the 80th Airmobile Battalion, from his post — he considered the operation plan too risky.