British soldiers have spoken out about their role in the Great War, apparently to avoid being overshadowed by American generals. Their version of events is set out in The Times

The week before last, the NYT newspaper told how the American military organized a secret back office for the great war, passed on intelligence data to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and helped plan offensive operations — the most important of which was the counteroffensive in the summer of 2023. Now the British military is talking about its role in the war: it was mainly about reconciling Ukraine and the United States. Babel retells the material from the British newspaper The Times about the role Great Britain played in planning the Ukrainian counteroffensive — and does not give up hope that one day the story (not to be confused with propaganda) of this decisive battle will be able to be told by the highest Ukrainian command.

In the early summer of 2023, when Ukraine launched its long-awaited counteroffensive in the south, one of the key areas of the strike was named after a non-Ukrainian figure — a British one.

The name of the direction “Wallace” referred to the then British Defense Minister Ben Wallace. Behind closed doors, he was called “the man who saved Kyiv”. In addition, Ukrainians considered the British to be the brains of the anti-Putin coalition, which included the United States, Britain, and dozens of other countries. The Americans provided Ukraine with weapons and key intelligence. The role of the British military was different — to maintain the difficult relationship between Washington and Kyiv.

In December 2022, the head of the British army, Admiral Tony Radakin, called his American counterpart Mark Milley. They discussed Ukraine’s plan for 2023 — to launch a counteroffensive against Russia to regain lost territory. Both the Americans and the British doubted that Ukraine was ready for this. But the British were confident that Ukraine would go on the offensive anyway, and reasoned: “If they attack, we need to help as much as possible.” In that conversation, Milley told Radakin that the Americans would support the Ukrainian plans.

The following month, at another meeting in the Ramstein format, the US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reported that the coalition would begin sending heavy weapons to Ukraine — armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks. The British were the first to transfer long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine. Great Britain secretly sent its specialists to Ukraine to install these missiles on Ukrainian aircraft and teach them how to use them. This was not the first time — dozens of British military personnel had already traveled to Ukraine and taught Ukrainians how to use NLAW anti-tank missile systems.

A few weeks before the counter-offensive, the head of the UK’s Strategic Command (and former head of army intelligence), General James Hockengall, met with the head of GUR Kyrylo Budanov. They had known each other since 2019. In mid-2021, Hockengall was one of the few people in the British Ministry of Defence who believed in a full-scale invasion. Now they were discussing how to work together during the counter-offensive – Hockengall had extremely important sources of information at his disposal.

And while Radakinʼs aides — generals Raleigh Walker and Charlie Stickland — helped plan the operations, Hockenhal passed on intelligence to Budanov. But there was a problem. According to the plan, Ukraine was supposed to receive all the equipment from its partners by the end of March. Then the deadline was pushed back to the end of April. Then to the end of May. The West insisted that the Ukrainian Armed Forces attack while Russia was still not sufficiently entrenched. At that moment, Ukraine already had as much weaponry as the entire British army.

When Ukraine finally went on the offensive in early June, another problem arose.

Radakin and his American colleagues insisted that Ukraine should follow a strategy of “exhaust, stretch, and strike”. The “exhaust” element meant attacks on logistical hubs to limit Russian supplies to the front. Stretch meant demonstrative attacks and maneuvers on several fronts, one of which was called “Wallace”.

For the “strike” in the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were to choose one main direction. They needed to concentrate their troops and firepower in one spot and hope for a breakthrough, so advised the British and American military. But President Volodymyr Zelensky had other plans. The commander of the Land Forces, General Oleksandr Syrsky, convinced him to try a different strategy: inflict damage in the north, while also pressing as hard as possible in the southeast. Instead of breaking through in the south and cutting the land corridor between Russia and occupied Crimea, the Ukrainians dispersed their combat power.

In addition, Ukrainian troops were moving more slowly than the United States had demanded. The Ukrainian command said that the Americans and British had underestimated Russian fortifications and the realities of modern combat. The routes of attack were mined. Ukrainian sappers were exposed to an additional threat — drones. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhny was desperately trying to cope with the crisis. He explained that Ukrainian soldiers on the front line were moving forward in three stages. On the first day, they were adapting. On the second, they were advancing 200–300 meters. On the third day, they were consolidating, preparing to hand over positions to fresh forces. The Americans urged the Ukrainians to “move faster”.

At this point, relations between the Ukrainians and the Americans had reached rock bottom.

Mark Milley and General Christopher Cavoli were very disappointed with Zaluzhnyi. Zaluzhnyi, in turn, was disappointed with the pressure from the United States. Therefore, Radakin interrupted his vacation and decided to go to Ukraine in person to reconcile the Americans and the Ukrainians. Radakin was supposed to listen to Zaluzhnyi and explain his vision to the Americans during a video call from Kyiv. While Radakin was traveling to Ukraine, his assistant, Raleigh Walker, was also calling his American and Ukrainian colleagues. He was responsible for military strategy and operations. The Ukrainians called him the “brain center” of the British military machine.

In mid-August 2023, British diplomacy yielded results. Radakin, Zaluzhnyi, and Christopher Cavoli met in person on the Polish-Ukrainian border. They spent five hours discussing the counteroffensive, as well as plans for the winter and next year. This was a sign that the Americans were not planning to abandon Ukraine anytime soon. Subsequently, Britain and the United States relaxed restrictions on the use of long-range weapons. And the center that coordinated the supply of Western weapons was moved from the city of Stuttgart to the American military garrison in Wiesbaden.

Since then, the British military has continued to delve into the war in Ukraine and learn its lessons. They say that Ukraine “paid a terrible price for its defense, but also opened a window into modern warfare”.

Walker, who has been promoted to Chief of the General Staff, has learned the lessons of the war in Ukraine and wants to transform the British army into a more lethal and flexible force. He says the British have three years to prepare for war.

Tony Radakin, who will soon leave his post as commander of the British army, has met Zelensky personally about a dozen times. The Ukrainian president warmly calls him "admiral" and notes that he is not a typical general, unlike most foreign military leaders he has met. Their last meeting took place on April 4 — when Radakin, together with his French colleagues, presented in Kyiv their plan for the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine if a ceasefire with Russia is achieved.