”We have serious problems, but the front has not collapsed.” We retell Viktor Muzhenkoʼs extensive interview for Radio Liberty: about Zaluzhnyyʼs mistakes, the situation on the front, mobilization and ceasefire

Former Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko returned to his old workplace on the first day of the full-scale war and helped Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny repel the Russian attack for several months. But in April 2022, Zaluzhny asked Muzhenko to leave, citing the instructions of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Currently, Viktor Muzhenko works as a chief specialist at the Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, preparing forecasts and some proposals for documents for the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. And on December 28, his big interview with Radio Liberty was released. He talks about the situation at the front, the mistakes of the command, and how to correct the situation. Babel retells the most interesting moments of this interview.

About Valeriy Zaluzhnyʼs mistakes. [The first two years of the full-scale war] were lost chances for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. There could have been more effective solutions: in March-April 2022, when Russia was withdrawing troops from Kyiv, [we] lost the opportunity to defeat the Russian group on the right bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson region. [We] only came to this six months later, in the fall of 2022.

During the Kharkiv operation in the fall of 2022, after a successful offensive operation, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were unable to reformat it into a defensive one in a timely manner. [If there was a success —] then the Armed Forces of Ukraine would have retained the initiative, but this did not happen.

The much-advertised counter-offensive of 2023 [in Zaporizhzhia, which failed] was not supposed to happen at all. At that time, it was necessary to form reserves. Instead, during the counter-offensive, the Russians defeated our groups, and then went on the offensive. As a result, we lost Avdiivka and Ocheretyne, which was in the second defensive zone. We are seeing the consequences of those mistakes now.

About the current situation on the front. We have serious problems, but the front hasnʼt collapsed. In the Donetsk direction over the past year [the Russians have advanced] 45 km. Although in the last two months they have begun to advance faster.

The Russians do not plan to take Pokrovsk. They will try to bypass and block it, then reach the border of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions and even enter Dnipropetrovsk region. If they cut off communication with Pokrovsk, it will mean that we have left Donbas to them.

Kurakhove is one of the biggest problems. There is the issue of Kupyansk, where the Russians are also making progress and will advance to surround and defeat our groups on the left bank of the Oskil River. If the Russians succeed, they will flank the Ukrainian group in Lyman.

In the Siversk area, they have been trying to cut off the [Ukraine-controlled] salient for several weeks. Their goal is to reach the Lyman area, create a threat to this group, and possibly push our troops back behind the Siversky Donets in the Lyman area. [This will give them] starting positions to surround the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Konstyantynivka agglomeration from the north. That is, [they want to surround the agglomeration from] two directions. This is what they tried to do in 2022, but it didnʼt work.

The Kursk operation was successful. Politically, it worked. In addition, the Russians did withdraw their troops from calmer areas and transferred them to the Kursk region. But the Russians did not withdraw their troops from the main areas, including Pokrovsk. The question arises about its format. Perhaps we could have achieved a greater result by conducting raid operations. In general, it is difficult to assess the operation yet, because it has not yet been completed and we do not know its purpose.

How to fix the situation at the front. It is necessary to change the management structure: abandon temporary structures such as the OTUV, OSUV. These are not regular groups, the officer corps there is [constantly] changing. Since the beginning of [the full-scale war], the generals there have changed three times, and this disorganizes the system. It is necessary to switch to a division-corps system, introduce regular management bodies. [Then] the commander understands in which zone he is performing tasks, and is responsible for it.

Frequent changes in commanders of units and military units do not improve the combat capability of the unit. Stability of personnel is one of the signs of combat capability. [As is] the presence of appropriate combat experience among commanders. From 2019 to 2024 inclusive, about 140 generals were dismissed, of which 41 generals resigned due to health reasons from 2022 to 2024 — during a full-scale invasion. Among them are many worthy people.

On general mobilization and mobilization age. General mobilization is needed. And itʼs impossible to set a clear deadline for when the military could demobilize. Ukraine is conscripting half as many people as are needed to replenish losses and form reserves. It is quite possible to lower the mobilization age. [Conscripting from] 18 or 20 years old is another question.

On possible foreign peacekeepers and a possible ceasefire. Foreign peacekeepers cannot guarantee our security. There are technical questions: how many of them are needed? How many of them need to be trained? And there is the main question: how will they act if the ceasefire [does not work and Russia violates it]? [On our own] we can only go to a ceasefire when Russia feels threatened. For this, we need to mobilize more people, and for this we need partners to provide us with as many weapons as we need.

Translated from Ukrainian by Anton Semyzhenko.