Why did the Ukrainian counteroffensive fail? RUSI experts answer: lack of equipment and people, overoptimism and naffy mission planning — key points from fundamental report

The counteroffensive, which Ukraine carried out in the summer of 2023, was discussed for a long time even before it began. The media and even Ukrainian officials made loud announcements about the offensive. The direction of the strike was known in advance — in the south, to cut off the land corridor to Crimea. However, the offensive, which began in June, did not live up to expectations. Britainʼs Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) analyzed why the long-expected counteroffensive essentially failed. Babel has read the research and retells the most important points about the prerequisites, course and reasons for the failure of the 2023 counteroffensive.

The story starts from afar. In the summer of 2022, Ukraine stopped the Russian offensive, but also exhausted its ammunition reserves. Also, the Armed Forces of Ukraine suffered serious losses and did not have enough reserves for the offensive. Thus, Ukraine became dependent on international aid. Kyiv believed that Ukraine would not receive much help if it did not show its partners the way to end the war. Therefore, the Armed Forces of Ukrainr had to develop such an offensive plan that could be "sold" to Ukraineʼs international partners in order to obtain resources.

The General Staff chose the direction for the strike in the summer of 2022. The most effective seemed to be an offensive from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol, in order to cut off the Russian land corridor with Crimea, as well as to cut off the Russians on the right bank of the Kherson region. This plan was risky — the Ukrainian fighters might found themselves lodged by the Russians from both sides.

Therefore, first Ukraine had to liberate Kherson in order to remove the risk of a counterattack. The offensive on Kherson began on August 29 and ended on November 11, 2022. This was heavy fight. Ukraine had to declare and show the "victory" to its Western partners — this meant that the Russians knew about the purpose of the operation.

Russia transferred reserves for the defense of Kherson. This gave Ukraine the opportunity to press at another point of the front. They decided to attack in the Kharkiv region, and the key point of the offensive was Izyum. In this area, there were not enough Russian troops for defense. That is why the Russian defense quickly quickly had been deteriorated.

However, after two successful offensives, the Armed Forces of Ukraine faced several problems. The main one is big losses. In 2022, the Ukrainian army had 30 000 killed and missing, as well as many wounded. They also lost a lot of equipment. Athough people could be mobilized, they could not advance without tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC).

In addition, at the beginning of 2023, part of the troops continued to defend Bakhmut. Then there were discussions about whether it made sense. The General Staff believed that if they withdrew from the city, Russia would go to Chasiv Yar and threaten Kramatorsk. During the defense of the city, the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost 10 000 killed and wounded. Russian losses were four times greater. However, Ukraine was losing experienced fighters, and Russia was losing mostly naffy trained and former prisoners from the PMC “Wagner”.

The draft of the new counteroffensive was ready by September 2022, and its scope was determined by February 2023. The unexpected success in the Kharkiv region convinced the partners: if you give resources to the offensive, it will be possible to achieve its political goals.

Ukraine planned to break through the Russian defenses on a 30-kilometer section, surround Tokmak in a week, go on Melitopol and cut off the land corridor between Russia and Crimea. It was assumed that the high momentum of the offensive would not allow Russia to quickly redeploy troops for defense, so only six Russian regiments would oppose the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The plan turned out to be overoptimistic. The command hoped to "kill" the Russians morale, cause a "local collapse" of the defense and break through deep, as was the case with the Kharkiv offensive. Instead, Ukraine did not plan good enough how exactly to do this.

In general, Ukraine made the same mistake in the counteroffensive as the Russians at the beginning of a full-scale invasion: the command hoped that a demoralized enemy caught unaware would become easy prey.

The coordination of which equipment Ukraine will receive took too long — almost three months. This worthed much to Ukraine. Ukraine heard the first promises in January 2023. Instead, it began to receive weapons for the offensive only in March 2023. At the beginning of the counteroffensive, Ukraine had only part of the promised aid.

Compared to Russia, Ukraine received little equipment, although it was a significant part of the Westʼs reserves. This was not enough for such an ambitious offensive planned by Ukraine and its partners. The West was not aware of the real scale of the hostilities. Ukraine did not modify the plans according to the availability of equipment. Together, this created a large gap between expectations and the outcome of the operation.

The offensive on the Orikhiv-Tokmak line began on June 3. The Russians knew exactly where and when it would begin. This was influenced by the "announcements" of the offensive from Ukraine, and the interception and leaks of secret information in the USA. Thatʼs why the Russians concentrated their defense precisely on the Orikhiv-Tokmak area. They built three lines of defense there, 30 km deep into the rear.

The very fact that Ukraine had to "sell" a counteroffensive plan to the West already contradicted the requirements of operational security. Part of the security failure was due to the fact that many countries participated in the organization of the offensive. In addition, Ukraine had only a few brigades that were well equipped for the offensive. The Russians were watching them to detect Ukraineʼs intentions. Therefore, as soon as the troops started to move, the Russians detected them and hit them with long-range weapons — this slowed down the momentum of the offensive.

Ukraine critically lacked equipment for demining in the offensive — both special equipment and mine plows. The paths that were cleared were not wide enough for a breakthrough. When the Russians disabled the cars that were driving first, it stopped the entire column. So many armored vehicles became an easy target for Russian artillery. In addition, inexperienced Ukrainian crews often deviated from cleared paths and blew themselves up on mines.

Ukraineʼs strikes with long-range weapons were not effective enough in the offensive. The Armed Forces of Ukraine destroyed several headquarters and hit the bridges on the Crimean Peninsula with precision. However, these strikes did not cause critical damage to logistics. In addition, they were not synchronized with ground operations and had little effect on the offensive.

Also, the effectiveness of Western weapons was influenced by Russian electronic warfares and anti-aircraft defence systems, which learned to counter them. If at the beginning of the war, high-precision Excalibur projectiles hit 70% of the time, then by August 2023 they hit only 6% of the time. The upgraded electronic warfares were also effective against GMLRS missiles of the Himars and M270 systems.

Initially, the Russians acted disorganized and lost servicemen and equipment to artillery fire. However, at the end of June, they began to counterattack. In the first two weeks of the counteroffensive, Russian troops withdrew from advanced positions, but then immediately attacked. Their long-range artillery hit positions that had just been captured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At night, these positions were attacked by armoured infantry.

At the beginning of the offensive, the morale of some Russian units was low — they were afraid that they will encounter heavy NATO equipment. But when Ukrainian mechanized units began to lose equipment, the Russiansʼ confidence began to recover. Instead, losses in personnel and equipment during the first assaults negatively affected the newly formed Ukrainian units morale.

Ukrainian units lacked equipment and personnel — each battalion could form at most two full-fledged assault platoons. Therefore, the troops did not keep up the momentum. It turned out that without assaultmen, the entire brigade is unable to operate to the utmost. The commanders had to protect the assault units and act carefully. As a result, they acted slowly.

This gave the Russians time to come round. The occupiers transferred many forces to the offensive line and made their ratio unfavorable for Ukraine. Why didnʼt Ukraine use more personnel in the offensive? There was no equipment for them or they were not prepared enough for the offensive. The Armed Forces of Ukraine did not have enough time to train and cope with Western technology.

Ukraineʼs capabilities were also affected by the fact that it had long postponed the strengthening of mobilization. In addition, part of the troops had to defend the border and repel missile and drone attacks. For example, about 50 000 soldiers had to be assigned to mobile firepower groups that destroy drones.

Mainly, the first wave of the counteroffensive consisted of newly formed units and recruits. Itʼs because in the winter and spring, Russia launched a new great offensive to the east, and experienced units had to restrain it. Although experienced fighters were not the propelling force of the offensive, they also took part in it. In particular, they made diversionary maneuvers, consolidated successes, and when the offensive stalled, they joined the assault troops.

Ukrainian units achieved not so many tactical results in July. This was facilitated by the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine narrowed the offensive zone: from a 30-km front area to a 10-km front area. However, the momenta of progress continued to be very slow. The Russians had time to rebuild their defense, make rotations, and restore losses.

When it became clear that the offensive might — at its best — reach Tokmak, the leadership decided to transfer the troops to Bakhmut. This was done so that the offensive would "demonstrate progress". However, due to the lack of equipment, these attacks also did not have enough momentum. This only exacerbated the shortage of troops involved in the offensive in the south.

In mid-September, the command admitted that there would be no breakthrough even to Tokmak. Then the Armed Forces of Ukraine tried to force the Dnipro River in the Krynky area on the left bank of the Kherson region and hit the Russians in the flank. When the marines landed in Krynky, they had three days to transfer significant forces there. But this did not happen, because Ukraine could not be able to provide them. And the more troops there were on the left bank of the Dnipro River, the more difficult the logistics would be.

As a result, the initial plan of Ukraine and the West failed. The operation did not achieve any of its objectives. The reason is both Ukraineʼs mistakes and the Westʼs miscalculations. As early as May 2022, Russia began the transition to a military economy, and in the fall — began mobilization. Due to this, it increased the contingent in Ukraine to 420 000. In line with it, the Ukrainian counteroffensive began under different conditions than when the military was developing its plan.

It is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to conduct a new offensive in the “foreseeable future." To a large extent, it depends on the military industry of Europe, which scales up production too slowly. The new offensive cannot be related to politically established deadlines. For now, Ukraineʼs optimal strategy is to inflict maximum damage on Russia, build fortifications and defend itself, but not to liberate territories.

So that Ukraine can liberate its cities, support the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For Ukraine to preserve freedom of speech and to analyze mistakes — support independent journalism: 🔸 Buy Me a Coffee , 🔸 Patreon , 🔸 PayPal: paypal@babel.ua