Lying as the core of Russian military doctrine and challenges in Ukraineʼs rebuilding. The worldʼs leading media about the war on November 9

The New York Times writes about deception as a weapon in the Russian-Ukrainian war. During the months of full-scale war, both Russia and Ukraine repeatedly tried to deceive the enemy in order to gain the upper hand. Only recently, a video of an empty checkpoint in Kherson appeared on social networks ― after the news about the disappearance of the tricolor from the administration building and the words of the Russian general that the troops may have to be withdrawn from the city (this NYT article was published before the news about the official decision of the occupiers to leave the right bank of the Kherson region appeared). In Kherson, it came to the point that the Russians took away the bones of Prince Alexander Potemkin, who is considered a significant figure of the Russian Empire. In the ukrainian Armed Forces, these actions were interpreted as a provocation for a premature offensive on the part of Ukraine, the article says. Although Ukrainians also resort to tricks. Norwegian expert Tor Bukkvoll believes that Russia has placed lies at the center of its military doctrine. Almost every Russian invasion over the past 50 years has begun with the appearance of military personnel in civilian clothes, or at least without insignia. That is why the ability to interpret the Kremlinʼs official messages has become part of the "art of war" for Ukraine and its allies, the media writes. The combat commanders of the Ukrainian Armed Forces say that they pay more attention to the assessment of the number and composition of Russian troops than to Moscowʼs public statements. As for the situation in Kherson, at the time of publication of the article, the situation there was tense, and one of the local residents told the newspaper that the streets were full of Russian soldiers, and they were looting shops and apartments, taking away household appliances.

Frank Ledwidge, a former military man, writes about the prospects for the development of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the winter in a column for The Guardian. In addition to the fact that many roads in Ukraine become impassable due to mud in winter, other climatic factors also affect the possibility of conducting hostilities. Bare trees make it difficult to camouflage from drones, and thick clouds create obstacles for aerial reconnaissance. Together, these factors will mean a significant slowdown of the offensive, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which relied on speed and the element of surprise, will significantly lose pace, the author believes. At the same time, Russia seems to have improved its hitherto "chaotic organization" after the appointment of Sergey Surovikin. The new tactic of attacks on civilian infrastructure is consistent and aims to reduce the Ukrainiansʼ will to fight. Though in the case of Ukraine, this tactic can lead to the opposite result. In the Kherson region, Ledwidge predicted the Russiansʼ withdrawal to the left bank of the Dnipro River, which would turn the river into a defensive resource for the Russian Federation. The Russians will probably stop advancing, and the front line will stabilize, the expert believes ― because Russia doesnʼt have a human or material advantage. So the Russians will dig in and try to hold positions that Ukraine will hit with artillery and missile systems provided by the West.

The Economist writes about the challenges facing Ukraine on the way to reconstruction and recovery. The damage caused by Russia is enormous: about 20% of the population has left the country, and the GDP according to the results of 2022 will decrease by 30%. Unlike the "Marshall Plan", which helped rebuild Europe after World War II, current projects to help Ukraine are starting to be implemented now, while Russia continues to shell Ukrainian infrastructure. At this stage, despite cases of fraud, itʼs quite easy to track the movement of money. However, in the long term, the international community is concerned about the risks of embezzlement, because Ukraine has had a high level of corruption for many years. The media mentions the lessons of the "Marshall Plan", which was not equally effective in all countries: thus, according to historians, a large part of the funds allocated for France and Great Britain was considered "captured". This term means that resources came under the control of officials who put their own interests above the interests of society. During the Berlin Conference in October, Ukraine presented a project to help the countryʼs reconstruction, which consists of three stages. Experts assess the third, final stage as the most risky from the point of view of corruption. This phase should begin several years after the end of hostilities and will be aimed at facilitating transformations that will help Ukraine join the EU. Ukrainian experts believe that corruption risks can be reduced if, at this stage, the state involves more businesses and public organizations in the planning of economic recovery. Therefore, although the restoration project seems promising, the international community and Ukrainian society should take into account the risks and dangers that these efforts will accompany.

Ukraine should not agree to negotiations with Putin, and the West should not pressure Zelensky with this request, writes The Washington Post in an editorial column. After the blitzkrieg of the Russian dictator failed, he switched to the tactics of competition for stability. By shelling Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, activating Internet bots and paid commentators, digging deeper into lands he already captured, the Russians hope that Ukraine will "break" before the crisis in Russia threatens its ability to fight or even exist in its current form. In response, Zelensky is trying to inspire the Ukrainian people and allies to a relentless, long-lasting struggle. Of course, the WPʼs editorial team admits that by asking Washington to show readiness for negotiations, it seeks to convince the tired Western voters that Ukraine seeks peace and itʼs needed to continue supporting it. However, in reality, negotiations now will be a sign of weakness. It is obvious that the Ukrainian presidentʼs team understands that sooner or later negotiations must take place. But it is unwise to start them before the Ukrainian Armed Forces have exhausted all their possibilities for the physical return of lands captured by Russia. And that is why the best thing that the Biden administration can do now, The Washington Post assures, is to reserve a decent amount of support for Ukraine in the budget for next year.